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Gumplowicz’s “Outlines of Sociology” is distinguished froth all earlier
sociological works by the character of the sociological unit upon which
it is based, which is the group. The author limits himself to the study of
the behavior of social units, and especially to the study of the action of
groups on each other alla the action of the group on the individual. To
compare Gumplowicz’s theory with the theory of Giddings, and to use a
metaphor for brevity, the former begins a Whole stage later in the evo-
lution of life; it does not account for but assumes group life.
Starting with cohesively aggregated life, Gumplowicz makes im-
portant use of the principles already accepted concerning the influence
of environment, and especially of the economic wants and the tendency
of desires to grow with the opportunity to satisfy them. To these he
adds, as something new, the postulates that the normal relation of unlike
groups is conflict and that progress comes through the conflict of groups.
Hence the important sociological phenomena are those relating to the
conflict of unlike groups and to their amalgamation and assimilation.
Sociology is considered the fundamental social science, for it deals
with the same subject-matter that all social sciences deal with, and treats
of laws and modes of behavior in group life that are common to all the
special social sciences alike. If what is general and common to all is set
apart as the sphere of a particular science, then what is peculiar to each
differentiated class of phenomena may be properly left to a special sci-
ence working on the principles of the general science as a basis.
Further, the special social sciences, which have developed in ad-
vance of the general science, must submit to a revolution in point of
view, to a revision of method and a restatement of accepted laws in
harmony with the new ideas in sociology; while for the future, whetherThe Outlines of Sociology/7
new social laws are first detected in general sociology or in one of the
special sciences, it must be remembered that the phenomena which the
latter study are social also, and that the special laws of their behavior
are inherently social and must stand the test of sociological criticism.
Gumplowicz’s sociology is not properly descriptive. Description
falls to anthropology, ethnology, politics, history, comparative philol-
ogy, the comparative study of law, religion, institutions, etc. It is con-
sidered the peculiar task of sociology to abstract the laws of the behav-
ior of social phenomena.
The volitional element plays no part, or a negative one, in
Gumplowicz’s theory. Man, misled by the idea of human free will and
by an anthropomorphic conception of deity, has overestimated his own
influence and importance. He is most successful in art and invention,
for here he strives to copy nature. In other spheres he is not infrequently
found striving to preserve what nature has ordained to decay. But first
striving to learn what the laws of nature are, he should next learn to
adapt himself to them as best he can and to bear with resignation what
cannot be avoided. Nature is unchangeable and so are her laws. The
history of mankind is the history of a species as such. The fate which
befalls the individual in society is not the fate which he merits always,
but it is necessarily that which his group makes inevitable. Historic
justice is not individual, but social.
Frederick W. Moore.Argument
Part I
Part I contains a survey of past progress in social science, intended to
prepare the reader for the new departure in sociological thought which
the author proposes to make.
He reviews the work of Comte, Spencer, Bastian, Lippert and oth-
ers, and the relations of economics, politics, the comparative study of
law, the philosophy of history and the history of civilization to the sci-
ence of society.
Incidentally four important propositions are laid down:
First.—Social phenomena are subject to the general law of causa-
tion as much as other classes of phenomena which have been success-
fully treated by the scientific method. This has been asserted or tacitly
assumed by all the earlier writers; it is axiomatic.
Second.—Human acts, whether individual or social, are the prod-
uct of natural forces and they excite reflection. The function of the mind
or soul is secondary in point of time. In this the author differs from some
of his predecessors.
Third. —Differing radically from other writers, the author denies
that society is simply an organism analogous to but as high above man
as man is above other organisms in nature. In his conception, society,
the social group, the sociological unit, is an organism or organization
entirely, (toto genere), different from any other. Considered as a whole
it is unlike any of its parts. Its nature cannot be inferred from their
nature, but more probably the nature of the individual will be influenced
by it. His system begins with social elements (swarms, hordes, groups,
etc.), and logically proceeds to the consideration of man, their product
both in mind and body; the social process and its products; and finallyThe Outlines of Sociology/9
the ethico-social products of the action of society upon the individual.
Fourth.—The author holds and defends the position that every po-
litical organization, and hence every developing civilization, begins at
the moment when one group permanently subjects another. Subjection
of some to others is the source of political organization and political
organization is the condition essential to social growth. This proposi-
tion and the preceding constitute the corner stone of the author’s theory.
Part II
Part II is introductory. Beginning with the classification of phenomena
and defending the unity of science, the author proceeds to a presentation
of the concepts especially connected with sociology.
Section I. The author takes up the triple classification of phenom-
ena into physical, mental and social, and justifies it and the correspond-
ing subdivision of the sciences by demonstrating that there are social
phenomena subject to laws of a special character.
Sec. 2. But if science is unitary and the universe of phenomena
monistic, there must be some laws at once specific enough to be valu-
able and general enough to apply to all three classes of phenomena alike.
He enumerates the laws of causality, of development, of regularity
of development, of periodicity, of complexity, of the reciprocal action of
unlike forces, of adaptation, of the essential likeness and identity of
forces and events, and of parallelism, showing that each clearly applies
to social phenomena, the only disputable point.
Sec. 3. Within each class the behavior of the phenomena is capable
of reduction to a number of laws which are more specific, which apply
to that one sphere (or even to a part of it alone) and are more fully
characteristic. It is the function of sociology to find the laws of social
phenomena. Social phenomena are defined as those arising out of the
relations of social groups to each other. Psycho-social are those again
which result from the influence of the group upon the individual.
[Psycho-social phenomena and psycho-social laws are thus quite
distinct from social phenomena and social laws, using the word social
in the narrower, more specific sense which the author gives to it here
and occasionally elsewhere. But he uses the word in a more general
sense also, including social in this narrower sense and psycho-social as
correlative subdivisions of it.2
[There would seem to be need also for a third subdivision including
phenomena growing out of the relation of the group to its physical envi-10/Ludwig Gumplowicz
ronment. Critics who will recognize the importance of the group as the
social unit and the weighty significance of the antagonism existing be-
tween groups will, nevertheless, show that such factors as food supply
affect the size and coherency of groups and the number in a given terri-
tory. In some places he seems incidentally to allow for them. But his
definition by unmistakable implication excludes them. Had he broad-
ened his conception of sociology so as to include this class of phenom-
ena, his dispute with Lippert would have fallen to nothing and his later
reference to the origin of groups by differentiation would have been
much more natural and easy.]
Phenomena that have been treated by one or another of the sciences
currently called social are nevertheless properly subject to reinvestiga-
tion by sociology, for they have been treated from the individualistic
standpoint, which is false. To review them from the new social stand-
point and to ascertain the social laws of their behavior will be of great
importance. It will be found that they all take their rise in a common
ground, which is the peculiar sphere of sociology.
Sec. 4. As there must be unlike forces wherever reciprocal action is
expected, the author assumes that there must have been a countless num-
ber of unlike original primitive groups. This hypothesis is then sup-
ported by arguments proving the polygenetic theory of man’s origin.
Sec. 5. However, if the polygenetic theory is true, it only proves the
existence of primitive groups anthropologically homogeneous. But as
birth and especially training in a group are the factors which make an
individual a member of a social group, these primitive anthropological
groups must also have been sociological groups; and though anthropo-
logical types have become endlessly mixed, each syngenetic group, be-
cause its members have had a common birth and training and have ac-
quired the same language, rights and religion, still continues to be a
sociological unit. Social laws, he adds, are the laws of the action and
development of syngenetic groups.
[Thus, narrow as he seems to make the conception of syngenetic
groups and important as such groups seem to be to his theory, he makes
allowance here incidentally and specifically later for the origin of fully
accredited social groups by differentiation within a given group.
[Primitive groups are unlike, heterogen, and so are syngenetic
groups, says our author. Now heterogen and homogen are antithetical
and should refer respectively to the mutual unlikeness or likeness of the
parts of a given whole. But this is not strictly the way the author usesThe Outlines of Sociology/11
them and his meaning would still be ambiguous if it were. There are
three sets of relations between unlike groups to be distinguished: those
between the differentiating parts of a whole that was beforetime strictly
homogeneous; those between the parts of a whole which is tending to-
ward homogeneity by assimilation and amalgamation of its parts; and
finally those between independent wholes which exhibit antagonism and
conflict whenever their spheres of influence overlap. These independent
wholes our author refers to as heterogen, unlike (improperly called het-
erogeneous). Sometimes, however, the adjective seems to refer to wholes
whose parts are in conflict with each other and is properly translated
heterogeneous. The translator has used his judgment as to the significa-
tion of the word in its context but has carefully inserted the German
word in parenthesis wherever it occurred.
[A study of the relations of the several classes to each other will
show a logical sequence from the conflict of independent wholes through
the subjection of one to the other even up to the complete homogeneity
of the new whole by assimilation or amalgamation. There is also a logi-
cal sequence from the condition of homogeneity to the condition of dif-
ferentiated parts with their proper relations. Now these two tendencies
are so antipodal in direction and character that it is unscientific and
ambiguous not to distinguish carefully between them. But the author, as
said, uses one and the same word heterogen, heterogeneous, to describe
the two conditions indicated in the first and second classes of relations
indicated above. He does not distinguish the former and therefore omits
from his theory of sociology all consideration of the character and be-
havior of homogeneous groups.]
He shows that the failure of earlier sociologists to obtain social
laws w as due to their failure to start with the proper sociological unit;
and incidentally he proclaims it as a typical social law that it is the
tendency of every social community to make as much use as possible of
every other social community that comes within its reach.
Part III
In Part III the author treats of social elements, simple and compound,
and the cause and manner of their combination.
Section I. Proceeding to consider the nature of the original synge-
netic group he concludes that it must have been a horde of human beings
of all ages and both sexes living in sexual promiscuity. Further than this
he is unable to carry the analysis; as far as this he feels justified in12/Ludwig Gumplowicz
going, since the hypothesis of such a horde enables him to explain the
origin of the mother-family which investigators have all but proven to
have been universal. Uterine consanguinity is the first force to introduce
order into the chaos of primitive promiscuity.
But the groups are mutually hostile and in particular in the course
of their conflicts females are captured who become the property of their
captors. [The warriors or the group? Are rights of individual property
in movable goods recognized respecting them?]. Then the men, sup-
ported by the favorable conditions growing out of their relation to the
captives, are able to resist the rule of the women and to substitute an
organization controlled by the males in which the various stages of the
father-family are developed down to and including the development of
the rights of the children to inherit.
Highly significant in the author’s opinion is the intermixture of dif-
ferent ethnical races which occurs here. [But this emphasis seems over-
strained. Either the males as a whole subordinated the females of the
group as a whole, still keeping them in the group except as they were
disposed of to other groups by purchase or capture; or the original group
divided, some under the leadership of the women retaining the organiza-
tion of the mother-family, the rest led by the possessors of the captive
females forming a new whole organized as a father-family. In either
case the conflict within the original group between the two classes, males
and females, with their peculiar interests, is quite as bitter and relentless
as the conflict between different syngenetic groups; and it is not so im-
portant as the author represents that there should be ethnically different
groups to antagonize and exploit each other.]
Not only are females and personal property captured in the raids of
group upon group, but whole groups are conquered, reduced to submis-
sion and put to work on the soil they occupied, producing supplies for
the conquerors. In the relations thus established we have property in
land in distinction from personal property (which is a very different
thing and arises much earlier), the organization of sovereignty by one
class over the other, and finally the state.
Sec. 2. The state consists of two parts, the ruling and the subject
classes, of which the former is inferior in numbers but superior in men-
tal power and military discipline. There are two sets of activities in the
state. One is in the ruling class directed toward external defence and
conquest, and the other arises from the conflicts of the two classes. [The
differentiation of interests within each group severally is not an activityThe Outlines of Sociology/13
peculiar to the state!] So there are but two points essential to the defini-
tion of the state. They are the organization of the sovereignty and of the
minority. The purposes commonly attributed to the state, like the pro-
motion of justice, are simply the modes of operation appropriate to its
several stages of development.
An important incident is ethnical heterogeneity. The hostile contact
of different social elements of unlike strength is the first condition for
the creation of rights. The relations established by force, if continued in
peace, become rightful. Thus inequality is stamped on every right.
Sec. 3. The life of the state is summed up in a common industrial
enterprise conducted under compulsion in which the greater burden falls
on the subject class while the rulers perform services which are no less
essential. [Were the author as fully impregnated with democratic ideals
as Americans are his language at this point, though not his idea, would
be somewhat different. For in a democratic government the ruling class
is the periodically determined majority, or its representatives.]
Man’s material need is the prime motive of his conduct. Efforts to
satisfy wants promote progress and are perpetual; for new wants are
constantly arising and social distinctions continue the antagonism be-
tween groups which began with ethnical differences.
But war, if perpetual, would defeat its own end in the utter exhaus-
tion of both parties. Peace is necessary. One party is victor and tries to
establish institutions for maintaining the inequalities, while the other
tries to reduce them. So apparent peace is only a latent struggle over the
body of reciprocal rights.
If the rulers are well off the subject class must rise too in order still
to be most serviceable. But social facts especially provoke reflection;
and the life of the subject classes is the more fruitful in ideas. Well-
being and enlightenment are the leaven of progress.
Sec. 4. The ranks or classes in the state increase in number, and
political organization changes to correspond The third class in order is
that of the foreign merchants catering to material wants chiefly; the
fourth is the priestly class arising by differentiation from the others and
satisfying spiritual wants. The development of wants and the formation
of classes go hand in hand. Material wants may be classed as primary,
and intellectual or moral wants as secondary.
The power of any class in the state can be expressed in terms of
human labor which it either commands directly or can purchase through
its possession or control of supplies and means of promoting produc-14/Ludwig Gumplowicz
tion. If a class can satisfy a social want it will be indispensable, and
through the power it acquires In return will participate in government.
However, habit, a purely mental factor, is also a source of power;
and order, custom and rights belong to the same category. But without
the organization of the state the moral powers would not exist and the
material possessions would fall to the physically stronger.
Sec. 5. Some social groups, like the ruling, subject and merchant
classes, are original, primary, ethnical and hereditary. Others, like the
priestly and professional classes, are secondary and evolutionary and
arise by differentiation. Though we no longer see primary groups aris-
ing, it has not been proven that no groups ever arose genetically; though
we see only the differentiation of secondary groups it cannot be asserted
that all groups are of that sort. Nevertheless all social groups of what-
ever origin are alike active as social elements and those of the secondary
sort tend by endogamy and otherwise to strengthen their coherence.
Sec. 6. The word society should properly be restricted to denote a
group centering about one or more common interests. As such it may be
large or small; local, national or international. The word folk should be
used co-extensively with the state to denote the group held together not
only by political organization, but also by common territory, language,
etc.
Sec. 7. Societies are numberless; but social relations and the prin-
ciples underlying social power conform to natural laws. The primary
binding tie is association; all others are evolutionary. All are essentially
represented in the primitive horde: association, with consanguinity, lan-
guage and all that they imply, and common needs and common interests
in satisfying them; and there are no social contrasts which cannot be
referred to dissimilarity in one or more of these respects. So we observe
the coherence of the heterogeneous and the differentiation of the homo-
geneous for cause. But social classes overlap and are curiously involved.
Sec. 8. The group-making factors are classified according to funda-
mental principles as material, economic and moral. But further, each
varies according to the degree of its permanency. Permanent material,
economic and moral interests make a group unitary.
Sec. 9. The power of the group in the social struggle depends on the
number of group-making factors uniting its members. The number of
possible binding forces increases with civilization but decreases at any
time with the number of individuals in the group.
In the final analysis the intensity of the union depends upon theThe Outlines of Sociology/15
personal character of the individuals [i. e., on their sociability. This is
one of the rare instances in which the nature of the individual is taken
into account]; and in times of revolution numerical strength is the test,
but such times are abnormal with civilized man.
Groups struggle for their interests group-wise; the result does not
depend upon individuals and success is the standard of conduct.
The means of utilizing power vary infinitely, but generally take the
form of an appropriate institution or exclusive right, as e.g., legislation.
However it may be with the individual, society never errs in seizing and
applying the right means. [This is a paradox. Conscientious scruples
which would constrain the action of individuals are ineffective to guide
the action of groups. But societies do err; for they perish as the result of
their own mistakes, and in those which succeed there are traces, if we
look for them, of choices that retarded progress or threatened extinction
and therefore had to be abandoned.]
Sec. 10. The struggle must always be conducted between assem-
blages and they must adopt a form of organization suited to the situa-
tion. So the struggle in the interest of the great mass of the people is
most difficult and the slowest to begin Historically the means which
they generally seek is participation in legislation.
Sec. 11. The conduct of the group is in utter disregard of the indi-
vidual and his code of morals. His moral sense is therefore often seri-
ously injured. [The difference between the individual and the social code
of morals demands explanation. A partial explanation will doubtless be
found in the current theories of individualism. But this is insufficient.
There would be a remnant which can probably be best explained as due
to the experience of individuals in the homogeneous group. This will be
in harmony with the author’s theory of the influence of the group on the
individual; but it will at the same time point out an important omission
in his general sociological theory, viz., the failure to give due consider-
ation to the life of the homogeneous group.]
Sec. 12. Every right ends in an obligation, the right of those who
otherwise have no rights. Though rights are constantly changing the
idea of right endures and is a fit weapon for the social struggle. But it is
applied indirectly. The bourgeoisie appeal to it to enlist the lower classes
with them against the upper. With success the lower classes gain some
amelioration and experience. This is aptly called the struggle for eman-
cipation. It may lead to revolution or anarchy; but a reaction and a new
period of evolutionary rights will follow.16/Ludwig Gumplowicz
Sec 13. The natural tendency of the state is to increase m territory
and power. But relative stability within and assimilation of former con-
quests are essential conditions to continued growth the absence of which
will induce a catastrophe.
If extreme violence is necessary to subjugation and if assimilation
is difficult, morals and the sense of humanity will suffer harm.
The principle applies as well to other social domains as to the politi-
cal, e.g., it explains the periodical crises of economic production.
Sec. 14. Folk-states will arise. But if, falling into opposition, the
weaker are subjected by the stronger the struggle for authority in the
new composite state will take on added severity. Historically it is apt to
centre about the rivalry of different languages for official recognition.
Part IV
Part IV treats of the influence of the group on the individual. The pro-
cesses involved and the laws are those specifically called psycho-social.
Section 1. The historical antithesis between individualism and col-
lectivism disappears upon substituting social or societary egoism and
sympathy instead of the alleged individual egoism and sympathy of cur-
rent philosophy.
Sec. 2. To establish the claims of a socialistic philosophy over the
individualistic the author notes, first, that the source of thought is in the
group and not in the individual. The influence of environment on the
individual is of fundamental and not simply of secondary importance;
but the individual’s environment is almost exclusively his group, and
the power that is admittedly strong enough to change his physiognomy
is a fortiori enough to change his mind. The type produced is not an-
thropological but social; and the factor producing it is social also. So-
cial thoughts and efforts produce the type; but it is the social life, vary-
ing with the habitat, that produces these. Hence also the variety of so-
cial types.
Sec. 3. Pre-eminently it is the economic status which gives charac-
ter to the social type, making the nobility and peasantry conservative
and the merchant class progressive and giving to each of the differenti-
ated classes also a type appropriate to its peculiar interests. But the
individual is affected through his moral nature; the transforming force
is moral.
The tenacity and permanence of the type is directly related to the
solidarity of the group which is a function of the group-making factors.The Outlines of Sociology/17
Sec. 4. The first factor in morals is habit and acquired manner of
life; the second is the conviction implanted by the group in the indi-
vidual that the manner of life which it imposes upon him is proper. Thus
morals grow out of the relations of the group to its members. But when
different groups are united different moral codes contend; all are useless
because no one is acknowledged by every individual and a new code has
to be formed and enforced by the state, called a code of rights. Thus
rights grow out of the union of different social elements.
There will be important conflicts between the code of rights en-
forced by the state and the moral code growing up in the complex com-
munity on the one hand and the moral codes of the more compact circles
comprised within it on the other. The supreme purpose of the state must
be to build up a moral code for the state as a whole; indeed the ideal
code is international.
Sec. 5. There are two elements in morals, the natural and the hu-
man, the former changeless, the latter changing. Though man acts as
natural forces compel him to, it is his nature to reflect on his acts and to
believe that he acts freely. When his behavior finally becomes such as
the long experience of his social group proves to be best he calls it
moral, but seeks a higher sanction for his moral ideas by ascribing events
to mythical and generally to anthropomorphic origins. Truth and fiction
thus grow up together until it seems impossible to sustain morals with-
out maintaining the truth of what is really supposititious. Thus the con-
flict of ignorance fighting in the name of morality begins.
But morals is the ripened fruit of the actual development of civiliza-
tion; natural science is the basis of morals, and whatever promotes sci-
entific knowledge promotes moral science also. Man’s only standard is
the visible tendency, the assumed will of nature.
Sec. 6. Rights are social creations, formed by the conflict of unlike
social groups of unequal power. But corresponding to each right is a
duty or obligation.
Sec. 7. The theory of “natural rights” is untenable. Rights arise in
the state only; and though there is much unavoidable evil in the state,
the alternative, anarchy, is worse.
Neither is justice the source of rights. On the contrary, it is simply
an abstraction from political rights and increases in perfection with time.
But because rights are relatively fixed in the form of written law and
deep seated usage, while political relations and the corresponding sense
of justice suffer continuous change, rights fall into formal antithesis to18/Ludwig Gumplowicz
justice at times.
Sec. 8. Considering the nature and form of morals and rights it is
not difficult to explain the cases where morals have conformed to rights,
and where rights, becoming formal merely, have yielded to well-grounded
morals and new rights.
Though morals are thus changeable the individual treats them as
unchanging; for his starting point in morals, though socially caused, is
subjective and relatively fixed.
Note to 6, 7 and 8. Private rights depend on the truth and merits of
the claims of the contending parties, public rights on their relative power,
on their might. The one relates to individuals, the other to the state.
Much confusion has arisen from trying to apply the principles of private
rights to political affairs. [After the author’s presentation of the om-
nipotence and omnipresence of social influences, what sphere is left for
private rights as distinct from political (social) rights? In the relations, it
must be replied, regulating the conduct of individuals within a homoge-
neous class or group. As the tendency of the state is to unity and solidar-
ity in some respects at least, the sphere of private rights is doubtless not
small. So a part of the conflict between and social codes is due, not so
much to the false ideas of free will as to the tendency to apply by anal-
ogy the rules suited to one set of relations to another and different set.
The author has not made as much of the rules of behavior governing the
relations of individuals in the unitary horde as they deserve.]
Sec. 9. Man’s impotency in the contest with social necessities is
illustrated by the antithesis between his desire to preserve and nature’s
tendency toward change and decay. Though men admire the ascetic who
defies nature and despise those who follow natural necessity, human
freedom in science and philosophy, in legislation, statecraft and diplo-
macy is shown to be merely the necessary oscillation of human choices
back and forth across the line of necessity. Only those which coincide
with necessity are fortunate; but as oscillation is a necessity, not all can
coincide, resignation to necessity is impossible and happiness is always
less than the maximum.
Some amelioration is possible, especially by learning not to over-
rate the value of human life. But the greatest success is in technology,
science and art, in which the object is to learn what is natural and to
copy it or adapt one’s self to it.The Outlines of Sociology/19
Part V
Part V treats briefly of the history of mankind as the life of a species
sociologically organized.
Section I. The task of sociology is to investigate human group-mak-
ing; not to give the history of every group, which would be impossible,
but to show conformity to law in the process and to study and describe
the manner of social evolution.
Sec. 2. Conformity to law is admitted almost without contradiction
in the development of art and science; but, if it is true in these domains,
it must be admitted even by those who have hitherto denied it to be
equally true of political history in general; and if true of the great gen-
eral results it must be true of the individuals and of the social structures,
for there is a close causal connection between mental development and
social, political and economic conditions.
Sec. 3. The evolution of mankind must be conceived of not as uni-
tary and not as polygenetic, not as genealogical nor even as having a
beginning. But the same things take place according to the same laws
whenever the same conditions arise. We must conceive of evolution as
running its course and stopping when energy is no longer generated.
This suggests cyclical development.
Sec. 4. Cyclical development follows from man’s unfreedom and
dependence on physical wants. According to the Malthusian law, in some
groups population increases under favorable conditions wihtout the group
making progress in any other particular or gaining any strength. Such
groups easily fall prey to more developed communities. The states thus
formed by conquest will enjoy general progress, in the lower as well as
in the higher classes. Then population may stagnate or even decline.
Being numerically weak, the states will fall prey to some barbarian,
whether external horde or internal proletariat.
Sec. 5. There is of course progress in particular countries and in
particular periods of the cyclical process, but there is no progress in the
course of history taken as a whole. History simply repeats itself. There
is of course progress in invention and discovery; but it is not to be ex-
plained as the result of a perfected human intellect. Intellects of the
same general range of power have replaced with interest the accumula-
tions of earlier generations. But even these accumulations are reduced
by recurrent catastrophes of wide reach. The same is true of morals and
philosophy.
Sec. 6. The current conceptions of justice consider man as its ob-20/Ludwig Gumplowicz
ject, and, owing to the belief in human free will and to the anthropomor-
phic conception of deity, men try to judge historical and natural events
by the standards of human justice. This is as wrong as it is harmful, for
the individual is never considered in these phenomena, only the mass,
and there is no criterion of his worth. Fate strikes individuals in propor-
tion not to their own merits, but to the merits of the group. This is
historic justice; and the crown of sociology is to recognize in human
history a natural process.Preface
Two years ago I published some of my “sociological investigations,”
under the title of “Der Rassenkampf,” diffidently offering them as the
“first lispings of a great science of the future, sociology.” The favorable
reception accorded them by competent authorities at home and abroad
has encouraged me to present the following “Outlines of Sociology.”
From the attention universally accorded to sociological problems it is
evident that sociology is not an ephemeral idea, but is actually coming
to be a science. I succeeded, as I believe, in laying down a few of its
principles in “Der Rassenkampf.” In the present “Outlines,” I have ear-
nestly striven to project a complete and unitary plan of the science; to
show the distinction between it and other sciences, and to call attention
to the most important questions which must hereafter be subjected to
sociological investigation. May this book meet with the same tolerant
criticism as its predecessor.
Gratz, April, 1885.
The Author.I. Sketch of Sociological Literature.
It is usual before proceeding to the systematic presentation of a science
to give a sketch of its literature. A bibliographical introduction informs
the reader how much effort has been expended on the science, how it has
progressed and what stage of development it has reached. If the sketch
is also critical, and it can hardly fail to be so, the reader is also informed
of the new writer’s attitude toward the work of his predecessors. Such
an introduction gives a comprehensive view. But it involves disadvan-
tages of a technical nature. If every system should be described in de-
tail, the introductory sketch would become a history of the science. The
reader would have to wander through system after system, each one
represented to be more or less false, before learning how the writer would
correct them, which is not practicable. Or should the writer make and
substantiate his criticisms in the introduction itself, he would anticipate
his own system; whatever followed would be merely tiresome repeti-
tion. This too would be impracticable; especially since the refuting ar-
guments can be used much more effectively as the author proceeds to
unfold his own views. Then he is not bound by historical sequence nor
need he present the older systems entire.
Accordingly we shall mention only the most important pioneers in
the domain of sociology noting, with all possible brevity, the most promi-
nent and most general points of view in their systems and deferring
criticism and refutation until we present our own system.
Young and imperfect as the science of sociology still is, a history of
its literature has already been written.3 But its author makes the “social-
istic” doctrines his starting point, and his failure to distinguish clearly
between socialism and sociology greatly diminishes the value of the
work. Further bibliographical material may be found in the literatureThe Outlines of Sociology/23
upon the development of constitutional law, politics, political economy,
and the philosophy of history.”4
Probably the first author to cherish presentiments of a “science of
the common nature of nations”5 was Giambattista Vico. But he adhered
to Biblical tradition and did not emancipate himself from the contempo-
rary theories of natural rights. Neither should we expect to find in St.
Simon, the world reformer, an objective science of society. Full justice
has been done hint when it is recognized that it was from him that Comte
received his inspiration.
To Auguste Comte unquestionably belongs the honor of having been
the first to recognize the real character of sociology. In his “Positive
Philosophy” he declared repeated plainly and correctly what this sci-
ence should be.
“All that can be rationally proposed in our day,” he says in one
place, “is to recognize the character of positivity in social as in all other
science, and to ascertain the chief bases on which it is founded.”6 The
scientific character of the future sociology is thus indicated. Further, “it
is the exclusive property of the positive principle to recognize the funda-
mental law of continuous human development, representing the existing
evolution as the necessary result of the gradual series of former trans-
formations.”7 Thus Comte conceived mankind to be subject to the law
of evolution and the present to be the necessary consequence of the past.
Though his conception of mankind was erroneous, as will be shown
later, still both ideas are true and important; and the general principle
has been maintained firmly in sociology ever since. Moreover, an admo-
nition of broad scientific application was added: “True resignation, that
is, a permanent disposition to endure steadily and without hope of com-
pensation all inevitable evils, can proceed only from a deep sense of the
connection of all kinds of natural phenomena with invariable laws.”8
Without such resignation, there can be no sociology.
“If there are (as I doubt not there are) political evils which. like
some personal sufferings, cannot be remedied by science,” he went
on, “science at least proves to us that they are incurable, so as to
calm our restlessness under pain by the connection that it is by
natural causes that they are rendered insurmountable.”9
Would that he had acted upon this wise principle himself. But he
violated it by suggesting plans for the “practical amelioration” of “the
condition of the lower classes.”10 The error is one for which his master,24/Ludwig Gumplowicz
St. Simon, is to blame. It finally forced him out of the path of objective
science and into the false ways of subjective politics.
How clear and precise his statement of the task of sociology in con-
trast with the older doctrines of the philosophy of history!
“Social science could not exist,” he says, “so long as men were
ignorant concerning what constitutes development, for this sci-
ence studies the laws of development.”11
Yet he himself failed to apprehend its true nature, for he accepted
Pascal’s “admirable aphorism” that “the entire succession of men,
through the whole course of ages, must be regarded as one man always
living,”12 and he misconceived the result of sociology most egregiously,
saying “that this science fulfills the famous suggestion of Pascal by
representing the whole human race past, present and future, as consti-
tuting a vast and eternal social unit whose different organs concur in
their various modes and degrees in the evolution of humanity.”13 But it
is false to conceive mankind to be a unit as we shall show hereafter. It
led Comte into a thousand and one errors.
In his time, it is true, historical and ethnographical material was
very meagre. His personal knowledge of mankind was limited; and his
investigations into the laws of human development were restricted to the
Teutonic and the Latin races of Europe. Indeed, France was often his
sole example; the “great revolution” was to his mind the overturning of
all humanity, whereas far the greater part of mankind was not influ-
enced at all by this local European event.
Not only were his “laws of human development” based on this nar-
row experience; they were also so distorted by personal predilections
that they possess little value. The historical and ethnographical horizon
of his time was far too narrow. His sociology was a failure from utter
lack of material. The epoch-making character of his work is solely due
to the brilliant generalizations (geniale Principien) upon which he
founded it. They are the basis, as we shall see, of all the sociological
efforts from his day to ours.
The prospect of verifying his laws of human development by means
of numerical calculations must have been all the more enticing, to a
mathematician like Quetelet, from the fact that Comte himself seemed
directly to suggest it.14 Quetelet’s interest centred in the “Natural His-
tory of Society,” i.e., in sociology. Even his earlier work on “Man” hasThe Outlines of Sociology/25
the sub-title “Social Physics,” and he states that “it is the body social
that we propose to study.”15
His task is obviously allied to that of Comte’s sociology. But the
“law of the great number”16 which he relied on to discover the laws of
social development was ineffectual. His statistical works afford mate-
rial for the theory of “man” and the thralldom of human will only. For
sociology they could do nothing. He made no distinction between “man-
kind” and the unclear concept “society;” and many of his investigations
begin with errors current in the social science of his day. He assumes,
for instance, that “the simplest and most natural social union among
men is the family, which is found in all ages and among all peoples.”17
He did not know that the family, in the modern signification of the word
and the sense in he uses it, is a very late social institution and an adap-
tation to political ends. Equally ingenuous is his idea that a “nation” “is
a body composed of homogeneous elements performing their functions
in unison and inspired with the same life principle;”18 whereas, in truth,
every nation consists of unlike elements performing complementary func-
tions under compulsion. His theory was that social unions originate in
the “preponderance of the force of attraction impelling individuals to
associate.” He frankly conceded, however, that “a nation is not always
composed of elements of one sort. Indeed it is quite often the result of
invasion and the fusion of conqueror and conquered.”19 But this is the
“exception;” his theory is not based upon it. No wonder that he failed to
get a clear conception of the laws of social development. Phenomena as
common as the struggles of nation with nation seem to him against na-
ture; and he concludes his “History of Mankind” with the enthusiasm of
an Elihu Burritt, saying:
“To the credit of mankind be it told, the nineteenth century is on
the point of striking into a new path. It is recognized that there
must be laws and tribunals for nations also and that crimes prac-
ticed on a large scale by one people against another are just as
much to be hated as crimes of man against man.”20
These are beautiful effusions, but they attest the scantiness of
Quetelet’s sociological information. Since he wrote them the nineteenth
century has witnessed, even in Europe alone, a half dozen wars: the
Crimean and the Austro-Italian; the war of Prussia and Austria against
Denmark; the Austro-Prussian, the Franco-Prussian and the Russo-Turk-
ish. According to him they were all downright “crimes.” Yet the victori-26/Ludwig Gumplowicz
ous nations inscribed them in their annals in letters of gold, and suc-
ceeding generations exult at the thought of them. His “new path” is still
a good way off. Is it not sociology that should take a new course?
Herbert Spencer’s words on this point are of inestimable impor-
tance:
“Thought and feeling cannot be completely dissociated. Each emo-
tion has a more or less distinct framework of ideas; and each group
of ideas is more or less suffused with emotion. There are, how-
ever, great differences between their degrees of combination un-
der both of these aspects. We have some feelings which are vague
from lack of intellectual definition; and others to which clear shapes
are given by the associated conceptions. At one time our thoughts
are distorted by the passion running through them; and at another
time it is difficult to detect in them a trace of liking or disliking.
Manifestly, too, in each particular case these components of the
mental state may be varied in their proportions. The ideas being
the same, the emotion joined with them may be greater or less,
and it is a familiar truth that the correctness of the judgment formed,
depends if not on the absence of emotion, still, on that balance of
emotions which negatives excess of any one.
“Especially is this so in matters concerning human life. There are
two ways in which men’s actions, individual or social, may be
regarded. We may consider them as groups of phenomena to be
analyzed, and the laws of their dependence ascertained; or, con-
sidering them as causing pleasures or pains, we may associate
with them approbation or reprobation. Dealing with its problems
intellectually, we may regard conduct as always the result of cer-
tain forces, or dealing with its problems morally and recognizing
its outcome as in this case good and in that case bad, we may
allow now admiration and now indignation to fill our conscious-
ness. Obviously, it must make a great difference in our conclu-
sions whether, as in the one case, we study men’s doings as those
of alien creatures, which it merely concerns us to understand; or
whether, as in the other case, we contemplate them as the doings
of creatures like ourselves’ with whose lives our own lives are
bound up, and whose behavior arouses in us, directly and sympa-
thetically, feelings of love or hate.”
“Here let me emphasize the conclusion that in pursuing our socio-
logical inquiries, and especially those on which we are now enter-
ing [political institutions], we must, as much as possible, exclude
whatever emotions the facts are calculated to excite, and attendThe Outlines of Sociology/27
solely to the interpretation of the facts. There are several groups of
phenomena in contemplating which either contempt, or disgust,
or indignation, tends to arise but must be restrained.”21
As the English statesman cries “hands off” to the onlookers in po-
litical quarrels, so Spencer cries “away with sentiment,” whenever a
sociological investigation is undertaken. On the portal of this science he
writes: “All sentiment, abandon ye who enter here.” This is not merely a
practical admonition, it is a conditio sine qua non, a stipulation indis-
pensable in sociology, and which moreover forestalls objections raised
on moral grounds.
Fortunately Spencer is in full agreement with Comte in recognizing
“the character of positivity in social as in all other science.” It is to him
the first principle of methodology, or rather it precedes methodology.
But in accepting the fundamental similarity of sociology and biology he
made a well-nigh fatal blunder.
Comte affirmed emphatically that this similarity was an essential
sociological principle.
“The necessity,” he says, “of founding sociology upon the whole
of biology is obvious.” “The subordination of social science to bi-
ology is so evident,” he continues, “that nobody denies it in state-
ment however it may be neglected in fact.” “Biology will be seen
to afford the starting point of all social speculation, in accordance
with the analysis of the social faculties of man, and of the organic
conditions which determine its character. But, moreover, as we
can scarcely at all investigate the most elementary terms of the
social series, we must construct them by applying the positive theory
of human nature to the aggregate of corresponding circumstances.
.... When the social condition has advanced so far as to exclude
this kind of deduction, the second aspect presents itself, and the
biological theory of man is implicated with the sociological in a
less direct and special manner. The whole social evolution of the
race must proceed in entire accordance with biological laws.”22
The whole “theory of the organic state” which flourished so luxuri-
antly in Germany from Rohmer and Bluntschli to Schaeffle and his
“Structure and Life of the Social Body,” should probably be traced back
to confute directly or indirectly; and Spencer seemed about to follow
him too.
“Setting out then with this general principle, that the proper ties of28/Ludwig Gumplowicz
the units [which it is the province of biology to treat] determine the
properties of the aggregate,” he also concludes
“that there must be a social science expressing the relations be-
tween the two, with as much definiteness as the nature of the phe-
nomena permits,”
and that
“in every case [social science] has for its subject-matter the growth,
development, structure and functions of the social aggregate, as
brought about by the mutual actions of individuals.”23
He is an individualist and endeavors to derive knowledge of social
events from the individual and his nature. If this were possible sociol-
ogy must be a higher order of biology, since we get our knowledge of the
individual through the latter. But we may state here that the social com-
munities are the sociological units or elements, and that it is not possible
to ascertain their mutual relations from the properties of their constitu-
ent parts, i.e., from the properties of individuals. No one starting from
the latter can reach the nature of the group. Hence biological analogies
are worthless in sociology except as illustrations.
Without saying so in words or even becoming clearly conscious of
it, the English philosopher seems to have felt this. At least his scientific
instincts have preserved him from such obvious exaggerations as others
have made in consequence of false analogies between biology and soci-
ology. Although he even affirmed such analogies in principle, he never
based anything essential upon them, he never went so far but that the
core of his sociology remained sound. Whenever he used biological terms,
he treated them as similes rather than as analogies. Notice, for example,
how he describes the peaceful differentiation of authority in a primitive
horde:
“Setting out with an unorganized horde, including both sexes and
all ages, let us ask,” he says, “what must happen when some pub-
lic question, as that of migration, or of defence against enemies,
has to be decided. The assembled individuals will fall, more or
less clearly, into two divisions. The elder, the stronger, and those
whose sagacity and courage have been proved by experience, will
form the smaller part who carry on the discussion; while the largerThe Outlines of Sociology/29
part, formed of the young, the weak, and the undistinguished, will
be listeners who usually do no more than express from time to
time assent or dissent A further inference may safely be drawn. In
the cluster of leading men there is sure to be one whose weight is
greater than that of any other—some aged hunter, some distin-
guished warrior, some cunning medicine-man, who will have more
than his individual share in forming the resolution finally acted
upon. That is to say, the entire assemblage will resolve itself into
three parts. To use a biological metaphor, there will, out of the
general mass, be differentiated a nucleus and a nucleolus.”24
The passage quoted is typical. Spencer uses biological principles
only to a very limited extent in investigating sociological laws. Social
facts and phenomena keep reminding him of similar biological facts, as
is proper; but he always connects the two distinct species by a plain
“similarly it happens,” without identifying them at all. It is this quiet
objectivity which makes him so superior to other sociologists Schaeffle
and Lilienfeld, for example, took these analogies seriously. They fol-
lowed these will-o’-the-wisps over treacherous ground. But Spencer does
not confuse the nature of social and organic phenomena for an instant,
notwithstanding anything which the title “Society is an Organism,’ might
imply.25 Every fact presented as common to both classes of phenomena
is so general that we may concede it without detracting from the lucidity
of the thought. He finds that societies grow as truly as living organisms
do; though this comparison only because we have but one expression
(growth, Wachstum) for two ideas, organic growth and social enlarge-
ment. If there were a special expression for each there would be no
temptation falsely to compare or identify them. Likewise, nothing but
want of verbal precision makes it possible to say that both an organism
and a society increase in “structure” at the same time that they increase
in scope. The word “structure” is biological and should be only meta-
phorically applied to the development of social classes, departments of
government, and the like. In that case, there would not appear to be any
common quality. The same criticism is true of Spencer’s third compari-
son, that both in an organism and in society, “progressive differentiation
of structures is accompanied by progressive differentiation of func-
tions.”26 The thought is perfectly clear, if we interpret the words accord-
ing to the nature of the respective phenomena. His comparisons with
biological processes, therefore, do not make our ideas of social pro-
cesses less precise.30/Ludwig Gumplowicz
Although such comparisons are frequent the positive inductive
method of natural science is not a mere phrase with Spencer. He really
applies it in the domain of sociology, whereas Schaeffle and Lilienfeld,
as we shall see, misled by biological analogies, deduce sociological laws
from a priori biological laws, regardless of consequences. For the real
subject-matter of sociology their method substituted a spurious organ-
ism from another domain of knowledge.27
But Spencer attacks social phenomena directly, examines them
calmly, with no predilections whatever, and formulates his results in
sound doctrines and general laws. His method is correct, but still his
results were only partial. He could not cut loose from the unitary con-
ception of mankind, the fable converse, the old conventional assump-
tion of all former sociologists and philosophers, although often after a
calm examination he is fairly compelled by the logic of facts to attribute
the beginning of social development to the mutual effects of unlike
(heterogen) ethnical elements. The “first internal cohesion” of “small
hordes of primitive men” is due, he notes, to their “combined resistance
to external foes.”28 Of the “rudiments of political organization,” he says:
“While there exist only small, wandering, unorganized hordes,
the conflicts of these with one another work no permanent changes
of arrangement in them. But when there have arisen the definite
chieftainships which frequent conflicts tend to initiate, and espe-
cially when the conflicts have ended in subjugations, there arise
the rudiments of political organizations.”29
And he adduces ethnological facts to illustrate every social phe-
nomenon arising from the contact of social groups. But when he wishes
to attribute phenomena to the mutual effects of the individuals of a group,
he is forced to fall back on loose logical reasoning and biological simi-
les. Had he appreciated this himself perhaps he would have given up
attempting individualistic explanations and would have, from the begin-
ning, accepted the plurality of human hordes as not susceptible of fur-
ther sociological analysis.”30 But as it is, there is a perpetual contradic-
tion throughout his sociological investigations. On the one hand he tac-
itly assumes a unitary mankind descended from a common origin, on
the other, where he really explains social phenomena he goes back to a
“plurality of primitive hordes.” As we have demonstrated in “Der
Rasserkampf,” the assumption of primitive plurality of human hordes is
the only possible rational basis; the only one upon which all social phe-The Outlines of Sociology/31
nomena can be satisfactorily explained. We have elsewhere made it suf-
ficiently clear that this assumption does not contradict Darwin’s theo-
ries.31 Primitive plurality is often the only possible explanation and we
shall adopt it exclusively, thus sparing ourselves the vacillation between
the unitary the plural conceptions of mankind from which Spencer suf-
fers. Had he followed it consistently, he could have still more easily
applied his formula of evolution, of which we shall speak later, to the
development of social phenomena. His universal law is so ill-adapted to
the development of mankind as a unit that the insufficiency of this as-
sumption is manifest at every step. Fortunately the importance of his
work is not due to the formulas which he superposes upon the facts; but
to his acute observations and his method of treating them. He has com-
mand of more material than any one save Bastian; and he is enough of a
positivist to test its complicated mass objectively, calmly, without preju-
dice, drawing conclusions regardless of metaphysical prepossessions.
This has made Spencer the real founder of sociology and he will long
remain its most powerful champion. Next to him stands Bastian; his
superior, perhaps, in knowledge and in calmness of observation, but
less skillful in presenting scientific conclusions. But before turning to
this phenomenal scholar and investigator, we wish to mention several
other attempts at sociology.
Monism is the thought underlying all of them. They culminate in the
endeavor to find a universal law for events in the whole domain of na-
ture. They all fail to distinguish between universal and social laws, seek-
ing to explain social events by universal laws—which is impossible.
They revive the old dispute between spiritualists and materialists. The
former attribute everything to the mind’s efficiency; the latter, to the
effective force of matter. The first grand attempt to explain all events,
natural, human and social, by a single universal law of matter, was
Holbach’s “System of Nature.” The author is a skillful reasoner; so we
find the demonstration complete in every detail, showing how those two
primordial forces, attraction and repulsion, not only sustain the heav-
enly bodies in their paths and regulate all life and motion on our planet,
but also help to establish the relations between man and man and build
up every social community. Indeed there would seem to be nothing that
attraction and repulsion do not accomplish.32 Molecules attract one an-
other and bodies are formed, they repel one another and bodies are dis-
solved, by the process of accumulation plants and metals, animals and
man are made;32/Ludwig Gumplowicz
“in short never to separate physical from moral laws it is thus that
men, mutually attracted to each other by their reciprocal wants,
form those unions which we designate by the terms marriage, fami-
lies, societies, friendships, connections.”33
“In all the phenomena man presents,” it is said, “from the mo-
ment he quits the womb of his mother, to that wherein he becomes
the inhabitant of the silent tomb, he perceives nothing but a suc-
cession of necessary causes and effects, which are strictly con-
formable to those laws common to all the beings in nature. All his
modes of action—all his sensations—all his ideas every act of his
will—every impulse he either gives or receives, are the necessary
consequences of his own peculiar properties, and those which he
finds in the various beings by whom he is moved. Everything he
does—everything that passes within himself, are the effects of in-
ert force—of self-gravitation—of the attractive or repulsive pow-
ers contained in his machine of the tendency he has, in common
with other beings, to his own individual preservation; in short, of
that energy which is the common property of everything he be-
holds. Nature, in man, does nothing more than show, in a decided
manner, what belongs to the peculiar nature by which he is distin-
guished from the beings of a different system or order.”34
The idea of explaining all human and natural phenomena by the law
of attraction and repulsion has repeatedly reappeared since Holbach’s
day; and we shall meet it again in Schaeffle.
Comte and Spencer, as we have seen, derived sociological laws from
the less remote domain of biology. The “theory at the organic state,” so-
called, which was current in Germany for decades, was based on Comte’s
ideas until, finally Schaeffle combined it with Holbach’s thought. Ev-
erybody will acknowledge Schaeffle’s great intellectual power and schol-
arly ability. But the fundamental thought of his system, the alleged anal-
ogy between the state and an animal organism, is baleful, and all must
regret that talent and experience were spent in elaborating an idea so
extravagant. It is impossible to go into the details of his comprehensive
work here, and it must suffice to quote the leading thought in the author’s
own words:
“We have repeatedly observed that not only nature as a whole, but
also the several organic and inorganic bodies in it, seem to be
great societies or systems whose parts, in turn, are either simple orThe Outlines of Sociology/33
more or less composite lichen, according to what has preceded,
attraction and repulsion between the elements and the outside world
impart motion to these atomic kingdoms. Under such circum-
stances, can it be a misinterpretation to assume that the social
body which is the realm of persons and the most universal and
spiritual realm of experience cannot accomplish the ends of its
existence without the manifestation of the same double force in
each of its personal elements? Some parts would appear to be cen-
tripetal in virtue of one force while others obeying the others would
seem to assert their independence of the whole. But as the units of
the body-social are neither simple nor irrational we ought not to
consider the two fundamental impulses either simple or irratio-
nal; but we can and we must explain the total life of the body-
social as the product of the multiform reciprocal effects of all the
active social elements of all the subjects endowed with volition of
all persons and institutional groups of persons in a state of attrac-
tion and repulsion. For ethical movement is not imparted to the
body-social by anything outside; but we see it arise within from
the discharge of ethical forces between the constituent parts, both
individual and collective.”35
This language, though not quite clear, is not the mystical language
of Kantian metaphysics, beneath which clear thoughts lie, for the illus-
trations are inapt. Schaeffle analyzes the “body-social,” but he leaves
us in doubt whether this mystical expression denotes mankind as a whole,
or only as a state or folk. It is unclear and intangible as Quetelet’s “so-
ciety.” The latter uses the “great number” to explain his meaning, the
former demonstrates that there are social cells, tissues, bones, nerves,
etc., which makes the matter worse. It needs a very lively imagination to
connect Schaeffle’s lengthy excerpts from anatomy, physiology and psy-
chology with social phenomena and social development. Sober reason
turns in despair from the endless limping comparisons. If they contain a
kernel of truth derived from experience and acute observation, as often
happens, it is tedious to find it in the confusion of metaphors and analo-
gies.
Of Lilienfeld, we can, on the whole, say no more than has been said
of Schaeffle. He has the same erudition and equally great intellectual
power and inventiveness; and he displays the same degree of industry in
executing a plan which is fundamentally wrong and in defending a cause
which is lost from the start.
The fundamental thought of his ponderous work is expressed in34/Ludwig Gumplowicz
these words:
“There is only one way to make human society the subject-matter
of a positive science. It must necessarily (?) be classed (!) among
organic beings and regarded as an organism as much above man
as man is above all other organisms in nature. On no other condi-
tion is it possible to treat human society inductively and to con-
ceive of it as an inseparable part of nature. On no other condition
can dogmatic social science become positive But on this condition
it obtains a basis as real as that of natural science.”36
The reverse of all this is true. Social science can never “obtain a
basis as real as that of natural science” until the fantastic view that
“society” is an “organism” has been thrown overboard and all biologi-
cal analogies have been cleared away.
Lilienfeld’s query whether “social organisms do not obey the same
laws as all other beings” must be emphatically answered in the negative.
The distinction between social organisms and organic beings is some-
thing more than a simple “preponderance of the principle of adaptation
in the former and of the principle of causality in the latter.” They are
distinct species of phenomena and different laws control them. Laws of
organic development and laws of social development are toto genere
unlike and ought not to be confounded. When Lilienfeld further inquires
whether “in relation to us, the whole of mankind does not constitute an
organic being uniting in itself all social groups and related to them as
the whole is to its parts,” we may be sure that we are confronted with a
wretched scientific blunder. After mankind has been declared to be an
“organic being,” what can be expected from any further investigation?
Yet in the next chapter, on “Human Society as Real Being,” he
solemnly protests that he
“conceives the analogy to he something more than an allegorical
parallel.” “If we had considered all the current scientific and popu-
lar expressions which point to a relationship between natural and
social phenomena to be mere rhetorical figures we should have
trodden in the footsteps of all the doctrinaires and metaphysicians,
we should have been working over the same barren soil on which
in the course of centuries so many capable natural scientists have
sacrificed their powers with no sociological results save doubts
and contradictions.”The Outlines of Sociology/35
Nobly said. But it must be laid to his charge that in spite of all he
was no more fortunate than they.
He seems to think that a metaphor can be made real by “conceiv-
ing” it to be real. “We must win the conviction,” he says, “that this or
that social group, this or that state, is a real living organism like every
other in nature.” He expects a great deal of the reflecting reader. We
have not been able to win this conviction even after a most earnest study
of his five volumes. There are many true and deep thoughts, but nothing
to enforce this conviction. In on place he trenchantly criticises
“metapolitics, which is busied with generalizing from allegories, i.e.,
from data that are themselves once removed from reality.” “Double non-
sense” he calls it. We frankly confess that between it and his methods
we see no difference. As of Schaeffle, so we must say of Lilienfeld, that
his work contains incidentally admirable observations; but his elaborate
system is built on a false foundation and can be of small profit to sci-
ence.”37
All in all, de Roberty is right when he laments that, notwithstanding
Schaefile and Lilienfeld, “social science still has its proper course to
seek.”38 The period of progress, since Comte clearly outlined the social
problem, was only one of incipiency, important though it be. Among
other errors of this period, de Roberty specially mentions “setting the
phantom light of general analogies to guide the science.” He recom-
mends above all that the “natural history of society” be made the basis
of sociology, saying that on it alone could an abstract social science be
built, but his work is occupied with the preparatory questions of meth-
odology. As propaedeutics of sociology it has fulfilled its mission; he
does not claim more for it. The task which he refers to sociology, the
construction of a science of “society,” based on its natural history, has
since been undertaken with great success by a German ethnographer,
Bastian.
We have already called Bastian a phenomenal character. He has
done more for the “natural history of society,” as de Roberty called it,
than all his predecessors together. The scope of his labors is great and
his plentitude of deep and excellent thoughts is beyond any man’s power
to reckon to-day. We can only make a few fragmentary observations in
upon them, being wholly unable suitably to exploit the sociological trea-
sures he has stored up
Bastian could never succeed in systematizing his knowledge; it was
too great. Whenever he made the attempt, even in his early work on36/Ludwig Gumplowicz
“Man in History,” his system was broken down at its very inception and
swept away by the flood tide of his information. Significant, however, is
the thought contained in the sub-title to this work: “Contribution to a
Psychological Conception of the World.” It recurs in all his works, and
is the great philosopher’s pole-star on the immeasurable ocean of knowl-
edge, his inspiration in all his labors
Probably this thought dates from the time when “race-psychology”
first flourished in Berlin. For in his preface he says:
“Psychology ought not to be limited as heretofore to individual
self-observation and the pathological evidence afforded by schools
and insane asylums. Man, as political animal, attains full devel-
opment only in society. Mankind, than which there is no higher
concept must be made the starting point, mankind is the unitary
whole in which the individual figures as an integral part.”39
He searches “mankind” far and wide for manifestations of “thought.”
He considers his task to be psychological. His object is to disclose the
soul of the races, which are the parts, and so finally to disclose the soul
of mankind, the whole. In the later works, he calls these psychical mani-
festations “race-thoughts” (Voelkergedanke).
So he is really not a sociologist; he lays little or no stress on the
process of social development. Still the material which he gathers from
every nook and cranny to demonstrate “race-thoughts,” illustrates so-
cial development also. Bastian wanted to be a race-psychologist; but the
problem he set himself was falsely proposed and impossible, and the
force of facts drove him into another course, he became an ethnogra-
pher and built up a system of ethnology.
Some passages may be cited to show his views. He is a realist from
the first and occupies the only correct realistic ground, materialism and
idealism combined.
“If so-called materialists have hitherto vainly attempted to con-
struct new systems,” says Bastian, “if they have been unable to
satisfy public expectations and have found no surcease for that
longing of the human heart which has always hovered over the
earthly horizon of all races like the promise of dawn, it was be-
cause they neglected psychology, not knowing how to rescue it
from the hands of dialectic speculation and to claim it as their
own province. They opposed the idealist on party lines, instead ofThe Outlines of Sociology/37
drawing his objects also within the sphere of scientific investiga-
tion. True science recognizes neither materialism nor idealism,
for it includes both. Psychology, ‘race-psychology,’ based on eth-
nographical studies, had to wait until the other natural sciences
developed, because it must build on them. But now that the pre-
liminary work is done, it joins them, proposing to swing a budge
from the narrow circle of sense to the endless realm of ideas.”40
What, then, is his attitude toward the facts of the social world?
“No judicious investigator,” he says, “will give further heed to
enthusiastic utopists and reformers. As soon as we learn that rec-
ognition of the causes proves development to be according to law,
we accept whatever is as right, because it has become what it is.”41
He is equipped with all the requirements of true objective science.
He wishes to “gather up evidence” and “collect psychological statistics”
in order “to acquaint the reader with the course of thought peculiar to
the various races of mankind.” Unfortunately (or perhaps fortunately
for the future science) Bastian plans a task immeasurably greater than
he can manage. His plan is nothing more nor less than “to show by
statistics that exactly the same number of original psychological ele-
ments have coursed regularly through the heads of all races in all ages
of history.” A quarter of a century has passed since this was written and
the tireless statistician of race-thoughts has never suspended his labors.
That his mind is still fresh and clear is proof of its extraordinary strength,
for his “statistics” have become impenetrable forests wherein ordinary
mortals lose their way and become bewildered.
Future science will be able some day to utilize his labors and will
find them invaluable. But it seems to us that the laws of the “regular”
course of thought might have been made intelligible at once if he had
been a sociologist rather than a race-psychologist. The fundamental
characteristic of Bastian’s investigations is the endeavor to attribute all
social phenomena to human thought. He accumulates inexhaustible stores
of social facts in order to unriddle man’s thoughts from them and then to
discover the thoughts, the soul, of the races. With him thoughts are
always primary and deeds are an emanation front them; thought arises
only under the influence of external natural phenomena, and the social
world emanates from thought. The scheme of his system is: (a) nature,
(b) man and thought, (c) society and social thought. His scientific struc-38/Ludwig Gumplowicz
ture culminates in the latter, his ultimate object is race-psychology. In
sociology the point of view and the object must be totally different. The
social process must precede; the social fact is primary. Man disappears
from the foreground of consideration since he receives his thought his
soul, from the social fact. Social thought, the concept of social facts,
appears in the individual human mind only by reflection.
Hence, in distinction from Bastian’s system, sociology includes: (a)
social elements, swarms, hordes, groups, etc., (b) man, their product,
both in body and mind, (c) the social process and its products, (d) the
ethico-social products of the reciprocal action of society and the indi-
vidual The social phenomenon is always primary; the thought of the
individual and the ethico-social products, such as religion, rights, mor-
als etc., are derived. An undivested remnant of idealism still troubles
Bastian and he continues to be a pronounced individualist (atomist),
i.e., he uses the individual and his nature to explain the nature and de-
velopment of the whole.
The first volume of his “Man in History,” treats of psychology (i.e.,
the psychology of the individual) as natural science;42 the second is on
psychology and mythology, and treats of the relation of the individual to
nature, and the third is occupied with “political psychology,” conclud-
ing with a description of society. But this does not seem to us the right
method for sociology. It has had little success in political science and
has fallen into disrepute as “idealism” and “atomism.” Yet he even at-
tributes “property,” in the traditional way, to the primitive possessory
act of the savage seizing the “fruit from the tree” to still his hunger,43
and he adheres to the old idealistic phrase that property is “the neces-
sary extension of the sphere of personality in society.” Likewise the
state, to cite only one more example, is derived from the family, which
has gradually “become a race.”44
But in the later works every suggestion of idealism and the whole
rationalistic theory of the state is omitted. He studies the “natural his-
tory of society” more and more objectively and finally gives the most
striking expression to this tendency in a “system” of ethnology.
In the ethnographical works,45 also, here and there in masses of
descriptive matter which is invaluable for its own sake, reflections crop
out that are not only the results of acute observation and clear reason-
ing, but are besides really epoch-making in social science. As example
we will cite the discussion of the “ethnological conception of descent
and relationship” in the introduction to his “Ethnological Investigations,”The Outlines of Sociology/39
for we shall often have occasion to refer to it in presenting social devel-
opment.
The current use of the terms “native race” and “relationship” is
criticised very sharply. It is shown that in the nature of the case they are
only relative. If we know any of the circumstances at all our knowledge
reaches back such a little way that we can never use these words in their
rightful acceptation.
“When historical analysis is not able to go further the last race
may provisionally be called native Although classical authors de-
scribed some races as earth-born autochthons which were not
known to have had an earlier dwelling-place, in general they ap-
plied the term regardless of historical considerations. Indeed some
races called aboriginal were notoriously immigrants, and were on
that account connected with the mountains in etymology.”
No criticism could be more destructive of the Biblical theory of
descent underlying every system of political and social science than that
of Bastian. He shows that
“every race tries to find the ‘first man,’ as the redskins call him;
the ancestor of man, or father of the race. For, as examples from
Asia, Australia, America and elsewhere show, the name of the
race always coincides with the general name for man.” “No differ-
ence of origin is allowed for,” he continues, “except that the former
race is said to have sprung from the ground, into which it with-
drew again before conquerors born of birds and wild animals, or,
being the offspring of trees and vines, was not adopted into the
family of the proud heaven descended heroes.... In Grecian tradi-
tion Laos sprang from the stones, and in German the Saxons from
a rock. Assyrian traditions are revolutionary; the Lybian repeat
the myth of the Moxos,46 and in Scandinavian story the first-be-
gotten were divided into classes. But since Christianity and
Islamism made the Semitic legend preponderant over large por-
tions of Europe and Asia all racial diversity is referred to the three
patriarchs who survived the flood with their father.”
The passage is typical of Bastian’s ability to upset false ideas. By
citing notions that recur the world over, so as to show that they are only
a form of human thought, he thoroughly destroys the delusion that they
ever contained any truth.40/Ludwig Gumplowicz
Next to the Biblical explanation of man’s origin nothing is so fatal
to sociology as the false views of tribal descent and kinship. By correct-
ing them Bastian rendered sociology another very great service.
“Kinship and descent, like so many other words, have a figurative
as well as a real signification, whereas they ought to be employed
in the inductive sciences as technical terms with one well-defined
meaning. Descent from a common ancestor implies kinship, but
kinship may also arise from a union of races and is therefore the
broader term. Strictly, descent should be traced through a limited
number of venerations, beyond which it is preferable to speak of
kinship. The limit might be somewhat extended where endogamic
marriages are the rule, as among the Incas, Achimenides and
Wanes, and in the aristocratic circles of certain mountain peoples.
But this practice is extraordinarily rare, whereas the marriage regu-
lations among the Australians, Chinese Abipones and many oth-
ers must lead to the incessant crossing of families, for the degrees
of relationship within which they prohibit marriage are even re-
moter than those the pope once had much difficulty in enforcing
in Bavaria. The term ‘descent’ should be avoided as much as pos-
sible in ethnology, unless one wants to grapple with the fruitless
problem of ultimate origin. And yet many an historical clue is
afforded by mythical traditions of descent, whether confined to
the Teutons, as those given by Tacitus, or made to embrace a wider
field, whether Celts, Scythians and Illyrians are grouped under
one common ancestor or the equally incongruous Galla, Waknafi
and Wakamba, whose languages even are unlike, under another;
or whether Grecian eponyms are represented to be brothers, or
genealogical tables are projected for the known and presumptively
the whole world at once.”47
“In general, the more definitely a particular locality is circum-
scribed the broader is the sense in which kinship may be used.
The recurrence of the same kabong, or brotherhoods, throughout
the whole Australian continent gives a clue to the general similar-
ity of type which continual crossing produces among savages at
the same time that it prevents individualities from becoming con-
stant.”
It is important to bear in mind how relative the ideas “kindred” and
“autochthonous” are, but it is equally so to have an objective concep-
tion of race and stem.
“Nationality,” says Bastian, “grows out of similarity of interestsThe Outlines of Sociology/41
and views, it is furthered by religious and political union, and
especially by the assimilation of language, and attains its greatest
perfection within an area enclosed by natural boundaries.”
According to Bastian, the earliest precursor of the nation is the race
or stem, which is “earlier than the folk,” since the “incorporation” of
races “into folk is determined by political boundaries.” Important also
is Bastian’s confirmation of the fact that “the most favored regions of
civilization are those in which several streams of foreign immigration
meet,” which amounts to saying that civilization is promoted by their
union. Admirable also is his explanation of how the resulting civiliza-
tion or, what is nearly the same thing, how the “national type” is related
to the local conditions, i.e., to “the local ethnological type,” to the “an-
thropological province,” to use his own words.
“A great variety of inhabitants,” he says, “may exist in every geo-
graphical province. The range of conditions within which life is
possible is wide, and circumstances may cause very great differ-
ences to arise even between adjacent varieties. Hence the dispute
over stability and mutability of races is, for the most part, facti-
tious, for both views are supported by examples, but the condi-
tions which pro duce them respectively are not accurately distin-
guished. How far the national type produced by one cause or an-
other shall approximate to the ethnological or territorial type will
depend on circumstances. A native stock, though capable of im-
provement in various ways, will never change much. Even if there
should be an influx of strangers indigenous to another climate and
permanent political changes should result, the influence of envi-
ronment would still tend to mould the type into harmony with
itself. But for centuries there might be a multiple series of transi-
tional phases, and when growth finally ceased, the resultant type,
while bearing the impress of historical and geographical environ-
ment might differ widely from the autochthonous type which was
wholly or principally the product of the geographical province, as
the modern Frenchman differs from the Gaul and the pre-Gallic
Kelt, or the Spaniard from the Hispanian, etc.”
But, by the “original autochthons” we must understand that he means
the type which is the earliest that historical investigation can discover,
not an absolutely “original” type. For, as Bastian emphatically declares
of the “original representatives of the anthropological province of the42/Ludwig Gumplowicz
Celebes,” the Alfores, “our ignorance of any predecessors is not suffi-
cient proof that there were none.” This is the only worthy conception of
anthropological history, and Bastian is consistent in contending that
“questions of tribal descent have no ethnological meaning, since in the
course of a few generations consanguineous relationships become so
extended and involved as to obliterate tribal lines.” So the “voluminous
question whether the Slavs descended from the Illyrians, the Sarmates
or the Veneti,” seems to him “senseless,” but the point is to learn “the
elements composing the tribe” and the processes going on in it. Hence,
in summing up the task of this “ethnological” science, he says: “In the
ethnological treatment of nationality,” by which, as we know, he under-
stands an ethnical composite,
“we must not divert attention into wrong channels by raising un-
justifiable questions about descent and preventing insight into the
springs of life, neither may we begin the investigation with an
arbitrary hypothesis,”
Biblical tradition, for example,
“but we must proceed from the given circumstances backward,
separating out the elements so long as we have a spark of histori-
cal light left, or so long as collateral proof still serves to guide us
through the darkness of myth.”
The outlines of the science thus incidentally sketched are not the
product of a priori deductions and philosophical speculations. They
developed part by part as he pondered over enormous piles of ethnologi-
cal material collected in the study and on exploring expeditions. He was
forced to proceed systematically. First of all, he had to make a critical
estimate of similar previous attempts; thus he compiled his “History of
Ethnology.” Its logical successor, “Race-thought and the Science of Man”
was probably intended to be introductory to a systematic outline; but
the flood of facts makes the forecast of a system impossible. Finally, in
the “General Principles of Ethnology,” he is more successful, as much
so as is possible with his overflowing information. These three late
works48 best show his epoch-making importance in sociology.
Just as Comte assigns sociology a place after biology in the hierar-
chy of the sciences since it is the youngest, the future science so Bastian
begins his “History of Ethnology” by pointing out that this science oc-The Outlines of Sociology/43
cupies the last place in order of development. This external coincidence
of itself suggests that perhaps both have the same thing in mind.
Indeed, Bastian calls ethnology the “science of man;” which would
also describe sociology. But by ethnology he means a science, or better,
that science of man which takes races49 and not individuals for the sub-
ject-matter of its investigations. A good portion of his scientific pro-
gram is thus comprised in the name. This “science of man” is to con-
sider the individual only as a member of an ethnical group. Its identifi-
cation with sociology which considers him as a member of a social
group is almost complete. Besides, hear what Bastian says of the present
position of ethnology:
“Some inductive natural sciences like botany and chemistry have
had a plain and definite field of observation before them; and
though they could not have arisen before the new epochal age of
discoveries dawned they have since developed systematically, rap-
idly and fully; whereas ethnology, which as science of man should
strive for ultimate conclusions, was incapable of such rapid
progress. It had to wait upon the others. First induction must be-
come fully established in chemistry and physics. Progressing from
inorganic matter to organic, it must reach the limits of the corpo-
real in physiology. After that, continually supplementing its gi-
gantic powers by the comparative method it might venture to in-
vade the mental realm, transforming psychology into a natural
science and analyzing race-thoughts in the name of ethnology.”
Thus the object of ethnology in Bastian’s sense is the discovery of
race-thoughts, and the means is ethnography. Hence Bastian sees the
germs of ethnology in the first of modern geographical discoveries, and
its continuation in the ethnographical and anthropological data of the
nineteenth century. “Firm footing was first gained” with Adeling’s
“Mithridates” and Blumenbach’s works. “After that the development of
the science was only a question of time.” It was strongly promoted by a
treatise on “Ethnology and the History of Primitive Ages” and by the
founding of ethnological museums. Then Prichard, writing in a “reli-
gious sense,” “to prove the unity of mankind and descent from one pair”
gave the science its first handbook.50
Herder, Rousseau and others contributed by discussing the philoso-
phy of history. Men like Auguste and Amadée Thierry hastened to adopt
the new points of view. Interest grew and ethnological societies were44/Ludwig Gumplowicz
founded in Paris and London and correspondence was opened with so-
cieties, journals and museums abroad. Bastian dwells on the signifi-
cance of these steps, holding the energetic development of ethnological
museums to be indispensable, a conditio sine qua non for his future
science.
“With suitable museums not only will many practical ends be re-
alized but especially the basis of induction will be strengthened,
which will be a great advantage in psychology where theoretical
studies first come in contact with the domain of philosophy.”51
But he does not mean the psychology of Fries, Herbart, Beneke,
Fichte, Schopenhauer, Ulrici, and Fischer; nor any “witch’s concoction
before which the philosophers stand dismayed,” but the natural science
of psychology. “In it lies our hope; so far as can be seen, the last hope of
mankind.”52
The essential characteristic of the future psychology, which he de-
sires should go hand in hand with ethnology, is that it does not start
from the individual man. For he “is nothing, at best an idiot; only through
spoken intercourse in society does he become conscious of thought, is
his nature realized. The thought of society, social thought, is the pri-
mary result and the thought of the individual is won by later analysis
from it.”53 These words are golden and we shall accept them as the
motto of sociology. Bastian aptly criticises the current psychology by
saying that “systems of philosophy generally begin with the individual
and have to patch social thought together out of the tatters that have
come into their hands they know not how; whereas, if the social thought
were looked upon as an unmutilated garment, each individual thought
would be found woven into its right place.” Then he unfolds his ethno-
logical plan “to win from social thoughts sufficient material for psycho-
logical investigation.” Not satisfied with the consideration of “the thought-
structures, or thought-trees of civilized races only,” he demands also the
assistance of the “ethnology of the savage races,” of those
“cryptogamic structures, so to speak, in which the processes of
cell life and growth may be more easily observed, in order that the
laws discovered in them may be applied to phanerogamic com-
plexes.” “The laws governing every organism are firmly fixed
within it, even ethical laws are unchangeable. Everywhere in the
five continents, we see thoughts springing forth, similar whereThe Outlines of Sociology/45
the conditions are similar or varying with local differences. As the
same principles regulate the processes of cell-life in the tropic
palm and the arctic fir; as the same plant may have its leaves
broad, curled, or dwarfed to needles according to its habitat, as
there are Asiatic, African and American varieties of the lion, so
the pantheon of the Indian national mind differs from that of the
Grecian and the Scandinavian.” “In all the psychological creations
of society, whether religious, social or aesthetic, there are primi-
tive elementary thoughtsndisputablv recurring and passing through
the same course of development, often with truly startling iden-
tity, like ghostly doubles of distant acquaintances The organic bond
is so close that one with such sharp eyes as Cuvier had for fossils
might reconstruct the whole circle of ideas from the torn frag-
ments and accidental traces.”54
Accordingly, Bastian proposes three specific ethnological problems.
The first is
“to determine the elementary laws of growth in race and national
thoughts, to get something which will do for these what the cell-
theory does for plant-physiology..... The second would be to study
the local influences of environment, to which Buckle in his phi-
losophy yields a preponderating importance..... The last is the in-
vestigation of what might be compared to grafting or to cultivat-
ing ornamental plants by artificial means It is chiefly concerned
with races just beginning to develop a civilization, before they
cross the threshold of history. All changes due to intercourse
whether with friends or foes fall under this head; all such phe-
nomena as were formerly supposed to be borrowed. For whenever
similarity of ideas was discovered, historical hypotheses were im-
mediately recast according, to that principle, whereas, according
to the psychological axioms of ethnology and the methods of com-
parative etymology, the explanation should be first sought in the
most general and elementary laws. When there is no longer possi-
bility of finding it in them, resort may be had to historical inter-
course so far as it seems reasonably certain. When the work is
begun in earnest, ethnology will have to arrange its investigations
according to these three points of view.”55
Such is Bastian’s ethnological method. In his “Race-thoughts” he
worked zealously to prepare suitable material and to arrange it properly
according to this plan. The methodological and propaedeutic hints of46/Ludwig Gumplowicz
the “History” come out more clearly. Carping criticism might complain
of the repetitions; but deeper insight discovers here a hard intellectual
struggle from the darkness of intimation to the light of cognition—the
severe birth-pangs of a new science.
Properly rejecting theories ascribing “the preponderating influence
to environment,” he again lays it down as the problem of inductive eth-
nology,
“disregarding the somewhat superficial local phenomena for which
an historical or geographical explanation must be sought later, to
determine first of all and permanently the uniform laws of the
growth of human race thoughts. It can be done most simply by the
genetic method, starting with uncivilized peoples as the lowest
and most transparent organisms. How development proceeds from
such germs to the most exalted mental products, must be discov-
ered by comparing parallel series of phenomena according to uni-
versal natural principles.”
This is not mere repetition. Each thought is more fully developed
and more clearly expressed. As he progresses he approaches nearer to
sociology. He very properly hopes “by observing uncivilized races and
gaining an insight into the human mind’s processes of growth” to obtain
a perfect key to its “higher stages,” “even to its full development in
civilized peoples.”56 It will not always be possible, however, for
“many primary ideas are so completely eliminated as civilization
progresses that their relation to current ideas is lost and they have
only an archaic value.... But others ... with their offshoots still
permeate modern conceptions.”
He has really projected a complete science of sociology. Indeed in
spite of his peculiar views, he penetrates right to its heart as we shall
see.
“Of the many series of conceptions touching the most important
interests of life, not a few,” he says, “concern the condition of
society when it is coincident with the state or when it is promiscu-
ously stratified into ranks, castes, guilds, parishes, confederacies
etc. But before ethnology can expect to investigate, methodically
awl thoroughly, the ideas prevalent under such circumstances, itThe Outlines of Sociology/47
must first have comprehended the social organism within which
they find expression.”
This organism is the state;
“and all depends on investigating its structure and biology, for
considering man’s immanent social nature, the question of its ori-
gin must be postponed temporarily before the fact of its existence....
Society which, morphologically, leads up to family, tribe and state
and, biologically, to kin, race and nation, exists in greater or smaller
proportion wherever man does for the conception of man as a so-
cial being is real; but the conception of him as an individual is
abstract.”
Thus Bastian stands fully on sociological ground; the involuntary
course of his thought proves, better than any logical argument could,
the intimate connection between his ethnology and our sociology. The
former is nothing but the necessary basis, the latter is the crown of the
ethnological structure.
So great is the power of thought over man, that often a mere acci-
dent is sufficient to awaken a whole system of ideas in the mind. Bastian
scarcely graces the portals of sociology, whereupon they open as of
themselves; and the whole complex mass of problems, overruns him.
Once under the influence of the sociological idea he cannot escape a
storm of perplexities and doubts. Suddenly he notices that “indefinite
terminology leads to various misconceptions, as when ‘race’ (clan, lin-
eage, band, etc.), is used for tribe and phyle (fÚlh), curia and phratry,
gns and gens, etc.”57 Suddenly he sees clearly what he did not see when
he wrote “Man in History,” that the “family, which is the substructure
of the whole development under prevailing conditions, must be aban-
doned in ethnology,” i.e., in sociology.
“Since our idea of the family is abstracted from actual conditions,
it is a particularly definite concept.... We have the schematic forms,
family and race, and think of the latter as arising out of the former
because a race can be analyzed into families, but an actual unit
first (?) appears in the kindred “58
The adverb “first,” seems objectionable here. Sociology does not
“first” begin with the kindred or horde, but begins with it as first natural48/Ludwig Gumplowicz
fact; for it is not and cannot be known what might have been earlier. He
does not clearly understand how the state arises from the first “actual”
or, as we should say, “ultimate” unit, nor what the process of transition
is, for he says that “even in the kindred or phratry there are traces of a
half-conscious interference, which suggest to some the social contract
as the origin of the state; but the state should be attributed to fysiz, to
nature.” He discards the social contract, as might be expected, and sets
the kindred first, conceding the origin of the state from it problemati-
cally. But while emphasizing the natural origin of the state, he gives no
clear account of the transitions from kindred to state, which we shall
treat of later in the appropriate place. However, when once the state has
arisen, he understands its changes perfectly, both as ethnical conglom-
erates and as social growths. By contrasting it with the kindred as the
“actual unit,” he points out that the
“ideal state is never realized for the boisterously waking life of the
race-mind [better race minds] grows more boisterous still in the
effort to unify and nationalize the currents of ethnical feeling by
force of political authority.”
In view of this deeper conception of the state, the ordinary theory of
political organizations and of political rights had to be abandoned.59
When the Semitic sphere of knowledge was added to the classical, the-
ocracy was added to the chief Aristotelian forms of government, king-
dom or monarchy, aristocracy, and city state (besides tyranny, oligar-
chy, and democracy or ochlocracy). But now that the whole globe is
subjected to observation there are so many modifications to be noticed
that the previous systems would be radically transformed were the types
arranged comparatively.
Such reflections do not belong in ethnology. Without observing it,
Bastian has reached social and political science. Later, in his “Prin-
ciples of Ethnology,”60 he realizes it and sets forth the relation between
ethnology and sociology, saying plainly that “ethnology, as ethnical so-
ciology or sociology under many ethnical forms, has to demonstrate the
physiological laws of the life of social organisms.” It is in comparing
savage races and civilized states that he develops his most interesting
ideas and proves the solidarity of “race-thoughts.” But the comparison
ought to be conducted sociologically and not ethnologically. To obtain
positive results it is necessary to treat the natural communities as such.The Outlines of Sociology/49
As he says: “Within the ethnical horizon it is the social organism and
not its components that counts,”61 be that organism the most or the least
civilized race.
“The problems which agitate the life of the most highly developed
races should be apparent in embryonic form even among the low-
est savages, and since it is so much easier to note all the character-
istic points quickly and correctly in such small and transparent
organisms, they should help us to understand the more compli-
cated wonders of creation and to reduce legitimate data to law.”
It would be impossible to comprehend the intellectual genesis of the
“more complicated wonders of creation” without resorting to the “smallest
organisms.”
“While modern races, like crystals clear and polished and radiant
with beauty, stand out in history in such definite proportions that
scientific measurement is quite possible, in the ethnology of sav-
age races, eve with a chaotic seething mass62 which, however, ap-
plying a chemical metaphor to race-thoughts, holds primary men-
tal elements in solution.”
These are what Bastian wants. To seek through the great variety of
living forms for the earliest germinal stages of the “primary mental ele-
ments” and to watch them growing into “race-thoughts” is the task of
his ethnology. He has a noble object before him and, with true and jus-
tifiable enthusiasm, he proclaims the way, and the grand visions that
will meet the astonished eye when it is reached.
 “After we know the law of development, it is possible to take a
perfected product and trace the stages backwards to the starting
point, the relative beginning. Many historical principles have thus
been established. Microscopical analysis may proceed even to the
cellular basis of ethnology, wherein reliable facts may be obtained
concerning the conditions precedent to existence, concerning the
enigma of being and becoming. Hitherto the investigation has been
purely philosophical; hereafter psychological inductions will be
used.” “Diving into the stream of thought, we shall only raise the
secrets of mysticism from the dark depths; but having the skeleton
race-thoughts objectively before us, we can handle, measure and
study them and, by sufficient analysis, reason back to the law of50/Ludwig Gumplowicz
development in thought itself.”63
This law should explain everything, but it can be learned only from
the “primary elemental thoughts of savage races and the changes they
undergo.”
“In contrast with narrow ideas of history and the early efforts to
attribute religious and social similarities to presumed intercourse
in the past, the idea must arise, as the geographical horizon was
extended and material increased, that the task of ethnology is to
go back to the elementary laws of development in race-psychol-
ogy, and then to make as much allowance for the admitted causes
and only so much as topographical reasons require.”64
We have perhaps dwelt too long on Bastian’s “History” and “Race-
thoughts.” Yet the fundamental sociological principles and methodologi-
cal suggestions contained in them cannot be overvalued. These two works
are positively epoch-making in sociology. It might have been expected
that he would have carried out his ideas in the “Principles of Ethnol-
ogy,” which soon appeared; it might have been expected that, after col-
lecting material for thirty years and after preparing himself by such
deep reflections on the character, problem and object of ethnology and
“ethnical sociology,” he would have given us finally an elaborate pre-
sentation of the science. But unfortunately he has not fulfilled this rea-
sonable expectation. Our previous remark is confirmed. The abundance
of the material interferes to prevent a clear and complete treatment of
the “principles” of the science.
The most that the later work furnishes seems scanty beside the plan
he projected in the two former. Not that the chapters seem deficient in
form and matter; but six (!) chapters treating six topics do not comprise
all the points which should at least be enumerated among the “prin-
ciples” of the science. Bastian treats in succession (1) geographical prov-
inces, incidentally touching on the question of the unity of the human
race; (2) implements, the first vehicle of civilization; (3) property, the
foundation of political order; (4) marriage; (5) rights, and (6) religion.
But what of phenomena so essential to “ethnical sociology,” as, slavery,
sovereignty, state and society, political economy, commerce and the like?
Where is there the least intimation of the social development in local
centres of civilization? The development of single institutions, like prop-
erty, gives no idea of the development of human societies themselves,The Outlines of Sociology/51
which in “ethnical sociology” is the most important thing. This is
Bastian’s weak point. He is so absorbed with minutiae that he loses
sight of the object as a whole. There is also another mistake, mathemati-
cal, it might be called. He states the sociological problem incorrectly,
and consequently cannot obtain the correct solution. Starting “from one
given point,” which is falsely held to be the soul, he wants to explain the
social development of human societies as the result of “thought.” “In
the beginning was the thought.” “Thought” grows and develops; all
phenomena are but variegated forms of thought, changing with time and
circumstances.
Strange that Faust’s misgivings did not warn him.
“‘In the Beginning was the thought,’
This first line let me weigh completely,
Lest my impatient pen proceed too fleetly
It is the thought which uncorks, creates, indeed?”
Had he taken to heart the deep meaning of the poet’s words:
“‘In the Beginning was the act,”’65
he would have come closer to the sociological problem.
Much as he afterwards tried, he never succeeded in eradicating ide-
alistic philosophy even from his latest works. At bottom he is always a
“race-psychologist,” seeking the cause of all social phenomena in the
“soul” of each race but (we speak not as combating idealism with nar-
row materialism) do we not daily see that it is always the act which
excites reflection? Does not the thought follow? The act is produced by
natural forces that have no connection with the soul. Man acts accord-
ing to natural law and thinks humanly afterwards, notwithstanding the
approved maxim “first think, then act,” the worth of which for the indi-
vidual we would never challenge. But social development and the be-
havior of communities is another thing. Blind natural forces prevail;
there is no thought, no reflection, always an onward tendency following
eternal laws and manifested in the form of acts. Then the act creates the
thought which the idealist refers to the “soul” of the actor as “motive”
of the act. As the acts arising from unitary natural laws are harmonious
and regular, so are the thoughts hence the law of the regular growth of
“race-thoughts,” Bastian’s “race-psychology.” But we would not in the52/Ludwig Gumplowicz
least depricate Bastian’s services by these criticisms. For perhaps no
one human being has done so much for science as he, and we hope his
services may long be continued.
We had to say of him that, finding so many trees, he fails to see the
forest or, at least, does not let us see it. Now we come to a younger
writer, who manages his material masterfully and works the great array
of scattered ethnological data into great mosaics. Julius Lippert always
presents the whole object in broad lines.
He began with a special department of sociology, comparative reli-
gion, and has advanced in fact, if not in name, to sociology in the best
sense of the word. His first two books, on “Soul Worship” and “Sys-
tems of Religion,” were thoroughly reviewed in “Der Rassenkampf.”
Let us recall briefly that in them he clearly and convincingly establishes
a universal law of the origin and development of religion, thus laying a
totally new and a sociological foundation for its scientific study.66
Undisturbed by the ill-natured criticisms of the Literarisches
Centralblatt, this very productive author has since enriched science,
and especially sociology, by two valuable works: the “History of the
Family,” and the “General History of the Priesthood.”67 He possesses a
high degree of talent for tracing the development of social or psycho-
social institutions through the history of all races and ages. His history
of the family is a model of sociological composition.
“Every man considers his family organization the normal human
form and is prejudiced in favor of the write. who thus treats it. But
that is not looking at history objectively,”
he says significantly in beginning. Then after gratefully recognizing the
services of Bachofen, the discoverer of “mother-right,” and showing us
the original mother-family, “organized upon the basis of mother-love,”
he goes on to show the rising “father-right” and the older father-family,
“not resting on the principle of kinship or any consciousness of it, but
on the principle of might, sovereignty and possession.”68 Finally he shows
the latest phase of development, the “younger father-family,” “in which
the terms father and son have come to imply consanguineous relation-
ship.”
He raised Bachofen’s theory of mother-right, which several writers
have since accepted, beyond all further doubt, adducing “rudiments in
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much light upon primitive groups and the organization of human societ-
ies in which “stranger and enemy are synonymous terms” and “all are
strangers who are not united by ties of blood or marriage to the same
small organization.”69
He discovers that there was a prehistoric variety of the family in
Germany “later than the one with maternal succession,” one in which
the man is “lord of herds and slaves,” “the woman belongs to the man as
a part of his possessions“ and “her children are his not simply if and
because he begat them, but because the mother is his.70 This “ancient
family” goes hand in hand with a “developed system of slavery,” for the
latter “proceeds undeniably from rising father-right in the older sense.”71
He shows various stages intermediate between the older and the
younger father-family.
“Whether the old union shall be preserved or dissolved into sepa-
rate families, depends on occupation and property-relations largely;
but eventually the question arises everywhere.”72
Later, we shall consider whether he has made it perfectly clear that
the motives he alleges are sufficient to produce the change; but it must
be recognized that he was the first, so far as we know, to prove that this
is the course of development and to attach importance to it. He was the
first to call attention to the contrast between the older family and the
younger one in which we live. This is no ordinary service, for the prob-
lem was a difficult one. “Have we any idea,” he asks justly, “we who are
wont to think that family relations are natural and have always existed,
have we any idea by what tortuous, weary paths mankind reached this
form of existence?”73 He has pointed them out with great clearness. The
task of the future will be to investigate each stage of the long way in
detail.
Lippert’s third sociological problem, the priesthood, surpasses, if
that were possible, both the others in scope and difficulty; for it is inti-
mately connected with almost everything that is important sociologi-
cally. The priesthood, as a body, has always and everywhere striven to
control all spheres of social life; so that its history necessarily involves
consideration of the most important of them: religion, custom, rights,
sovereignty state and society, etc. He did not shrink before the difficul-
ties of the task but has produced a significant sociological work which
is a pioneer in several directions54/Ludwig Gumplowicz
He starts with the same theory that the root of all religions is in
“soul-worship” and that religious ceremonies are derived from religious
conceptions.
“Especially is it a fact,” he continues, “that the unseen is not thought
of as a natural force, even when manifested in a natural effect, but
it is conceived to be a personal spirit analogous to the human soul.
The savage is utterly unable to comprehend a natural force; but as
soon as he begins to think logically every death suggests the idea
of a personal spirit. It is only by grasping this fact firmly that we
can see how religious observances, however complex originate in
human logic and how the unity of the latter explains the essential
similarity of the former even to the remotest corners of the earth.”74
This citation indicates the plan of the work and justifies the method
of general treatment adopted. At bottom, Bastian’s thought is the same;
but his terms, race-soul and race-thought, are less clear than Lippert’s
plain “unity of human logic.” Since human logic, when stimulated by
one and the same fact, soul-worship, can not conceal its character even
in the complex texture of religious observances, it must be universally
demonstrable that the principle underlying them is unitary; and this
Lippert has succeeded in doing by describing the life of the groups indi-
vidually. For though soul-worship originated everywhere in the most
primitive human logic, its development varied with the kind and degree
of social life in each group. It would be impossible for us here to present
the development of the priesthood in detail, the world over, as he does or
discuss the purely sociological questions involved. But his view on the
question fundamental to all sociology, the origin of political organiza-
tions, must be presented because it differs essentially from that which
we have hitherto defended and upon which we base the present work.
While we hold that every political organization, and hence every devel-
oping civilization, begins at the moment when one horde permanently
subjects another; and while ate do not hesitate to recognize that the most
cruel and barbarous conquerors are the blind instruments of human
progress and powerfully promote Civilization, nay even found it; Lippert
sees nothing but the victory of “barbarism” over “civilization” in the
undeniable fact that states are founded by conquest. He holds that civi-
lization begins and grows in “peaceful” companionship within the primi-
tive horde, defending the view warmly decrying the opposing view at-
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enlist our sympathies, we would gladly accept them in preference to our
own if we could be convinced of their truth. But we will reserve the
discussion until later, simply citing some of his statements here.
“Mexican history,” he says, “is full of tales of invasion, but in
every case dominion fell to the rude sons of barbarism, not one of
the conquering races, Toltecs, Chichimechs, and Aztecs in turn,
brought civilization to the charming land of Anahuac. Rather, the
old tragedy was oft repeated. The races which had been hundreds
and perhaps thousands of years in rearing a civilization in their
upland valleys are the ‘good house-wives’ of history, of whom
nobody speaks. But the Bedouins, repeatedly breaking in from the
wilderness of barbarism, open beaten off, but finally victorious,
made civilized man with all his skill their slave, and they are praised
as the creators of it all. In the school-books they are called the
founders of civilization, as if they had brought it from the wilder-
ness. The sympathizer with those quiet and ceaseless workers, the
lineage of peace, must be satisfied if the object of his regard is not
accused of the most profligate ‘corruption’ which a healthful breeze
from the desert must needs blow away. Fortunately the conquerors
do not always want to destroy all of it. They are ready to adopt the
most serviceable parts and even to increase and extend them by
the power of organization.”75
Lippert makes no secret of the fact that his judgment is influenced
by sympathy with the conquered; which makes his opinion the less ob-
jective. Moreover, he concedes to the “rude sons of barbarism,” a “power
of organization” sufficient to “increase and extend” the civilization of
the “lineage of peace.” We are thankful for both the confession and the
concession. Later we shall have occasion to show that “power of orga-
nization” is an invaluable trait of the “rude sons of barbarism” and that
the “lineage of peace,” after being powerfully organized, will add not
“sand upon sand” but block upon block, “to rear a civilization.” But
reserving the discussion, let us hear further evidence in support of his
views.
Historians have generally followed Garcilasso de la Vega in dating
the beginning of Peruvian civilization from the time when the Incas con-
quered the ancient Peruvians and founded a kingdom. Lippert discards
this conception and agrees with the views of the English traveler
Hutchinson, who is “convinced from personal inspection that we are
here dealing with a civilization that began long before the time of the56/Ludwig Gumplowicz
Incas and progressed gradually.” “This opinion will doubtless gain
ground,” says Lippert; and he believes himself justified in considering
that the government of the Incas, as well as that of the Toltecs and
Chichimecs, was “the dominion of an energetic conqueror over races
that had already founded a settled civilization.” This may be the case,
however, without justifying Lippert’s theory. Everywhere we see re-
peated instances of civilized states subjected by more or less “barba-
rous” conquerors; as China was by the Mongols and Roman Italy by the
Goths and other German tribes. The Incas were not necessarily the first
conquerors, the Anglo-Saxons, of Peru; they may have been its Normans.
This argument alone is not sufficient to confirm Lippert’s theory of the
generatio æquivoca, the problematic genesis, of civilization.
Again, ancient Egypt is cited. “The historical events” seem to Lippert
not “essentially different from those which welded the Peruvian state
together.” But they may be explained in more than one way and, it seems
to us, justify Lippert’s views less than the Peruvian and Mexican cases
cited.
“As there the low country on the holy lake, so here the rich delta
lands of the holy river between desert and wilderness first invited
to permanent occupation. The races in the delta, pressed by the
nomadic hordes to the border of the sea, had to sustain life in
permanent settlements by provident labor, they subdued the wa-
ters and made the first stride toward civilization, learning to feel
their higher human value in comparison with the barbarians.”
Let us not forget that Lippert is here speaking of the “object” of his
“sympathy:”
“We may assume,” he continues, “that there was in antiquity a
like number of small tribes leading a pastoral life and cultivating
a piece of land incidentally, as many modern Africans do, yet never
leaving a certain definite territory. The fertility of the inundated
lands permitted such an arrangement and the ‘red-land’ of the
desert remained the home of the nomads.”
After this rather apodictic description of the settlement of the “lin-
eage of peace” on the lowlands of the Nile, he goes on somewhat doubt-
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“Naturally we do not know the lowland races of antiquity became
politically united. But the union might very well be due to the
advance of the nomadic hordes which even to-day sweep over the
plains and neighboring deserts. Certain it is that in historical times
as well as in prehistoric Mexico, tubes of higher civilization have
been united politically under the sovereignty of tubes of younger
civilization, among whom the tribes spreading over both plain
and desert must doubtless be reckoned.”76
However much we may sympathize with Lippert’s theory, is this
statement of the facts sufficient to convince us of its correctness? He is
unable to explain “how the prehistoric lowland races became united
politically.” We should explain, though only by analogy from historical
experience, that political union and organization were in all probability
due to subjection by the “sons of barbarism.” This is not a pleasant
explanation either to Lippert or to us; but it seems to be the only correct
one. We hold that sociological laws prevail unchanged whether we have
historical evidence of the fact or not. Applying Lyell’s geological method77
to sociology, we should say that the “sovereignty” of the “rude sons of
barbarism” was necessary to organize the “lineage of peace” and to
cause the succeeding development of civilization. As Lippert concedes
that he knows no explanation, he should not take it amiss when we say
that his theory is simply an interpretation of the facts dictated by sym-
pathy with one party and consequent antipathy toward the other. But we
leave the question unsettled. It is possible that in some lands civilization
arose from the subjection of one tribe to another and that in other lands
it was autogenetic in the “lineage of peace.” However, autogenesis is
contrary to the experience of historical times and needs to be established
beyond a doubt.
This indication of the contents of Lippert’s work must suffice. It is
not possible even to trace the course of his investigations into the devel-
opment of the priesthood, much less to do justice to the many historical
and sociological questions which he treats from new standpoints. He is
master of the art of giving life and artistic shape to the sociological
material which others have collected; with that we must stop.
Comte, Spencer, Bastian and Lippert are the leaders in sociology.
What others have done is of secondary importance and will be men-
tioned incidentally as the discussion proceeds. But we must speak of
several whole branches of science which concern sociology more or less
intimately and co-operate to prepare the ground for it in various ways.58/Ludwig Gumplowicz
First in order are economics and politics, in which it was very diffi-
cult to get an adequate conception of society. What Mohl, Gneist and
Stein did in this direction, we have duly commended elsewhere;78 it is
only necessary to recall that these scientists conceived society to be
preponderantly economic. Especially Stein has only “economic” groups
of men in mind though, to be sure, he is thinking of their relation to the
state as political power “above society.” This simple economic concep-
tion of society, partial as it is in view of social questions, pervades po-
litical economy so thoroughly as to make it in common speech the “so-
cial science.” Carey’s “Principles of Social Science,” wherein he handles
political economy simply, had the same effect. Baerenbach, in his bib-
liographical sketch of the “social sciences,” treats political economists
chiefly, noting their relation to the “social questions” in particular. Like-
wise Menger, discussing the “Method of the Social Sciences,” treats the
method of political economy alone, which he looks upon as pre-emi-
nently cat/ ezochn, the social science. In spite of this narrowness the
great sociological importance of political economy should not be over-
looked. It was the first science that recognized that men’s actions, which
alone it considered, were controlled by economic laws. Seeing that the
regular transitions from one economic phase to another were determined
by external factors, political economists were forced to accept the idea
of development in accordance with law. What is still more important,
political economy had in the nature of the case to treat not individuals,
who might evade every rule and law, but social groups: landlords, manu-
facturers, merchants, artisans, laborers, agriculturists, etc. So political
economy became the best fitting school for sociology; and economic
thought led the way to sociological thought.
The connection between political economy and sociology nowhere
appears so prominently as in Carey’s works. But this is due to this
versatility. His field of view extends far beyond the merely economic
events of social life. The man who defended the unity of science in
Comte’s sense and strove to demonstrate it in all the phenomena of life,
could not be content to consider economic events exclusively. He made
very instructive digressions on various sociological matters.79
The socialists also were pioneers in sociology. They pointed out
that the relations between the laboring and the property classes, be-
tween large and small industries, etc., develop in conformity to law.80
Next to political economy, the science of comparative law has accu-
mulated the most valuable sociological material and awakened the mostThe Outlines of Sociology/59
fundamental ideas. Since every domain of social life fashions its own
rights, this science embraces the whole social order and every domain
may be considered from its point of view.
Sporadic attempts at scientific comparison long since demonstrated
that, among the most various peoples of ancient and modern times, similar
rights rise and develop analogously to a degree that is inadequately ex-
plained by assuming historical relationship and transfer of ideas. We
have seen how Bastian protests and offers instead an explanation based
on race-psychology. In any event reflective comparison must suggest
that rights develop according to law; and from this idea it is only a step
to a “Natural Law” and a “Natural Science of Rights,”81 as Post called
his earliest writings. In them he presented the physical idea that “the
world’s history is the unfolding of material forces by the specialization
of universal types.” But as he worked at the problem incessantly year
after year he emancipated himself from this idea so that, in another
series of writings, he made a very objective compilation of interesting
material for a comparative science of rights.82 The subtitles of these
works are characteristic of the general course of his ideas. While the
first, in 1875 and 1876, were introductory contributions to a “universal
comparative science of rights,” he offers in 1880–81 material for a “com-
parative ethnological basis” for the science, and in his latest work, in
1884, attempts to construct “a universal science of rights on a socio-
logical basis.” Thus we see that from all sides, ethnology, political
economy, and comparative law, scientific ideas tend toward sociology
and help to establish it.
However, traces of his “physical” views of the science still appear.
In most of his works he advances the idea of “species-organism,” an
order of structure higher than natural organisms. We can not accept any
such idea, because there is no reality behind it; but we shall not dispute
with him, as he uses the term less and less frequently and drops it alto-
gether in his latest work
With this correction, we can accept his views of the development of
juridical and political life. “There are definite laws,” he writes, “for the
development of every organic structure within the human race and above
individuals,” for the development of human communities, we should
say;
“and they can be discovered by comparing the corresponding pe-
riods of development of all the species-organisms which are liv-60/Ludwig Gumplowicz
ing or have lived on the earth. It is the first task of the future
political and juridical science to determine them.”83
He distinguishes several phases in the history of the “species-or-
ganism,” the first of which he calls a “kith and kin,”84 or “peace” con-
federation.
“The most primitive form of organization in the life of the human
species is the confederation of kith and kin, a number of men
leagued together, on the basis of common blood, for (?) offense
and defence.”
This forcibly recalls the “social contract.” We should substitute in
its stead the simple “primitive horde” as the first natural recognizable
fact. It is neither an “alliance,” which implies a previous state or act of
separation, nor an “offensive and defensive” alliance, which would im-
ply a “social contract.” Yet, with a slight correction, the “kith and kin”
confederation might stand as the most primitive social formation, if Post’s
statement of its development into higher social forms could be accepted.
But that is difficult, for he neither explains development nor shows on
what it is based’ but presents it as spontaneously following an inner
law.
“Every form of organization,” he writes, “proceeds from this and
can be traced back to it. The kith and kin confederation is the
normal form of organization in hunting and nomadic races and by
growth front within outward is often extended beyond the narrow
circle originally included until it has become a system of tubes or
a race with institutions considerably developed.”
This is not clear. Such development never takes place by “growth
from within outward.” Besides Post takes no account of the motives and
factors impelling it. “When the kith and kin confederation adopts a settled
life its old constitution decays to a certain degree.”85 How it becomes
settled does not worry him. “It takes place,” “the confederation decays,”
he says, content that there is some “law” behind the changes. But such
statements are unsatisfactory, to the sociologist at least. Although Post’s
services in the domain of juridical science must be recognized and al-
though he has industriously collected suitable material and tirelessly
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ment is not thorough; it shows that he has no clear idea of what social
development is. Even his latest work on the “Basis of Rights and the
History of their Development,” though clearer and indicating progress
in every direction, is still unsatisfactory on this point. We can overlook
his old hobby, that “the human race, like every organic race on our
planet, constitutes a biological organism;”86 but we must reproach him
for retaining, even in his latest work, the fundamentally false views of
social development criticised above, especially as the literature of the
subject ought to have helped him to make many corrections. He says,
e.g., that
“a number of individuals descended from a common parent or
parents, affords a nucleus from which a tribe may arise. As the
offspring grow up, the procreative process is continued and the
tribe becomes a union of tribes. After a number of generations, we
speak of a race, then of a people, then of allied peoples.”
But what scientific proof does he offer? The same naïve idea underlies
the Biblical story and leads with infallible logic back to Adam and Eve.
Or is it a scientific explanation of development to say that “with the
decay of common tribal life the mutual rights and duties of the indi-
vidual members are differentiated,”87 and that after the “gradual decay
of original universal common life,”88 the “human individual by degrees
becomes endowed with rights,”89 which “slowly develop in times of
peace.”90 These are simply vague propositions about unclear ideas, con-
sequently they make nothing clear.91
But we must be grateful for the material which Post has accumu-
lated, in spite of its defective presentation. He also deserves full recog-
nition for tirelessly disseminating the idea of a “natural science of rights”
of a “comparative ethnological science of rights,” and finally of “social
science.”
He conceives the social problem quite in Bastian’s sense however.
“The great fundamental thought of modern social science is to
discover the essential nature of the human mind from what it has
deposited in the several domains of race-life. Sociological juris-
prudence searches for the essential nature of the human juridical
consciousness in what it teas deposited in the juridical views and
institutions of all races of the earth.”62/Ludwig Gumplowicz
With Post as with Bastian, the “mind,” “consciousness,” is the pri-
mary, the world-moving principle, so to speak, the object of all investi-
gation; and social phenomena are only means of exploring this inmost
cause of all that happens. We shall soon have opportunity to demon-
strate our own view that what happens of natural necessity is primary
and emits “mind” as flowers do fragrance. “Juridical institutions” are
not the deposit of juridical consciousness. On the contrary, the latter is
deposited from the former. History begets the mind, not the mind his-
tory.
Political economy and the comparative study of rights and religion
concern particular domains of social life and hence anticipate parts only
of sociology. There are other branches of philosophy, however, which
have treated the supreme problem of sociology itself, or at least its most
important principle, though not under that name.
Here we will mention only the philosophy of history. It treats of the
historical development of mankind, its object is to seek the “philosophi-
cal idea.” It is clear how close it approaches to the supreme problem of
sociology; and the sociological importance of its literature is apparent
at once.
Pretty much everything written on this subject before 1876 up in R.
Rocholl’s prize essay. Rocholl has mastered the art of letting all the
philosophers of the world speak through him, while he betrays not a
single original thought to the acutest reader. A whole volume, and noth-
ing original! He understands how prizes are won. Whoever is curious to
see all that philosophers would interpret into the history of mankind
should read this book. It makes the reader dizzy; or, he thinks that Rocholl
is exhibiting a fools’ gallery. In fact, the philosophy of history was an
untimely birth. The “idea in human history” was spoken of before any-
one half understood what human history was. For, what is the bit of
Mediterranean history compared with all the actual history of man on
this planet which the philosophers knew nothing about? How childish
any opinion of the whole when they knew only the least part!
Yet the stimulus of their sociological ideas is considerable. The most
important difference between sociology and the philosophy of history is
that the latter would deliver an opinion on a whole which it did not
know; whereas sociology, being aware that the whole can never be known,
will judge only of a process which is the same here and everywhere,
which transpires in the same way to-day before our eyes as it transpired
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whence and the whither and the wherefore. This is its claim to decided
pre-eminence over the philosophy of history, from the ill success of which
it learns valuable lessons.
The transition from philosophy of history to sociology was more
direct in France than elsewhere. In Germany the so-called history of
civilization intervened. The history of human civilization from its be-
ginning to the present day is almost, at least might easily become, soci-
ology. Kolb, Henne am Rhyn, and especially Hellwald, have accom-
plished much in this field, correcting many things that the philosophers
had spoiled. They introduced a wholesome soberness into the concep-
tion of human development. The indefatigable Hellwald makes use of
all sorts of anthropological and ethnological material, extending the
horizon of the history of civilization even to the ultimate beginning of
prehistoric time. The investigations of Lubbock, Tylor and Caspari in
this field are especially helpful, and in anthropology and ethnology. Waitz-
Gerland, Perty and Peschel have contributed their share of valuable
sociological material.
Thus, there is no lack of sociological material, and Comte Spencer,
Bastian and Lippert have imparted the breath of life to sociology; may it
never lack for disciples to labor in it and cherish it unremittingly.92II. Fundamental Conceptions
I. The Three Classes of Phenomena
It is an old saying that division and classification are means to knowl-
edge. The more appropriate the means, the greater is the profit that may
be expected from their use. To this end that which has been character-
ized as the “world of phenomena,” all the phenomena that surround us,
has been repeatedly classified. But with increasing knowledge, the plan
of classification has to be changed; deeper and deeper grounds of divi-
sion are discovered, approximating nearer and nearer to the very es-
sence of the phenomena. A superficial examination served to distin-
guish animate from inanimate nature. According to another very com-
mon classification, the phenomena that were perceived by the organs of
sense were put in one class and those that were perceived the mental
faculties were put in another; the former were called material, the latter
mental phenomena.
As knowledge advanced, inanimate nature was divided into inor-
ganic and organic. Then another class, composed of phenomena which
were referred to the soul of man as source, was co-ordinated with the
organic and characterized as psychic. Thus three classes, inorganic,
organic, and psychic,93 were obtained. It is apparent from the terminol-
ogy itself what phenomena are included under each class; and it is just
as clear that this classification is intimately connected with a given stage
of human knowledge, with the knowledge of the distinction between
inorganic and organic matter. It seemed desirable not to call organic
matter simply “inanimate;” for the inorganic inanimate had to be distin-
guished. But there was also a growing conviction that all of man’s ac-
tions, his whole behavior, at least all the phenomena affected by him,
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to him. If convictions change on this point, if it is discovered that there
is no such soul, that man’s thoughts, and the whole of his so-called
spiritual life, is only a manifestation of the physiological functions of
his organism, that basis of classification will be dropped; the psychic
phenomena will be included with the organic.
Thus classification is a means of promoting knowledge and knowl-
edge acquired is, in turn, the basis of new and more accurate classifica-
tions. But it often happens that phenomena are forced upon our atten-
tion which we cannot immediately identify with any crass hitherto known,
we are not sure how to classify them. In such cases, we include them in
some class already constituted, in spite of the differences, or we make a
sub-class for them; or, finally, having found some characteristic which
is peculiar to them, we proceed to constitute a totally new class. A re-
cent instance is furnished by the “social” phenomena. It was observed
that they differed from other phenomena; there were many reasons why
they should be recognized as a special class. But nobody knew exactly
what to do with them. They could not be included with either the organic
or the inorganic; they presented the characteristics of neither the ani-
mate nor the inanimate; they did not seem to be purely psychic, for they
did not emanate from the individual soul; indeed they appeared to sweep
whole aggregates of men, in spite of will and consciousness, along with
them. So they presented a problem of classification, the solution of which
was attempted in various ways.
It was perceived that especially those phenomena which are mani-
fested in the state, political revolutions, party conflicts, political en-
deavors, etc., are social. Some attempted to class them all with “or-
ganic” phenomena. It is really so comfortable in old quarters, where
everything is familiar, that people will cramp themselves a little, if nec-
essary, in order to avoid the trouble of moving! Hence arose the “or-
ganic” theory of the state. Schaefffle has shown that all the so-called
social phenomena are in reality nothing but “organic functions of the
social body,” which has cells, tissue nerve muscle, flesh, bones and blood,
just like every animal organism. There are still people, not only in Ger-
many but in France, who accept this literally; we do not.
There were others who were less imaginative and more reflective,
yet abhorred the overthrow of old and familiar arrangements no less
than the former. They represented that everything that takes place in
connection with the state is manifestly done by man—for who else could
do it? But whatever man does issues from the soul within him. Hence66/Ludwig Gumplowicz
social phenomena are psychic. To be sure, a social occurrence is differ-
ent from an individual thought or feeling. But the difference can be
disposed of by making a sub-class, “psychic” is “psychic.” Thus that
estimable scholar, Ruemelin (again from many examples citing the one
we have first at hand), treats social phenomena as psychic and “social
laws as a special kind of psychic” laws.94
But we can no more consent to subordinate social phenomena under
the psychic than we can to reckon them as organic. Rather it seems to us
proper to divide the phenomena which we perceive into three classes:
physical, mental and social.
We classify social phenomena apart from all others because the
ends of scientific investigation will be best served by treating them sepa-
rately. They constitute a unique group, distinguished by several funda-
mental traits.
It is certain that they cannot be perceived by the senses, and there
was thus much reason for reckoning them with mental phenomena. But
social phenomena happen only through the co-operation of a number of
men, of an aggregate, whereas mental phenomena, strictly so-called, are
inseparable from the mind of the individual. They originate in it and are
limited to it. Thus all conditions of the soul, all scientific activity and
each artistic manifestation of the human mind, all works in art and sci-
ence—so far as the mind perceives them, all thoughts and ideas which,
issuing from the human mind, are perceived by the mind, are mental
phenomena. But all relations of men with one another, all their eco-
nomic, political and juridical relations, for example, are social. A num-
ber or aggregate of men is their distinguishing trait. It is not necessarily
present in mental phenomena in the real sense, but without it a social
phenomenon is unthinkable.
As the classification of phenomena is only an aid to knowledge, and
as the world which envelops us is strictly one and unitary, so, it is con-
ceived, there is only one science. For, as we have shown elsewhere,95 the
object of science is to discover the laws that control the sequence and
the development of phenomena. Yet the division of science into parts
devoted to particular classes of phenomena is common and has been
recognized as proper. It satisfies the need of a division of scientific la-
bor. The division into “natural” sciences and “mental” (or moral or ethico-
political) sciences is the best known and the most usual. It is parallel
with the classification of phenomena as physical and mental.
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ganic nature and with the physical laws governing them. The mental
sciences sought for the laws controlling the human mind. Then, when
Comte and Quetelet classified social phenomena apart for scientific study
and asserted that they too were controlled by fixed laws, the question of
defining social laws arose. It was not easy to explain what they were.
Yet, if there is a science of social phenomena if there is such a thing as
sociology, we must be able to give a clear positive definition of social
laws
In order to define them we must recall what a natural law is. Apply-
ing our idea of a natural law in general to social phenomena, we shall
get an idea of what a social natural law, or, briefly, a social law is in the
abstract. Finally, we shall test the objections commonly raised to the
existence of social laws. If they can be refuted we may enter the domain
of social science. For to this he must hold fast: without social laws there
can be no social science.
When we find the same phenomena time and again occurring to-
gether or in the same order, we say that it is due to a law. Obviously, we
are using an analogy. When an act of legislation directs how a thing
shall be done, it is uniformly done in the prescribed way. When, in na-
ture, we see a phenomenon repeatedly occurring in the same form, we
conceive that it is the result of some higher will incorporated in a “law,”
and we speak of the law of the phenomena without hesitation. We thus
acquire for a series of phenomena an easily intelligible expression, a
simple formula.96
The question then arises: Can such laws be stated for social phe-
nomena also; in a word, are there social laws? We ought to answer in
the affirmative if there are social phenomena which constantly occur
together or in the same order, so that we may ascribe them to an hypo-
thetical higher will, to a “law,” as we do physical phenomena. That the
mutual deportment of social groups, the formation of social communi-
ties, their development and their decay so occur, history and experience
prove undeniably. Hence, we may direct investigation in the social do-
main with a view to formulating the social laws of those phenomena.
This matter is so simple and self-evident that there would seem to
be no need of wasting any more words over it. But, unfortunately, it is
not acknowledged by everybody. The formulation of social laws, i.e.,
natural laws of social development, is violently opposed by some who
are anxious to maintain man’s free-will in its integrity. For it is feared
that a death-blow would be dealt it, if natural laws of social develop-68/Ludwig Gumplowicz
ment were generally accepted.
The struggle between these two principles, whether to apply natural
law or free-will to social phenomena, is well portrayed by Ruemelin’s
experience. His candor deserves special recognition. In his earlier years
this scholar was inclined to accept natural law in social phenomena
which, as we have seen, he made a sub-class of the psychic. He ex-
pressed this view in an academic discourse “On the Concept of Social
Law”97 in 1868. After defining natural law in general to be “an elemen-
tary expression for the uniform behavior of force in each and every
case,” he questioned “whether this idea of law which is taken originally
from the processes of inanimate nature is also applicable to the pro-
cesses of animate nature,” and answered in the affirmative, though with
no great assurance.
“As a result, we have found three kinds of forces,” he said, “physi-
cal, organic and psychic, no other kind can be conceived co-ordi-
nate with them. Social phenomena are a sub-class of the psychic.
There are two kinds of psychic phenomena, the psychological and
the social.”
He seems to concede almost without reserve that the phenomena of
political economy are social. Since this science
“starts, expressly or tacitly, with the hypothesis that man has a
strong inclination to supply himself plentifully arid at the least
possible cost with the means of satisfying his desires,” it “seems
quite proper that the fundamental propositions concerning com-
petition, the movements of prices and wages, and the circulation
of money should be called laws. They fulfill the requirements ex-
actly. They indicate the elementary and uniform behavior of psy-
chic forces in a mass” or aggregate.
As to whether the so-called statistical laws should be recognized as
social, Ruemelin has serious doubts.
“Psychology,” he argues, “considers the psychic forces observable
on typical individuals to be characteristic of the class; social sci-
ence observes the same forces operating in aggregates of individu-
als and notices the changes thus produced. Hence social laws should
express in elementary form the behavior of psychic forces in ag-
gregates.”The Outlines of Sociology/69
But he is not certain that statistical laws satisfy these conditions.
Some weighty objections prevent him from recognizing that everything
proclaimed by the statisticians to be law is social; and he is right per-
haps. He sees in the reasoning of the statistician, Quetelet, especially,
“significant truths and serious misunderstandings compactly woven to-
gether;” and in that, too, we will agree with him. He closes his “Search
for Social Laws” unsatisfied. “The return was not great.” But that is no
occasion of reproach “The youngest sciences are always the hardest,”
so he comforts the sociologists. “They treat problems that others had
quite overlooked or had not the means to grapple with.” He has the
“highest opinion of the future of statistics, of the scientific value of a
methodical observation of facts, if continued and developed.” In short,
he does not give up hope that real social laws may thereby be discov-
ered, though he does not conceal his misgivings. This was in 1868.
Ten years later he spoke again on the “laws of history,” and de-
scribed the observations he had made in the meanwhile. The riper
scholar’s disappointment is undisguised. The hopes he had cherished a
decade before had been completely dissipated. The serious doubts he
had entertained had been fully verified.
“I thought that there must be” social laws, he says almost sadly,
“and that statistics would be especially helpful in discovering them.
I have had the task constantly in mind for many years, I have
sought for them not simply in statistics and in the theory of soci-
ety, but in history and in philosophy too. I have fallen upon nu-
merous cases of uniformity, upon rules of experience of compre-
hensive import, upon positive causal connections; but never upon
any thing answering to the formula for a law, never upon proposi-
tion expressing the elementary, uniform behavior of psychic forces
in an aggregate.”
Then he explains why his search was futile. He is “inclined” to
believe “that the problem was not properly stated and that what he sought
is not susceptible of being found.” The ultimate cause of failure he dis-
covers in the fact that “physical and psychic phenomena differ from one
another even as incomparable quantities.“
“Between material existence and motion in space on the one hand
and feeling, thought and volition on the other, there is a chasm70/Ludwig Gumplowicz
which cannot be filled and has not yet been bridged.” Hence, ‘I
would be strange if one and the same concept of law were appli-
cable to both”
Thus we see Ruemelin coming again in his later years full sail into
the sea of dualism; and it ought not to seem remarkable that, in follow-
ing out the fundamental opposition between mind and matter, he should
dispute the possibility of law in the province of the former since “man’s
free-will” prevails there. Then come the old arguments on the old theme.
“Whoever denies freedom of the will is bound to show natural
laws determining will and excluding choice. It is said by some, for
example, that the strongest motive must of necessity determine
the human will. If this were something more than worthless tau-
tology(?); if it were only explained what beside the will could make
a motive the strongest!”
Strange prepossession! Why should not external circumstances make
a motive the strongest? and how can a deus ex machina named “will”
strengthen a motive, i.e., an external factor? The external factor works
with the force inhering in it in the given conditions as the steam does in
the locomotive. Must the will still mediate that the force of the steam
may overcome the force of inertia? No more in the case of man is this
putative mediation and assistance of will necessary to strengthen a mo-
tive which is in and of itself the stronger already. Man differs from the
locomotive only in having consciousness, i.e., an inner sense which, like
an inner eye, sees the internal processes, becomes conscious of them,
observes the conflict of motives, and the victory of the stronger. In com-
mon experience this perception is mistaken for free-will; the coming
consciousness of the overbalance of the stronger motive, for the act of
choice. All this was long since known; but it will not for a long time yet
convert the adherents of dualism and free-will. The force of mental iner-
tia and conservatism cannot be so easily overcome.
Those who persistently maintain the dualism of mind and matter
cannot possibly accept social laws in the sense of natural laws of social
development. Hence Ruemelin is thoroughly self-consistent in discard-
ing them and every “law of history,” too. He is perfectly logical when he
says:
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prehensible which imputes to the individual human soul freedom
of the will. in the sense of rational or irrational self-determination
within the broad scope of given natural conditions(?), while ne-
cessity is recognized in the history of mankind or of single ages
and peoples psychological indeterminism and historical indeter-
minism stand and fall together . . . If the complex aggregate of
social relations into which I have been put determines all my think-
ing and doing or allows me only the narrowest scope of individual
independence, it is of no use to discuss freedom and accountabil-
ity further. But if I am able of myself to initiate new series of
operations, to mould and assert myself in spite of the opinions and
usages of others, then no logic can prevent a community as a whole
from acting freely and striking into paths which have no causal
connection with the past. Necessity will then signify no more than
the universal limits of human activity, will be restricted to the
unavoidable influence of the community on the individual.”
Persistence in the traditional dualistic view is also largely due to the
mistaken idea that “the necessity of natural law” would negative “con-
science” and all rational activity.
“Or we are told,” says Ruemelin, further, “that the will is deter-
mined by necessity, being the product of two factors: the concrete
circumstances and the individual character, which is itself the prod-
uct of inherited faculties, training and course of life. If conscience
and reason are included among the inherited faculties and it is
conceded that they co-operate in their way in the act of willing,
the answer may be accepted. But then it is merely a quarrel about
words to speak of the deterministic character of natural law and
the necessity of willing.”
As if reason and mental effort could not be, were not actually the
product of natural processes! As if we could not sneak of the natural
development of reason, mental effort and will, i.e., of mental effort the
product of motives! After traversing such errors, Ruemelin reaches the
principle which, as a true dualist, he believes he has “established,” viz.:
“that psychological and physical laws are wholly different in form and
nature and cannot be expressed by the same formula.”
As has been said, the logic is correct; but the premise, free-will and
self-determination, is false. Possibly Ruemelin is justified in saying that
the constraint exercised by society upon the individual has not yet been72/Ludwig Gumplowicz
demonstrated to him by obvious proofs.
“I cannot convince myself,” he says, “that investigation into the
relations between society and the individual has ever led a single
step beyond showing an intimate and universal reciprocation of
influences in which each is giving or receiving, active or passive,
all the time, in varying degrees.”
But insufficient proof does not alter the fact of unfree-will; and it
would better have become a philosopher to take the matter in hand him-
self than to assume the attitude of defence by throwing the burden of
proof on others.
Had Ruemelin done so without prejudice (his dualism greatly em-
barrassed him), he would have given up the false premise of free-will
and all that it entails; and he would not have discoursed at length on the
way men of genius make the world’s history. Such things should never
have been said at this late day in a German university, and by a lay
professor. The standpoint which he occupies is purely and simply theo-
logical.
Dualism of mind and matter is a fundamental principle of religion.
Religion is a necessity to the masses; their temperament demands it. So
free-will and self-determination, the necessary consequences of dual-
ism, are integral components of every religious system, and we have no
thought of combating them here. Moreover modern philosophy and
modern natural science have spared us the trouble of establishing mo-
nism, which is as correct and true as, for the temperament of most men,
dualism is necessary. We are not writing for this majority. They may
leave our book unread. We turn to the adherents of monism; our prob-
lem is to work out its consequences in the social domain.
2. Universal Laws
Modern natural science has successfully demonstrated that even the
“human mind” is subject to physical laws, that the phenomena of the
individual mind are emanations from matter. But in the domain of social
phenomena unchangeable natural laws have not been completely dem-
onstrated. Between “mental” phenomena subject to the laws of matter,
and the social world strode the conception of human freedom to distract
and confuse. It seemed to order and control social relations according to
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sense of the word, monistic natural science has in part demonstrated the
unconditional sway of natural laws and in part shown the presence of
other factors to be impossible. Dualism, driven from this domain, has
retired to the domain of social phenomena, whence it must be dislodged.
To this task the distinction which we have drawn between mental and
social phenomena is essential; for it is an old rule of strategy to divide
the enemy and grapple with the scattered sections separately. lathe criti-
cal question concerning monism is the existence of universal laws valid
for social as well as for physical and mental phenomena. If such laws
exist, the monistic theory is true; if such laws cannot be discovered,
monism is an unproven hypothesis, like dualism.
As we have seen, their existence is hotly denied; and doubtless the
earliest defenders of monism in the domain of social phenomena gave
occasion for the denial. For with great zeal and less discretion some
thought it simply necessary to transfer to the domain of social phenom-
ena the laws that had been discovered in the domain of physical phe-
nomena, the laws of attraction and repulsion, of gravitation and the like.
Others seemed to see in the shapes which social phenomena assumed
structures similar to animal organisms and they thought that the laws
valid for the latter might be accepted as valid for the former also. We
have already pointed out the impropriety of these assumptions and we
shall criticise them more in detail hereafter.
But in spite of such errors, there are universal laws which prevail
alike in the physical, the mental and the social domain; and the existence
of the science of sociology can be justified only by proving their exist-
ence and validity.
Before calling attention to some of them, we must answer another
question: How far, in general, can we expect to find laws common to
phenomena so unlike as physical, mental and social phenomena are?
Plainly we ought not to go too deeply into the characteristics of the
species, for where the peculiarities begin the common traits end. Where
the physical nature commences the laws common to the mental and so-
cial domain cease to apply.
Of course it may be objected that the universal laws will be taken
from such a high sphere of abstraction that every idea beyond the con-
cept of mere existence will have been sacrificed. Such laws, though
easily found, would lack significance; and we shall try to find our uni-
versal laws close to where the three classes of phenomena become dif-
ferentiated, in the sphere of the modalities of existence. Having found74/Ludwig Gumplowicz
them here, we shall consider our task complete. It was the great error of
our predecessors that they sought universal laws in the lowest sphere of
one class alone, even among the differentiated physical phenomena. We
ought not to commit the same error; we must not seek to generalize the
physical laws of organic life and extend them to the domains of psychic
and social phenomena as they did. But we may and indeed must dis-
cover the universal laws of the modalities of existence of all being. We
must be satisfied to possess in them the keys which, to use Bastian’s
expression, “unlock in all directions.”
Let us now proceed to give examples of such universal laws.
(a) The Law of Causation
The law of causation is just as true of social as it is of physical and
mental phenomena. Every social phenomenon is the necessary effect of
anterior causes. No social phenomenon, originates in the nothingness of
individual whims. The principle of sufficient cause is true also. Every
social phenomenon whether political, juridical or economic, must have
a sufficient cause in one or more social agencies. The effects must also
be equal or at least proportional to the energy of the causes alike in the
social, the physical and the mental domain. The deed of an individual
will never create a social condition nor change it, however much ap-
pearances may deceive us. One social condition is produced by another.
The task which falls to the writer of pragmatic history is to point out the
true connection in each case.
(b) The Law of Development
Parallel with and perhaps emanating from the law of causation is the
law of development. Each social phenomenon is a momentary phase in
a period of development; though often the end of the period may be
beyond the reach of calculation. Every political organization, all rights,
every economic relation suffers change. We can distinguish the begin-
ning, the process of growth and often the decline and decay.
But of course manifestations of the law in the social and in the
physical domain must not be confounded. Cells, germs, stalks and fruit;
or eggs, embryo, lungs and digestive organs can not be found in social
formations. Such analogies lead away from the truth; they becloud sci-
entific vision and give incorrect results. The order of development in the
social domain is from one social phenomenon to another.
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tinction must be observed rigorously. No digression to manifestations of
the law in other domains can be allowed.
(c) Regularity of Development
Development does not in and of itself involve the idea of regularity; the
sequence of like or similar phases might or might not be uniform in all
cases. But actually progress is regular; it conforms to law everywhere.
We admire the regularity of development in the whole compass of physical
nature. It dominates mental phenomena. It is found to be true of the
state, of rights, of political economy, and of language which must also
be included with the social sciences since, according to the definition
given above, language is a social phenomenon. The great honor of dis-
covering it in the domain of social phenomena is shared by the historical
schools in the several departments.
(d) The Law of Periodicity
In all domains of phenomena, regularity of development passes into
periodicity. Wherever we can watch the whole process, we find a period
of existence extending from the origin through the phases of growth and
perfection to decline and fall. Of course the manifestation is different
for each class of phenomena. Sap flows, the trunk grows strong, the
organs develop, etc.; or, thought arises, is confirmed, is spread abroad
and gains consideration—then loses influence and is recognized as noth-
ing; or, a social relation arises in small proportions, is extended over
larger aggregates, procures ever greater recognition, exercises decisive
influence on great masses, is then broken up and supplanted by other
relations and disappears leaving no trace. It is one law valid everywhere
and universal.
(e) The Law of Complexity
In physical nature we always find the elements in combination, never
single. Likewise in the mental domain we meet with combinations only.
Our conceptions, our thoughts and our mental powers, too, are com-
plex. So also are all the social phenomena about us. They are structures
composed of simpler parts. Every state, every people, every tribe is
complex in a great many respects. Every principle of right is a compos-
ite of views, conceptions, ideas and principles. Every common economic
interest is made up of conditions, activities, relations. In every language
there is an endless variety of philological elements.76/Ludwig Gumplowicz
But further, what is complex may be analyzed. Analysis of physical
phenomena will give the elements of matter. Analysis of mental phe-
nomena will disclose ultimate concepts and the simplest mental func-
tions. In the social domain it leads to the simplest social structures think-
able, from state and people to primitive horde; from developed institu-
tional rights to the beginning of actual relations; from the most complex
economic interests of the community to the satisfaction of the simplest
needs; from a literature in the fullness of bloom to the simplest expres-
sion of thought by sound and gesture.
(f) Reciprocal Action of Foreign (heterogen) Elements
Another result of complexity is that phenomena of every class show the
reciprocal action of foreign (heterogen) reacting elements. Although
there is an endless variety of cases in each particular domain, yet thelaw
seems to express the first and most important impulse to development in
each and every one of them. The significance of this force in social
processes was surmised long ago, but it was erroneously interpreted by
individualists and atomists as the reaction of man upon man and was
designated as love or hate, as sociability or mutual hostility (bellum
omnium contra omnes). The error in this conception will appear as we
proceed. Specific reciprocal influence of man upon man cannot be af-
firmed in a universal law. What holds true between man and man in one
group is not necessarily true in another group. Here it may be love and
sociability and there hate and thirst for strife. First one and then the
other relation was assumed to be normal according as attention was
confined to one group or directed to the deportment of group toward
group; but neither assumption was correct, because neither was univer-
sal. To find a law valid in all times and places for the reciprocal forces
inherent in social phenomena we must take, not the individuals, but the
social groups as the elements. Thus the law of the reciprocal action of
foreign (heterogen) elements will be found universal. Social groups ex-
hibit reciprocal effects which are fundamentally the same always and
everywhere; they arise from the same exciting causes and obey the same
law, though manifested in various forms and ways according to time,
circumstances and the peculiar qualities of each.
A more specific expression for the universal action of foreign
(heterogen) bodies upon each other might seem desirable, but there would
be danger of getting entangled in empty analogies and of falsely gener-
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Suppose we desired to speak of the “absorption” of foreign
(heterogen) elements as a general principle. Perhaps the universal law
is manifested in this way on much of the physical domain. But it is not
so manifested in social phenomena. Applied to them the statement would
be an empty analogy. On the other hand, the manifestation of this law on
the physical domain, especially in inorganic and vegetable phenomena,
has been described as a “struggle for existence.” Obviously this is an
illustration borrowed from animal and social phenomena. It does not
describe physical phenomena. So if we would have a law common to all
domains of phenomena we must modestly be content to speak of the
reciprocal action of foreign (heterogen) elements. The more precise state-
ment of its manifestation on the respective domains must be left to spe-
cial formulas.
(g) Adaptation to an Obvious End
One thing might be affirmed to characterize this law more precisely, and
that is universal adaptation to an end,—though in a very definite, tech-
nical sense. For the universal effect of the reciprocal action, of foreign
(heterogen) bodies is to favor further development of the phenomena
concerned; which may be expressed by saying that, universally, phe-
nomena in this state are adapted to the end of further development.
This law has been abundantly demonstrated throughout the physi-
cal domain. The botanist knows “to what end“ the leaves serve the plant.
The zoologist knows “why” the respiratory organs of birds and, in gen-
eral, “why” all animal organs have their peculiar qualities. Among men-
tal phenomena, also, the adaptation of means to the ends produced has
been recognized in many cases. On the social domain, to be sure, the
law is much questioned. The more warmly it is defended by conserva-
tives, Manchester men, and optimists, the more violently is it opposed
by revolutionists, socialists and pessimists. But on one point, at least,
there seems to be no dispute; every social growth, every social entity,
serves a definite end, however much its worth and morality may be
questioned. For the universal law of adaptation signifies simply that no
expenditure of effort, no change of condition, is purposeless on any
domain of phenomena. Hence the inherent reasonableness of all social
facts and conditions must be conceded.78/Ludwig Gumplowicz
(h) Identity of Forces
The reciprocal action of foreign (heterogen) elements obviously pro-
ceeds from forces immanent in them or arising from their contact. These
forces never change their character. They are identical, as we wish to
say. Those operating in the domain of physical phenomena have always
been the same that they are now. So of mental forces; thought, feeling,
volition, each has moved man and controlled his actions in the same
way always. Likewise the social forces, the causes which we must con-
clude from the effects that follow on the social domain, have ever been
the same. Thus the identity of forces is a universal law. We encounter it
in every domain of phenomena.
(i) Similarity of Events98
A necessary consequence of the last law is the perpetual similarity of
events on all domains of phenomena. It has long been recognized of
physical phenomena. Nobody doubts that the sun’s warming powers
acting on moist ground age after age have produced and always will
produce the same effects in vegetation that they produce now. Nobody
doubts that ocean waves breaking on a rocky coast have always pro-
duced the same effects that we see to-day. So, too, nobody doubts that
man’s mental faculties have produced the same effects in all times and
climes. Always and everywhere men feel and think and plan; even the
sensible products of these mental processes are the same. They differ
only in form with changing time and circumstances. The Kamtschatkan
sings his native song, and so does the Frenchman, thousands of years
ago the Chinese thinker philosophized just as did more recently the sage
of Koenigsberg; the architect of the pyramids projected his artistic plans
and so do the modern European artists. Thus the perpetual similarity of
events in the mental domain is obvious. But people are much less con-
scious of similarity in the social domain, though it is no less a fact. The
identity of social forces could not be discovered because individuals
instead of natural social groups were taken to be the true elements of
social phenomena. But when the true social forces are recognized, the
perpetual similarity of social events must also be apparent. Rights, states,
languages, religion, etc., have always and everywhere arisen in ways
essentially alike. Economic events are controlled by the same forces;
they have always been alike in essence, though often differing in formThe Outlines of Sociology/79
(f) Law of Parallelism
In every domain we find some phenomena which are similar but we do
not know the ultimate cause of their similarity. In the physical domain
such phenomena are ascribed to identical forces directly. But in the mental
domain the tendency is rather to attribute the similarity to some alleged
connection between them; and in social phenomena it is considered the
result of consanguinity or of some historic relationship. But actually
there is something fundamental at the bottom of all these similarities
which we must refer temporarily to a law of parallelism since we do not
know more precisely what it is. By resorting to this law we guard our-
selves against obviously false and erroneous explanations.99
The reason why parallel physical phenomena are referred without
question to identical forces, whereas such an explanation of parallel
mental and social phenomena is anxiously avoided as long as possible,
is partly found in the widely accepted theory of monogenism. The de-
scent of all men from Adam and Eve afforded a very plausible explana-
tion. But if it is rejected as too absurd, the only course left is to refer the
countless mental and social parallels also directly to a law of parallel-
ism common to all domains of phenomena. The existence of universal
laws is one of the most convincing proofs that the whole world of phe-
nomena rests upon a single simple principle. It, is a weighty argument
for monism, a thorough refutation of dualism. Consideration of these
laws shows how untenable it is to refer phenomena to two principles,
matter and mind, since the modalities of existence are the same for all
and point to one simple principle only. Whether it be called nature, or
God, or the great unknown world-moving principle matters not. We have
presentiments that it is omnipotent, omnipresent, perhaps even omni-
scient. But we are not in condition to know its essence. Since, however,
there are laws which are universally prevalent and valid, we must con-
clude that this one principle pursues, so to say, a consequent and
selfconsistent policy; that it reveals itself always and everywhere in the
same form and in the same character for all kinds of phenomena. This
necessary conclusion is of unending significance to science.
3. Concept, Function, Scope and Importance of
Sociology
It is almost unnecessary to remark that universal laws like these are not
a priori cognitions but the result of an exhaustive examination of all
spheres of phenomena, inductions obtained by long mental exertion. In80/Ludwig Gumplowicz
propounding them at the beginning of our discussion, we are reversing
the natural order of cognition, to be sure; but this provisional anticipa-
tion of the results of an investigation is simply didactic strategy.
These universal laws govern phenomena of all kinds, it has been
said. But for each particular kind they are manifested in a particular
way. We might call this quality of special adaptation their “specific
energy.” An example will make the thought clear. Adaptation to an ob-
vious end is a universal law. It is manifested in plants by the equipment
of the several organs and the manner of their growth; and the botanist is
able to formulate a whole series of special laws for plants. In the social
domain the same law will be manifested differently. For example, a horde,
before starting on a raid, will organize by choosing a leader; and other
illustrations may be given. Hence the sociologist may speak of special
social laws to designate the adjustment of universal laws to the peculiar
nature and conditions of social phenomena. Obviously special laws will
be more numerous than universal; for the latter generalize the condi-
tions common to all phenomena, whereas the former take account of
those common to small numbers of phenomena.
The function of sociology consists in showing that universal laws
apply to social phenomena; in pointing out the peculiar effects produced
by them in the social domain, and finally in formulating the special
social laws.
As we have to deal with social phenomena exclusively in what fol-
lows, we must get a clear idea of what they are; we must distinguish the
domain of social phenomena from every other; we must explore it and
learn the most important groups upon it. In so doing we shall come in
contact with the special sciences which are occupied with the special
groups and which are very properly designated the “social sciences” in
general.
By social phenomena we mean the phenomena which appear through
the operation of groups and aggregates of men on one another. The
aggregates are the social elements. We must assume that the simplest
and the original social elements were primitive hordes, of which, for
reasons that have been explained elsewhere,100 there must have been a
great number in remote antiquity.
The combinations of the simple social elements into greater asso-
ciations: tribes, communities, peoples, states and nations, are just so
many social phenomena. There are also psychosocial phenomena, such
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social elements with or upon the individual mind.
The province of sociology embraces them all. Sociology must in-
vestigate them and show the social laws of their development. Many
groups, it is true, have been isolated and made the subject-matter of
independent sciences. But that should not hinder sociology from sub-
jecting them to a new examination from the standpoint of social science,
especially since they have generally been studied from an individualistic
standpoint. Sociology should make their social origin and development
perfectly clear.
It has just been said that mankind is the substratum of all social
phenomena, hence, it is the real subject-matter of sociology. But it is
clear that the character of the science will be determined ultimately bv
our conception of the natural history of mankind. According as our
conception is correct or false will sociology be a success or a failure.
The smallest mistake in the beginning will avenge itself in hundred and
thousand fold greater errors in the end.
Hitherto a very gross misconception has prevailed in social science
concerning the natural history of mankind. The character of human phe-
nomena has been completely falsified by conceiving mankind to be ge-
nealogically a unitary genus, by supposing lineal descent from a com-
mon stock, and explaining varieties of race and type as successive off-
shoots from it. This fundamentalotion set the whole social science on
the wrong track. Not only were all right points of view, resulting from
the fact of original plurality and variety of races, lost from consider-
ation, but many false ones were presented which produced nothing but
errors.
Closely connected with this, indeed resulting from it, is another er-
ror. It was conceived that culture and social relations generally, whether
of mankind or of particular peoples, develop spontaneously as a plant
or animal develops. It was conceived that one and the same group passed
through different stages of culture, from the hunting stage to the pasto-
ral, to the agricultural, to warrior life and so on down to industrialism
by simple transitions in virtue of an inner law and tendency to develop.
But the law of persistence applies to social groups as much as it does to
anything else in nature. Social groups persist in their actual social con-
dition and cannot be made to “pass” into another without adequate so-
cial cause.
Therefore, we must remember not only that contiguous groups are
diverse in origin, but also that they have been undergoing different courses82/Ludwig Gumplowicz
of development. We must also remember that every social group per-
sists in a given condition until forced out of it and into another through
the action of some other group, and such action is pre-eminently called
social.
In other words, each alteration in the social condition of a group
must always have a sufficient social cause, which is always the influ-
ence of another group.101 This is a law, and can be amply illustrated
from history and experience. An important proposition for the method-
ology of sociology follows from it, viz., whenever an alteration in the
condition of a group is perceived we should inquire what influences
exerted by another group produced it. It follows, also, that a rapid and
varied development and frequent social changes occur only under the
continual reciprocal influence of many foreign (heterogen) groups, that
is, in states and systems of states.
This brings us very close to the definition of a social event or pro-
cess. When two or more distinct (heterogen) groups come in contact,
when each enters the sphere of the other’s operations, a social process
always ensues. So long as one unitary, homogeneous group is not influ-
enced by or does not exert an influence upon another it persists in the
original primitive state. Hence, in distant quarters of the globe, shut off
from the world, we find hordes in a state as primitive, probably, as that
of their forefathers a million years ago. Here, very likely, we are dealing
with an elementary, primitive, social phenomenon or, better, with a so-
cial element, but not with a social process nor with social change.
But as soon as one group is exposed to the influence of another, the
interplay of mutual forces ensues inevitably and the social process be-
gins. When two distinct (heterogen) groups come together, the natural
tendency of each is to exploit the other, to use the most general expres-
sion. This, indeed, is what gives the first impulse to the social process.
This tendency is so inherent in every human group, so natural and in-
domitable, that it is impossible to conceive of groups coming together
without displaying it, without generating the social process.
The course of the process depends upon the natural constitution of
“mankind” and the tendencies peculiar to all human hordes and social
communities. Since these factors differ only as one individual or, at
most, one species from another and everywhere exhibit the same generic
characteristics the process is essentially the same everywhere.
True, the human race is composed of an endless variety of species,
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a variety of social formations or collective entities which in turn act
upon one another; even the influence of time and place yields a diversity
of effects: so that the social process nevertheless presents endless vari-
ety and individuality of development. But the differences are transient
and local. It is the task of sociology—and by no means an easy one—in
the midst of diversity to find the controlling social laws, to explain the
miscellaneous variety of social development by the simplest forces in
operation and to reduce the countless shapes it assumes to a simple
common denominator.
All social laws, indeed all universal laws as well, have one charac-
teristic in common: they explain the becoming, but never the beginning
of things, the ultimate origin. This limitation must be insisted upon the
more emphatically since the human mind is given to inquiring after the
genesis of things. It desires knowledge of the first arising, the ultimate
origin—a tendency fatal to science; whereas with all the laws cogni-
zable it can apprehend only the perpetual becoming.
Hence none of the questions about the ultimate origin of human
associations belong in sociology, if indeed they belong in any science
whatever! Sociology begins with the countless different social groups of
which, as can be irrefutably proven, mankind is constituted. The ques-
tion how they came to be does not belong within its forum.
As we begin by limiting sociological discussion to the becoming of
things, excluding discussion of ultimate origin, may we be allowed to
point out that the discoveries which are recognized as the greatest achieve-
ments of science all lie in the same field. The Copernican discovery
applies only to the motion of the planets in their orbits, without inquir-
ing how they came to exist. Harvey discovered the circulation of the
blood, a process continually going on under our observation. And we
certainly do the great Englishman no wrong in expressing the opinion
that when, centuries later, the problem of the “origin of man” shall have
long since been laid aside, his investigation into the laws of the becom-
ing, into the “struggle for existence,” “adaptation” and “heredity,” must
still be lauded as an imperishable service to science.
We are unwilling to close this section without emphasizing the im-
portance of the knowledge of social laws to historians and statesmen.
The view that history can be raised to the level of a science only by
taking account of the natural and social laws of development is still
violently opposed though the reasons for it have been presented many
times. We could cite innumerable examples to show how very much84/Ludwig Gumplowicz
history has suffered from ignorance of social laws on the part of the
most eminent historians. The most common error, one into which al-
most every historian has fallen, especially if he is treating of a single
nation, is to regard the phenomena as peculiar to one people; whereas
did he know social laws he would recognize that they are more general.
How long is it since in every history of Germany, in every treatise
on the philosophy of German history, political particularism was as-
cribed to an individualizing tendency inherent in the German people?
Particularism was considered a virtue in its day. But Prince Bismarck
has thoroughly counteracted the tendency and violently disputes its vir-
tue.102 If the writers were not so absorbed in one aspect of their subject,
if they considered the laws governing all historical changes, they would
recognize that, as a universal fact, periods of disintegration and particu-
larization alternate with periods of integration. If they recognized that
periodicity of development is a natural, necessary and universal law
they would come nearer to the truth of many matters, their results would
gain in scientific value.
Or what shall be said when a distinguished historian like Curtius
writes: “The acquisitive impulse deeply inherent by nature in the Greeks,
excited them at an early period to a many sided activity.”103 Is this ten-
dency natural to the “Greeks” alone? What of the “Semites,” of whom
Curtius relates that “the Greeks cherished a national hatred against
them!”104 Was the “acquisitive tendency” less “deeply inherent by na-
ture” in them? or had it “excited,” them less “to a many sided activity?”
Or why did the Spaniards go to America, the English and Dutch to
India, if not to “get gain?” Have we not here a general social phenom-
enon and a general social law? and is it not a scientific error to consider
general social phenomena peculiar to the people among whom they have
been accidentally recognized?
Take another example from Curtius:
“According to the usual conception of the Greeks, who felt the
need of assuming an author for every great historical work, with-
out caring to distinguish what had previously existed from what
subsequently ensued, the whole political system was regarded as
the legislation of Lycurgus.”105
But to ascribe to a single legislator the creation of a body of juridi-
cal and political regulations which have been accumulating for centu-
ries is not peculiar to the Greeks. It is a psycho-social phenomenonThe Outlines of Sociology/85
common to all peoples; and will not truth and science suffer if no ac-
count is taken of the fact?
How much the science of history will improve when historians dis-
cern that all the alleged individual peculiarities of the peoples they de-
scribe are manifestations of general social and psycho-social laws! Simi-
lar examples of false and narrow views could be cited without number
from the best historians. But we prefer to give in precise terms the gen-
eral cause of error in the conception of historical phenomena.
It is asserted that
“history, however it may be defined and classified, will never be
reduced to a bare natural science or sociological discipline. For it
is not simply the product of tellunc and anthropological natural
forces and the momentum of social masses. There is a third factor
the power of individuality, which is not susceptible of calculation
by the rules of either natural science or sociology.”106
In so far as individuals are concerned, to be sure, history can pro-
ceed “neither like natural science nor sociology.” But in so far as history
portrays the individual it is pure art. For art deals only with individuals,
in contrast with science which deals with what is universal, what ac-
cords with law and is schematic. The individual might be typical; never-
theless the historian is generally in error if he thinks that he finds any-
thing individualistic in the history of a people, a nation or a tribe, or in
the actions of social groups, however considered. Only single personali-
ties are properly individualistic; when treating them the historian may
yield to his artistic impulses. But when he has collective wholes to present,
where he has to show how they live and move, the effort to “individual-
ize” is shortsighted and erroneous; the science of history can and should
“proceed according to the rules of both natural science and sociology.”
For the behavior of collective entities is determined by “natural and
sociological” laws and not by the motives and natural qualities of indi-
viduals.107 It will be some time before this is realized; but the recogni-
tion will come only through sociology.
Important as sociology is for historians, its significance in politics
is greater still. For though hitherto politics has not been reckoned a
science at all sociology will give it a scientific character.
At present politics is strife after power. Each state, party and fac-
tion, every man even, is striving after power with all the means at com-
mand. Material means are supplemented with as cogent reasons as pos-86/Ludwig Gumplowicz
sible. Such reasons and arguments are called the theory of politics. But
where is the criterion of their correctness? From the standpoint of suc-
cess, when the fact has been accomplished, the policy which succeeded
is recognized as right. Yet it is not so much ideas and arguments as
greater might that makes the project prosperous. So ultimately, greater
might is the better policy—as things stand now.
Sociology must give quite another turn to politics; though, indeed,
it will develop political science rather than practical politics. That is to
say, the social laws which sociology is to formulate from its observa-
tions on the processes of history include also the laws of the develop-
ment of political life. When they shall have been correctly formulated
from the past, they must be verified in the present and the future. They
must control the course of political development now and hereafter as
unequivocally as they have hitherto. But when reliable laws have been
formulated, political machinations, tavern politics and ignorant gossip
will give place to political foresight and sober calculation based upon
positive sociological knowledge.
These words will provoke a sceptical smile—and certainly not with-
out some reason. Similar promises have often proved to be vain talk if
not charlatanry even; and usually people who talk of calculating future
politics scientifically are not taken seriously, Did not Auguste Comte
speak of a politique positive, a positive science of politics, which, “in-
stead of pronouncing absolute judgment and suggesting ameliorations,”
should rather create “a body of scientific conceptions such as has never
been outlined nor even suspected by any philosopher before?” Yet how
many false and erroneous notions he held! And Thomas Buckle! How
little he recognized the truth about the development of political relations
in modern times! Claiming to have obtained final cognition of the “laws
of history,” he prophesied cessation of war and universal perpetual peace,
yet how has his prophecy been verified?
In one point, however, the old sociologists were clearly right. With
presentient mind they suspected the existence of social laws and as-
serted the possibility of a social science. It is true they did not pass the
point of conjecture. They never advanced the true principles of the sci-
ence, much less to a knowledge of social laws. Nay! they did not even
find the starting point of the way which leads to the principles. The
point of departure is polygenism. The way is the investigation of the
natural relations of distinct (heterogen) groups of men to one another.
We entered upon it in “Der Rassenkampf” and we wish to continue in itThe Outlines of Sociology/87
here.108
Being the science of human society and social laws, sociology is
obviously the basis of all the special sciences treating of parts of human
society, or of particular manifestations of associative life. Anthropol-
ogy, the science of man as an individual being, falls within the scope of
the universal science of society as a species within the genus. So do
ethnography, embracing the description and comparison of existing tribes
and peoples; political science, the science of the state treating of social
communities which are the result of disciplinary organization; compara-
tive linguistics, or philology; the comparative study of religion, rights,
art, etc.,—sciences of social institutions which satisfy the psycho-social
wants of man; finally political economy and other sciences treating of
institutions which the material wants of man as a social unit have pro-
duced. It is perfectly natural that all these sciences should have taken
shape long before the science in which they should afterward find their
basis. This is the normal course of man’s developing knowledge.
It was so in natural science in the narrow sense of the word. Botany,
zoology and mineralogy took shape before geology and paleontology,
though the latter are the foundation of the former. Similarly the art of
healing is earlier than physiology.
The explanation is very simple. Things, institutions, relations en-
countered in concrete form are the first objects observed and investi-
gated. The most convenient hypothesis or crudest explanation suffices
for a time to account for their origin. For instance we live under laws
constituting a body of rights. The nature of the phenomenon is investi-
gated the rights are explained, interpreted, compared with others; and
their history is traced out. But provisionally their source and origin was
satisfactorily explained by saying that the lawgiver proclaimed them.
Similarly the explanation of the origin of religion is that God revealed it
to His prophet, the founder.
With the progress of knowledge and reflection, ideas concerning the
origin of the subjects-matter of the respective sciences undergo changes.
The new conclusions come in conflict with the earlier explanations. Thus
the comparative study of law showed that rights arise historically in the
collective or “folk” mind; and religion, similarly studied, was found to
emanate from exigencies of man’s spiritual nature, and so on.
Moreover as knowledge broadened the germs of all the psycho-so-
cial institutions were eventually found to be in close proximity to one
another and the different social sciences met on a common ground—88/Ludwig Gumplowicz
though the common designation was not at once applied. The subject-
matter of each science in turn was discovered existing in every people in
a greater or less degree, and in a more or less forward state of develop-
ment. Consequently men were forced to regard the differences in psycho-
social phenomena among various peoples and to compare psycho-social
products.
The first step was the comparative study of law, especially of cus-
tomary law, then of religion, language, art and philosophy. This prompted
and aided investigation of the common ground whence the fountains of
all the sciences seemed to spring. This common ground was at first
designated history of civilization, ethnography, or ethnology, Bastian’s
term. But in fact it may most suitably be called social science.
It discloses the true source of all those psycho-social products that
had previously become subjects-matter of special sciences But it does
this only because it comprehends the substance of human. Hence we
must recognize in sociology the philosophical basis of all the sciences
claiming to be “social;” and it will fall to the Lot of sociology to demon-
strate the relation of each of them to their common basis, and their
connection with each other upon it.
4. The Substratum of Social Laws
Laws are revealed objectively. Substrata are necessarily presupposed.
It is by the forms in which bodies appear, or in which forces manifest
themselves in and on bodies, that we are able to discover laws. The law
of gravitation cannot be conceived apart from a body which falls—on
which the force of gravitation manifests itself. To speak of attraction is
to call to mind the bodies on which attraction acts.
So the question arises: What are the substrata of social laws? What
are the media through which force is manifested when we infer social
laws from its behavior? Obviously the medium is not the individual, on
whom a psychical or a physical law may be manifested, but not a social.
It has sometimes been thought that “mankind” was the substratum; but
erroneously, for there must be heterogeneous (heterogen) elements wher-
ever reciprocal action and an interplay of forces is expected.
If mankind is conceived to be a unit, the condition necessary for the
action of opposing forces is by supposition absent. Besides, nowhere on
the earth, and at no time either in the present age or in remotest antiquity
has mankind been found to be a simple substance. It always consists in
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was led to seek the starting point of sociological investigation in the
hypothesis that there was originally an indefinitely large number of dis-
tinct (heterogen) ethnical elements;109 and it gives me satisfaction to
note that good authorities consider the polygenetic hypothesis estab-
lished. Indeed, Bastian, the highest authority in this matter, declares that
“it is self-evident,” and that my efforts, in “Der Rassenkampf,” to “rec-
oncile it with Darwinism,” were superfluous.
But since the hypothesis is so fundamental to the whole system of
sociology it is not enough to state what authorities accept it. I must also
take pains to bring before the reader as much scientific material as pos-
sible in support of it.
First of all may I be allowed to cite Carl Vogt, another authority of
the first rank in natural science, to vouch for the “original plurality” and
the “constancy” of human races:110
“No men would certainly have doubted the specific difference in
mankind” says this investigator in his “Lectures on Man,” “if the
unity of the human species had not to be defended at any price, if
a tradition had not to be supported in opposition to the plainest
facts—a tradition which has been the more venerated because it
runs counter to positive science.”111
“As far as our traditions go, however far back they reach into the
remotest antiquity, we observe that wherever peoples migrated and
discovered unknown countries, they found human beings, who
appeared to them not less strange than the animals and plants
they met with. . . . The larger islands, as well as all parts of the
continents under the hottest and coldest climates, were by naviga-
tors or conquerors always found inhabited.”
Then Vogt reminds his readers that
“even religious legends, which have for their object the origin of
mankind and the history of a privileged race, even these legends
indicate that at the creation of the first pair the world was already
peopled, an indication given even in the Bible.... The only fact
from which we can start is that of the original dispersion of man-
kind upon the earth, and the original difference of races spread
over the surface of the earth. However much we may indulge in
theoretical speculations on the origin and differences of mankind,
however weighty proofs may be adduced for the original unity of
the human species, this much is certain, that no historical nor, as90/Ludwig Gumplowicz
we have shown geological data can establish this dream of unity.
However far back our eye reaches we find different species of men
spread over different parts of the earth.”
“Not merely the difference of races, but also their constancy in the
course of time, is perfectly established. We have endeavored to
show that these characters may be traced back beyond the histori-
cal period up to the pile-works, the stone-period, and the diluvial
formations. The Egyptian monuments show that already under
the twelfth dynasty, about 2300 years before Christ, negroes had
been imported into Egypt, slave hunts had, as now, taken place
under several dynasties, as proved by the triumphal processions of
Thothmes IV, about 1700 B. C., and Rameses III, about 1300 B.
C. There are seen long processions of Negroes, whose features
and color are faithfully rendered, there are seen Egyptian scribes
registering slaves with their wives and children, even the down
growing in bunches upon the heads of the latter may be distin-
guished. There are also seen many heads presenting the charac-
ters of negro tribes inhabiting the south of Egypt, and which the
artist distinguishes as such by the superadded lotus-stalk. But not
only the negroes, but also the Nubians and the Berbers, as well as
the old Egyptians, are always depicted with those characteristic
peculiarities which have been preserved to this day.”
Vogt also cites the conclusions of Broca, Morton and Jomard, who
identify the modern Fellah-type with the Egyptians of the time of the
Pharaohs, and then he continues:
“The same constancy of characters can be traced in the other races
with which the Egyptians came in contact. The Jews are as easily
recognizable as the Tartars and Scythians with whom Rameses III
was at war.
“In the same way we observe upon the Assyrian and Indian monu-
ments the characters of such races as still inhabit these regions, so
that the constancy of race characters is everywhere rendered evi-
dent.”112
Though Vogt concedes a “certain flexibility” to the “natural races”
of mankind in virtue of which they “show certain changes when trans-
planted into different media,” yet the change never exceeds a very small
maximum and does not obliterate the essential race-marks. Hence Dar-
win is not justified in concluding from single demonstrable examples of
unimportant alterations due to change of environment that they will con-The Outlines of Sociology/91
tinue until eventually the essential traits have been lost and the race has
been changed.
“We thus infer that all instances which have been cited of change
in races of pure descent by the mere influence of changed media,
immigration into foreign countries, etc., are insignificant and do
not affect the essential race-characters. These modifications, there-
fore, which we by no means entirely deny, do not in any way ex-
plain the differences in the human species. . . . In accordance with
the facts,” says Vogt finally, “we must assume a fundamental dif-
ference of races as our starting-point.”113
We must confine ourselves to these quotations from Vogt. It would
lead us too far should we follow the forcible argument in which he not
only shows the harmony between Darwin’s theory and polygenism but
also demonstrates that the latter follows necessarily from the former.
His two most important theses, the constancy and the original “plu-
rality and diversity” of human races, have found striking confirmation
in the progress that has since been made in anthropological and
craniological investigation.
Efforts were made to find the types of all the known races. It had
been assumed upon superficial examination, that each race represented
a genealogical unit in which a fixed anthropological type was transmit-
ted from generation to generation. But when scientists undertook to de-
termine the typical peculiarities exactly, it was found impossible to as-
sign a single type exclusively to any one historical race whatever. The
investigators would then have been content with a “mean type” for each
race. But, says Virchow, “such a variety of individual differences was
accumulated among the civilized peoples of Europe that to many it seemed
impossible to set up even a mean type for each.”114
In his embarrassment he proclaimed, a decade ago, that “science
demanded” that the “original type” of each race be discovered; and he
spared neither labor nor pains in the search. If after all he did not find it
among the Germans, where he looked first, it was not his fault. The
simple fact is that not a single historical race ever consisted in a genea-
logical unit.
After laborious and unsuccessful investigation he concludes that
“the assumption of a simple original Germanic type is as yet en-
tirely arbitrary. Nobody has proved that all Germans once had the92/Ludwig Gumplowicz
same shaped skull, or, otherwise expressed, that they were from
the beginning one nation (!), the Suevi and Franks being its purest
types. If Germans and Slavs belong to the same Indo-Germanic
stock, if Slavic brachycephaly and Germanic dolichocephaly do
not prevent assuming the common descent (?) of Slavs and Ger-
mans, it might seem that mesocephaly and even brachycephaly
among the admittedly pure Germans would be a favorable cir-
cumstance. The great hiatus becomes filled and original relation-
ship is more easily comprehended after actual intermediate mem-
bers have been discovered. If the Germanic nation once had a com-
mon fatherland in the far East, it is very probable that these differ-
ences were brought thence into the later home.”
We see with what reserve and reluctance Virchow notes that the
German race lacks anthropological unity. He demands further investi-
gation.
“Perhaps it will appear that, as the measurements in our schools
in my judgment indicate, different Germanic stocks have in fact
existed here in Germany for ages, moving side by side from east to
west, and spreading out towards the west.”
To the sociologist the “different stocks” which the anthropologist’s
craniological material leads him to conjecture seem plain and natural
from the beginning. To call them “Germanic” is simply national preju-
dice. There were many different stocks all about; and in time a “Ger-
manic” unit arose as they came into closer contact and took on a com-
mon civilization.
But the anthropologist’s concession that “the common type” of the
Germans “is not so simple as it has hitherto been assumed to be” is of
value to us.
The farther craniological investigations were pursued, the stronger
grew the conviction that there was nothing which could be called a “uni-
tary type,” even in the remotest tribes, whom the current of migration
does not touch, who have no intercourse with others, and who are ap-
parently beyond the reach of every other agitating force of history. Among
the old Frisians, even, there are several types; and Virchow is forced to
assume that “possibly other tribes were there before them, whom they
subjected and whose blood was mingled with theirs.” Whether the
craniologist examines modern Finns and Capes, or wild Veddas from
the interior of Ceylon, or the skulls from old Trojan graves, the fact ofThe Outlines of Sociology/93
intermixture appears with equal clearness.115
But while Virchow, who started to find an original unitary type,
reluctantly notes that there is none and, with disillusioned resignation,
concedes an original plurality of types for all the tribes he has investi-
gated, the distinguished craniologist, Kollmann, has proved with scien-
tific certainty that original plurality is universal.
As early as 1883 it was apparent to him that “traces of different
anthropological elements can be shown in every race. Many centuries
have elapsed since the peoples of Europe were racial units, and now no
dale, however remote, contains a pure race.” But the latest results prove
abundantly that racial differences are not due to a later process of dif-
ferentiation. It has existed unchanged since diluvial times.
“An extended comparison of diluvial and modern skulls,” writes
Kollmann, “shows that osteological race characteristics have not
changed. Since diluvial times the influence of natural selection
has not caused man to ‘vary’ in the Darwinian sense. His race-
marks have withstood external influences with great tenacity, per-
sisting in spite of them. These important conclusions contradict
the current view that man is undergoing a continuous process of
change. But it must be conceded upon closer examination that the
evidence I have adduced admits of the construction I have given
it, to say the least.”
Then he cites the opinions of prominent naturalists to show that not
only do many animals have permanent types but unquestionably the
men of the Nile valley also, according to Cuvier, and even mankind
since the flood, according to Ruetimeyer.
“All the evidence man has left in his burial places,” he continues
“shows that he belongs to the latter class of beings, having a per-
manent type. The osteological characteristics of race and even of
variety have not changed in all the time he has wandered over
Europe. The universality of this rule is forcibly illustrated by the
difference between Papuans and Malays, to mention only one ex-
ample. Since time immemorial they have lived side by side in
similar regions without change of habitat. Yet they are different
still. As for Europe both prehistoric and modern, it can be shown
that the number of different races has always been rather large
and that they have always been intermixed.” “Owing to penetra-
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thousands of years have lived, side by side everywhere in Europe.
Hence, each people and state contains different races in different
proportions. This conclusion I drew after comparing more than
3000 European skulls.”
Indeed craniologists who are moved to defend the unity and “pu-
rity” of their own races cannot withstand the undeniable facts. Hoelder,
for example concedes five different “types” within the “Germanic stock.“
That is, he finds five among his specimens to-day. It is not impossible
therefore that once there was a greater number and that other investiga-
tors may be able to recover more of them.116
“Hiss and Ruetimever, using rigorous scientific methods, have
shown that at least three different races have lived in Switzerland
since the period of the lake-dwellers began.”117
These same “anthropological differences,” to use Kollmann’s term,
may also be noted among the American aborigines.
“Formerly it was believed that a single race extended over the
whole continent from Cape Horn to the great northern lakes....
Decisive facts to the contrary were first adduced by Andreas
Retzius.... He showed that there were two different races in
America, a brachtcephalic in the west and a dolichocephalic in
the east.”
In Virchow’s opinion, also, the evidence shows “that the autochtho-
nous population of America is not a racial unit.” Kollmann showed
from his investigations on American skulls that
“the various cephalic indices, from extreme dolichocephaly to ex-
treme brachycephaly, are scattered ever the whole continent. The
autochthonous population, north and south, is composed of the
saute races, though their relative proportions differ. . . . Hence we
must speak of American races....
“I will add that there is no prospect of finding racial unity even
within a smaller region. It might be thought that individual tribes
in the north or the south would consist of dolichocephabc or
brachycephalic persons only.... But the Mound-builders and Cliff-
dwellers in their day were composed of the same races that occur
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diluvial period in Europe, or the Reindeer-hunters, Lake-dwell-
ers, Germans and Celts.”
Kollmann’s theory of “penetration” is thoroughly confirmed by the
observation of his disciple Passavant in west Africa.118 The first place
he visited on the African continent was the French possession of Gorée,
the black population of which belongs to the Seres and Joloff tribes.
“It is extremely hard for the beginner to distinguish the blacks by
their physiognomies,” writes Passavant of his first experience there.
“At first all the faces appeared alike. Only after several weeks of
practice did I really succeed in taking account of individual differ-
ences.”
This accords with the well-known fact that the countless differences
really to be found in men escape superficial observation almost com-
pletely. It also explains the whole previous history of anthropology, es-
pecially the circumstance that mankind was at first divided into only
three or four races, distinguished by the crudest, most striking traits,
such as the color of the skin whereas, after a more intimate acquain-
tance, we become conscious of countless differences.
Cuvier, as is well known, divided mankind into three races: Mongo-
lians, Negroes and Caucasians. Blumenbach distinguished five types
and made five races to correspond. Lacépède and Dumerit added a sixth.
Bory discovered fifteen races even and Desmoulins sixteen. But Waltz
found this number insufficient and declared that theoretically there ought
to be no division into races lest he be compelled, in spite of ethical
scruples, to recognize a great number—several hundred in fact. Fortu-
nately the American investigators were not influenced by such insipid
considerations. They carried the subdivision courageously forward un-
concerned about the Bible and European ethics.
The catalogue of human races accepted by Morton, Nott and Gliddon
ran into the hundreds without being complete; there is nothing to pre-
vent the increase of the number as anthropological knowledge increases.
Passavant’s investigations among the negroes afford further proof that
this may be expected in the nature of the case
The first subdivision of the African Negroes into four grand races:
Negritos, Congo Negroes, Kaffirs and Hottentots, he says
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progress of ethnographic knowledge.” “Undaunted explorers have
gradually brought a population which may be estimated at 151
millions so far within our knowledge that we can now distinguish
several large ethnical groups.”
There are “at least three Negro races” in Africa, he says, besides
the Berbers and the Bedjas or Ethiopians.
“There are, besides, some tribes intermediate between the Negroes
on the one hand and the Berbers and Bedjas on the other. There
are some also in which different stocks and types are so mingled
that they can. not longer be ascribed to any one in particular.”
According to Passavant, instead of the one black race, we should
have seven ethnical groups in Africa. But what of the material of each
group? The Negritos “differ so among themselves,” says Hartmann,
“that the current conception of the negro with woolly hair, flat nose,
thick lips and raven black skin must be entirely disregarded.”
Endless differences still! But it is well understood what they consist
in and why closer observation makes it necessary to increase the num-
ber of “races.” “Racial characteristics are pre-eminently anatomical,”
says Kollmann. “... Physical or material traits must be apparent on the
bones.”
Relatively few races were recognized by scientists because “labori-
ous investigation is needed in order to show specific characteristics on
the bony framework of the skull.”119
But is it worth the trouble? Are not all these “differences” capri-
cious sports of nature, endless and ever changing, without rule or law?
Modern craniology answers the question decisively.
“The skeleton,” says Ruetimeyer, “seems to preserve its acquired
shape more tenaciously than any other organ, so much so that a
cross does not produce a third form, but the two elements persist
side by side. The effect of crossing on the skeleton might be called
mechanical rather than chemical.”
Vogt also maintains that race characteristics are permanent on the
skeleton, and Passavant considers the “shape of the skull to be a con-
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“There is a mass of evidence,” he says, “showing that race-types
are maintained continuously or reappear by reversion.”
“If the characteristics of different varieties did not resist external
influences with such extraordinary obstinacy,” says Kollmann per-
tinently, “complete uniformity must have long since prevailed
among men everywhere, for intermixture has been continuous and
prolific. But craniological evidence shows that there is no unifor-
mity and every unprejudiced observer confirms it.”
Elsewhere he says:
“Life in the drawing-room may reduce the ligaments and the mus-
cular strength and make the hands and feet small; but the charac-
teristics of his race, which the individual bears in himself as heir
to an ancient heritage, remain undisturbed in spite of tall hat and
patent leathers.”
If, then, race-characteristics are constant and the number of human
races or varieties is still undetermined, it follows obviously that when
man’s existence on earth began and before races had mingled and “pen-
etrated,” there were countless distinct (heterogen) human swarms, sev-
erally representing the various race-characteristics which have persisted
unchanged in penetration.
The conclusion is imperative. If race-characteristics pass from gen-
eration to generation only by inheritance; if no new ones arise and only
the old ones appear over and over again; if they are countless to-day and
penetration and inheritance are still spreading them (though many may
have disappeared forever); if they prove to be as permanent and ancient
as the tombs; must we not conclude that there was in the beginning a
countless number of distinct human hordes, each one an individual race
or society? Only a mind warped by Biblical traditions and modern con-
ceptions of the family would insist on substituting first “pairs” instead
of hordes.
It may be said that it is exaggeration to speak of countless hordes
since even the anthropologists and craniologists who accept polygenism
use modest numbers. But to how few traits they limit themselves or are
confined by necessity! Who will believe that the race-characteristics are
all confined to the skull and the skeleton though that is almost the only
place where anthropologists may look?
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finest features of the face and in the minutest convolutions of the brain,
which are as yet wholly unknown. Some are entirely inaccessible to
such investigations as we apply to the bones; others are too delicate for
our sense-perceptions; others still are on organs and parts of the body,
like the nose and ears, which suffer complete decay so that no compari-
son can be made with the past. Yet nobody doubts that the racial differ-
ences in these members are important. So it is not too rash to suppose
that a far greater number of human varieties now exists and, since types
are permanent, always has existed than anthropology has any means of
knowing. These considerations, we hope, will still further justify us in
starting upon our sociological investigations with the polygenetic hy-
pothesis.120
5. Concept and Essence of Social Law
The facts cited show plainly that existing “races” are not simple and
mutually exclusive in the anthropological sense; moreover every means
of investigation fails to disclose racial purity in prehistoric times. Yet,
reasoning deductively from the mixed to the unmixed and from the
composite to the simple, we must infer that races once were pure. The
logical conclusion must be accepted as the working hypothesis, at least,
of a scientific investigation. But anthropological changes have not af-
fected the social relations of either the ancient or the modern human
groups of which we treat. Sociologically they are distinct groups still.
Sociological dissimilarities are independent of the structure of the bones
and skull. They consist in very different factors. Once the distinction
between native and alien may have answered to differences purely an-
thropological. But ever since the dawn of history the native has been
distinguished from the alien simply by social status and relations which
he and everybody else recognizes as necessarily correlative with and
consequent upon sociological or, really, social factors.
Birth and training are social factors. The latter, especially, imparts
the language, morals, ideas, religion and usages of the group and causes
the individual to appear to himself and to others to belong to it. All
together bind the members to each other by a common interest, which is
patriotism in its earliest form.
The simple syngenetic groups are affected by a great variety of
interests, political, economical, national and intellectual in such ways
that several elementary groups become united in one; primary social
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sively higher orders. The same regular processes which took place in
the simple groups in virtue of their social nature occur in all the others;
combinations and cultural changes only modify or complicate them.
These processes, which we shall call social since their source is in social
elements, are the content, as the groups, simple and compound, are the
agents of social history.
Social processes exhibit great uniformity. Though time and circum-
stances modify them they remain essentially the same. So for each in-
stance of uniformity in the social domain, as elsewhere, we formulate a
law of the cause and call the law social.121 Hence a social law is an
inference from concrete social occurrences presenting the norm of the
development and reciprocal influence of social elements, i.e., of the syn-
genetic groups.
The only way to prosecute social science is to discover social laws
where ethnical or social elements come in contact and to demonstrate
their validity. So long as the investigation was conducted in any other
way, no attempt to discover or found a social science could succeed.
It was recognized that there must be regularity of development and
that the laws of development must be demonstrated, were a philosophy
of history or a social science to be founded. Comte and Carey insisted
upon this repeatedly. But no one knew where to look for conformity to
law. Some like Voltaire, sought for laws of the development of mankind.
But if mankind is taken as a unit, it is obvious that development must be
either upward or downward; that there must be either progression or
retrogression. Rousseau and others accepted the latter alternative. As-
suming a primitive happy state of nature, they went on to prove man’s
growth in corruption. But the greater part, including nearly every writer
on the history of civilization, taught the contrary, laboring to show up-
ward progression from original savagery to successively higher forms
of civilization. Both parties were wrong; both erred in treating “man-
kind” as a unit of development. The mistake was general, but the posi-
tion cannot be maintained unless the field of view is materially limited.
Generally it is confined to the narrow stream of European civilization
running through Greece and Rome to France or Germany. The develop-
ment discovered here is attributed to mankind as a whole. Comte, for
instance, locates a period of polytheism between primitive fetichism and
modern(!) monotheism and asserts that “it was under its reign that man-
kind(!) rose to settled monogamy.”122 It is clear what a tiny fraction of
mankind the statement applies to. Comte took no thought of the rest; it100/Ludwig Gumplowicz
would have vitiated the orderly development of “mankind” and its el-
evation to monogamy.
But a few sagacious statisticians led by Quetelet escaped the self-
deception. Unsatisfied by this fancied regularity, they sought to dis-
cover laws of orderly development by other means. Quetelet is con-
scious that there can be no science of man unless man’s whole conduct
depends on fixed laws just as the phenomena of natural science do; and
he regrets that philosophers have never perceived it.
“Either from a distrust in their own strength,” he says, “or a re-
pugnance in supposing it possible to reduce to fixed laws what
seemed to flow from the most capricious of causes, it has hitherto
been deemed expedient by learned men to abandon the line of
inquiry employed in the investigation of the other laws of nature
as soon as the moral phenomena of mankind become the object of
research.”123
He also surmises correctly that if we would discover the laws con-
trolling man’s behavior we must disregard the individual.
“It is of primary importance to keep out of view man as he exists
in an insulated, separate, or in an individual state, and to regard
him only as a fraction of the species. In thus setting wide his indi-
vidual nature, we get quit of all which is accidental, and the indi-
vidual peculiarities, which exercise scarcely any influence over
the mass become effaced of their own accord, allowing the ob-
server to seize the general results.”
After giving the well-known illustration of the particles of chalk-
dust which form a circle only when seen from a distance, he continues:
“it is in this way that we propose studying the laws which relate to the
human species: for, by examining them too closely,” by examining the
individuals, he means, “it becomes impossible to apprehend them cor-
rectly, and the observer sees only individual peculiarities, which are
infinity.”124 That is, in place of the false and discarded subject-matter,
the individual, he substitutes a vague and incomprehensible “human
species,” “society,” or “social body.” This is his error. He never discov-
ered what the real subject-matter of observation should be; and conse-
quently all his efforts to found a science were a failure, as wee shall see.
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gests nothing concrete, nor even anything measurable. But every con-
crete object in nature is limited, and none but limited objects can be
observed scientifically. His terms suggest something unlimited, unde-
finable, as unfit for concrete observations—the foundation of all sci-
ence—as time and space. It must be resolved into concrete units first.
He wisely discarded the “individual,” but he failed to find the real unit.
He had recourse to the “great number,” as has been said. It is the
magician’s wand with which he conjures a finely plastic scientific sub-
ject-matter out of the unyielding “human species,” “society,” or “social
system.” Using a “great number” of cases, he finds laws prevalent where
formerly blind confusion reigned. The operation is very simple; if it
were only as sound!
Any convenient phenomenon may be observed and a record made
of the frequency of its recurrence in equal periods of time. If the several
totals are compared, either they will seem to conform to law or they will
not, one or the other. In the former event, the statisticians proclaim the
“law of the greet number;” in the latter they keep silence. Generally
some law is discoverable; for everything in the world is amenable to
number. Anything can be counted. At some limit, which must eventu-
ally be attained, numbers always give certain proportions; and this prop-
erty of numbers seems to have been communicated to the enumerated
articles.
Take any rare occurrence in ordinary life. Say a lunatic climbs a
tower and jumps to the street. Within the memory of man the like had
not happened in that locality. It stands alone. No law can be discovered
on it. If it is never repeated it eludes all statistical treatment. But possi-
bly it may re-occur. If we could find only one other instance in a long
series of years, even that would be enough to show “conformity to law;”
the event will occur once in so and so many years.
Obviously the opportunity for making ratios is far greater when the
events enumerated occur daily and hourly, as many in human life do.
Births, marriages, deaths, in fact the majority of demographical phe-
nomena must occur with great regularity; and statistics win an easy
triumph. But nave the laws governing natural phenomena been explained
when the regularity of their occurrence is confirmed? Here number is an
indication or proof that there is conformity to some law; and that is all.
Statistical results are wholly insufficient for formulating and ex-
plaining the least law of “mankind,” “society,” “the social system.” In a
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phenomena enumerated; whereas social science wishes especially to learn
the laws of social phenomena. Granted that statistics are a very impor-
tant means of investigation; yet counting phenomena and computing
ratios is a process purely arithmetical. It has no identity with the discov-
ery and explanation of the laws of the behavior of phenomena.
Quetelet’s statistical investigations are a great boon to science. But
he did not demonstrate social laws as he proposed. He mistook the laws
of number for the laws of social phenomena. His self-deception origi-
nated in his unclear concept of the subject-matter of social science. His
indefinite and incomprehensible “mankind” could not be subjected to
rigid and exact scientific treatment.
In one of his later works, the “Natural History of Society,” he tried
to improve by distinguishing several social communities from one an-
other. But he got no clear idea of “race,” “nation,” and “state.” On the
contrary he did what would not have been expected of him: he assumed
the individual to be their source and so prevented apprehension of their
true substance as effectually as the individualistic and atomistic ten-
dency in politics does. Spencer’s philosophy and sociology is, as we
have said, a significant advance upon Quetelet, Comte and the histori-
cal philosophers. He too argues that social science is both necessary and
possible.125 But he does not insist, as Comte does, that the subject-mat-
ter of social laws is mankind developing as a unit; rather he always
speaks of the development of social aggregates. Nor does he, like Quetelet,
use the “great number” to solve the problem of regular development. He
thinks he has found the solution in his formula of evolution.
As evolution stands in a certain though distant relation to social
phenomena, it might be accepted as a “universal law.” But we cannot
accept it as a “social law.” In every science, according to Spencer’s
theory, if we trace the history of particular things backward we shall
find that their constituent parts were once in a state of diffusion. And if
we trace their history forward from any point we shall find concentrated
conditions instead of diffuse. Hence he concludes that the formula for
the law of evolution must include both processes, concentration and
diffusion. Every perceivable thing, as he states it, is in a state of con-
tinuous change; it is either becoming or passing away. The former state
consists in the integration or concentration of matter and the dissipation
of motion, which he calls evolution. The latter consists in the disintegra-
tion of matter and the absorption of motion, which he calls dissolu-
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He demonstrates its validity for all classes of phenomena with great
acumen. But the connection between the universal formula and the con-
crete phenomena is so loose that we gain no explanation of them from it.
Applying to everything it explains nothing. It is not really a law of the
phenomena. It says no more, at bottom, than that motion is universal
without disclosing why.
In the social domain, especially, the defect is glaring. The formula
fits the social processes in a certain figurative sense, but does not ex-
plain them.
“While there exist nothing but small, wandering assemblages of
men, devoid of organization,” he says for instance, “the conflicts
of these assemblages with one another cannot work changes in
structure. But when once there have arisen the definite chieftain-
ships which these conflicts themselves tend to initiate, and espe-
cially when the conflicts have ended in permanent subjugations,
then arise the rudiments of political organization.”127
The process uniting social aggregates into political organizations is
remotely analogous to his law of evolution to be sure; but we must still
have recourse to the law that “solicitude for the means of subsistence”128
forces each social aggregate to try to make every other social aggregate
coming within its reach serve that supreme end. This law fully explains
why the stronger of the “small wandering hordes” aim to subject the
weaker and get their services; and it shows the necessity for all the
“structures” or variety of organization which culminate in the “state.”
The “universal law” of evolution applies to the process, but Spencer
fails to emphasize the “social law” which explains it.
But Spencer offers many just observations upon social phenomena
and processes. The formula of evolution does not prevent a correct con-
ception of them and in so far it is harmless and superior to other univer-
sal formulas. The most significant part of Spencer’s sociology however
is his demonstration that psycho-social phenomena develop with regu-
larity. Herein he displays a natural talent and mastership unequaled save
by Bastian. Let us notice this feature of his social psychology briefly.
Ethnographical and prehistoric investigations conducted in all cli-
mates and regions of the earth have established the remarkable fact that
changes in social phenomena from period to period are consequent and
logical, in a word, are evolutionary. Thus the investigation of the pre-
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stone, to bronze and to iron. The entire series could not be illustrated in
the history of one people but had to be constructed out of the relics of
peoples from all regions of the globe. Many groups, moreover, had con-
tinued permanently on some one stage without any development what-
ever. In all the domain of social life, religious, moral, juridical or cul-
tural, it is the same.
The philosophizing human mind finds a logical and strictly regular
development from fetichism through anthropomorphism, polytheism,
monotheism to the atheism of free thinkers. But scarcely would any one
group illustrate the whole series; and how many groups still pray to
fetiches, conceive their God in human form, people their heaven with
throngs of deities or recognize only one Jahve as they did thousands of
years ago! while, on the other hand, there were occasional free-thinkers
and atheists even in antiquity.
Spencer’s sociological and Bastian’s “ethnological” works abound
in examples of apparent psycho-social development reconstructed out
of the contributions of various peoples, times and lands. The first avail-
able explanation might seem to be the hypothesis that mankind is a unit;
and this explanation has often been offered. But man’s actual condition
is unlike the constructed development. Take any series of psycho-social
phenomena whatever and the several phases prevail as generally to-day
as at any time in the past. Yet how inviting it is to a nineteenth century
European to construct a “social development” from the condition of
unregulated “free love” to polyandry, polygamy and, finally, to the “most
beautiful flower of human development,” monogamy.
Not only is this method relied upon by Spencer repeatedly and used
by Bastian in compiling his “manifestations of race-thoughts;” even
Lippert uses it in his thoughtful presentation of the family and the priest-
hood, etc. Indisputably such series exhibit logical sequence and (logi-
cal!) “conformity to law.” But the development is not social and must
not be taken for it. The development of social institutions ought not to
be confounded with the development of mankind itself, with social de-
velopment in the stricter sense. Psycho-social progress never takes place
uniformly throughout mankind. Rather there is always such a great va-
riety of human conditions that types may always be found for a logical
series. Not only thousands of years ago but to-day there are communi-
ties living in unregulated free love, and tribes and races in which poly-
andry, polygamy and monogamy did and do prevail. Bastian wants to
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thought,” upon a case of psycho-social development, as we should call
it; and Spencer constructs his sociology out of similar cases.129 To a
certain extent they are justified. Psycho-social investigation furnishes
valuable material. The “examination of the mental creations of aggre-
gates to find the laws of the human mind’s growth,” may be considered
an integral part of sociology, or ethnology, the word Bastian prefers.
“Whenever the local surface colorations are penetrated and analysis is
vigorously prosecuted, uniform fundamental conceptions are dis-
closed.”130 But sociology, the “science of man,” is something more. So-
cial and psycho-social must be sharply distinguished. The former com-
prehends the relations between groups and communities of men. The
latter the manifestations of “race-thought” in the domain of religion,
morals, rights and civilization. Only the laws of the relations of distinct
aggregates of human material to each other are social. In distinction, the
laws of the “mental creations of aggregates,” to use Bastian’s language,
may be suitably designated psycho-social.III. Social Elements and Their Combinations
The Primitive Horde
(Promiscuity, Mother-right, Marriage by Capture, Paternal Family,
Property, Sovereignty.)
As individual consciousness, long dormant, does not awaken until the
mind has passed through the early stages of development, so also politi-
cal reflection is not aroused until after stock and folk and other complex
social phenomena have been developed. In natural science we are con-
fronted at the outset with composites which have to be analyzed, and so,
too, modern social science has to work laboriously back to the primitive
horde, reconstructing the originals of modern social communities out of
scattered vestiges in traditions and survivals, but deriving great assis-
tance from living examples of wild, “uncivilized” hordes.131
The so-called “mother-right” is an instance. There are vestiges of it
still among civilized peoples, and its former diffusion is confirmed by
its presence among contemporary uncivilized races. It is the Ariadne’s
thread of sociology, leading through the complex social communities of
present and historic times back to the primitive horde.
The type of “family” presided over by the “father” existed in Eu-
rope even at the dawn of history. The Greeks and the Romans consid-
ered it the primeval form, established by nature, the true germ of all
later social forms. They followed the tradition of the Asiatic races and
European science accepted the current view.
Only recently has ripened reflection and acute observation discov-
ered that the “father-family” was preceded by a period in which a very
narrow consanguineous group flocked about the mother as its founder.
The evidence collected by Bachofen, Giraud-Teulon, McLennan,132 and
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clusive. Even in the Germanic law Dargun has recently shown undoubted
traces of a former “mother-right.”
Hitherto it has sufficed to prove that historically, or rather prehis-
torically, there was a “mother-family” and resulting “mother-rights,”
which survived for centuries. But it is more important, in our opinion, to
show that the “mother-family” is the necessary consequence of the con-
stitution of an earlier group. Not only is this necessary to a proper con-
ception of the “mother-family,” it will also help us to understand the
nature of what for the present we must assume to have been the primi-
tive horde. The very fact that the former existed confirms the existence
of the latter.
Such a horde cannot be conceived of simply as new, or as proceed-
ing directly from the hands of “a creator;” for in distant parts of the
world there are hordes that are primitive still. It is a group of men who
are still dependent upon the simplest animal impulses, whose conditions
of life and social constitution show no social change. Its life moves
upon the plane of the simplest and most common impulses inherent in
man.
The satisfaction of hunger and thirst, the first necessity, engages the
men of the primitive horde and constitutes a great part of their life work.
The satisfaction of the sexual impulses is the next strongest factor.
The simplest form of sexual relations is promiscuity transient con-
nection within the horde according to accidental encounter or stronger
momentary attraction. It is still exemplified in the conduct of contempo-
rary uncivilized tribes.133
No fathers are recognized because, as a rule, they are unknown.
The bond of kinship between the men and their own children is lacking
and the only tie of blood other than kinship with the common stock,
which binds the whole horde together, is through the mother. Under this
primitive system there could be no other family than the “mother-fam-
ily.” The children were hers, she exercised authority over them and over
the “family”—hence “mother-rule” and “mother-right.”
This type of family organization had nearly disappeared at the dawn
of history. But numerous traces of it persisting in tradition have been
collected; and further proof is furnished by the aetiological explanation
of the subordinate position of woman where the opposite system pre-
vails.
A conspicuous case is the Biblical narrative, which treats the woman
as a secondary creation of God since she was made of the rib of the108/Ludwig Gumplowicz
man; a circumstance tending to justify his authority.
This is perhaps one of the earliest examples showing that no actual
ruler is ever at a loss for a theoretical explanation of his “right.” When
woman lost her authority, she also had to make the best of a descent
from the insignificant rib of a man, as the political philosophers in the
new order of society alleged. They who suffer the inj ury must also
endure the ridicule. Later the subject classes were traced to an inferior
descendant of Noah; while the ruling classes were called the descen-
dants of his privileged, first-born, son. These are all genealogical tricks
and aetiological lies of the historian.
It is recognized that mother-rule everywhere gave place to father-
rule; but the natural forces which produced this revolution in the origi-
nal constitution of society have never been pointed out so far as we
know. Yet marriage by capture or, more exactly, exogamic connection
explains it fully.
The universality of woman-stealing both in the present and in the
past is fully established, and the custom has been well described by
ethnologists. But too little weight has been given to the circumstance
which constitutes its real essence: the wife must always be stolen from
another horde. This is self-evident when we consider the condition of a
horde living in primitive promiscuity. Within the horde woman-stealing
is impossible. It must be from without; and to this form of it the
gynecocratic constitution gives abundant incentive.
In the raids of unrelated hordes the woman has been and in many
cases still is more valuable than cattle or any other form of food-supply.
In the gynecocratic horde an exceptional position can be claimed for
her, for the captor can hold her as his individual property; whereas the
native women are common and occupy a ruling position protected by
custom.
The foreign woman has no share in their privileges; belonging ex-
clusively to her “lord,” she must serve as his slave. This is greatly to his
advantage; it was the beginning of his “emancipation” in the primitive
horde. No wonder that the advantages which this innovation secured
caused it to spread so that, when the historical period opened, traditions
of woman-stealing are universal. Recollect, for example, the rape of the
Grecian Helen by a prince from Asia Minor, with which Grecian history
begins; and the rape of the Sabine women, from which Roman history
starts. Herodotus, the father of European historiography, begins char-
acteristically by reciting the rape of Asiatic women by the Greeks, andThe Outlines of Sociology/109
of Grecian women by the inhabitants of Asia.
Woman-stealing readily developed into the institution of marriage
by capture, the universality of which is fully attested by the countless
survivals still persisting.134
But as the custom spread the mother-family and mother-right nec-
essarily declined; the native women could not maintain their position in
competition with the foreign. The charm of the new and strange alone
would have assured the latter a certain preference; but it also afforded
the man an opportunity, certainly not unwelcome, to escape from a con-
dition which had become unnecessary, burdensome and “unreasonable,”
though the innovation must have been a rude offense against old and
sacred customs.
Thus mother-rule was overthrown, and with it fell mother-right and
the mother-family, while the sovereignty of the men was extended over
the native women also. They had to adapt themselves to the inevitable;
the good old custom disappeared and a new ethico-legal institution pre-
vailed: father-hood, father-family, father-right.
But its significance for the social development of mankind was in-
creased by one of the attending circumstances, the mingling of unlike
[heterogen] ethnical groups. The process has been continuous and uni-
versal and the intermixtures are interminable in number, variety end
degree. Together with political, judicial and other institutions, they have
produced an endless number of differentiated social unities.
However, rape was not the only occasion of early intertribal hostili-
ties; the plunder of property must also have been an incentive just as it
always has beer and still is, not among the uncivilized tribes alone.
Simple plundering raids are carried on at irregular intervals as ne-
cessity dictates and circumstances allow. But they generally lead to ex-
peditions for the permanent subjection of the foreign horde and the ac-
quisition of territory.135
These latter conditions are the most favorable for the development
civilization, as has been explained elsewhere.136 Yet the proximate basis
of the evolution is the institution of property which develops in connec-
tion with them also.
We have already seen that property developed concurrently with the
control of one group of men over another and, in fact, as a means to
uphold it.137 But a few remarks must be added here, partly for the sake
of greater clearness, and partly because of some recent works which
were written in ignorance of our explanation.110/Ludwig Gumplowicz
In the first place property in land is, in our opinion, the only form
which serves as an instrument of control. “Property” in movable goods
should be distinguished from property in immovable goods. What is
there in common between the unlimited possession and free disposal of
chattels and that juridical relation in virtue of which a person may keep
a piece of land exclusively for his own benefit? Yet for these fundamen-
tally different conceptions the European languages use but one term,
with consequent indistinctness and confusion of ideas in science.
Common property (Eigentum, proprium) is a contradiction in terms;
yet even separate or private “property” has been discussed as a simple
concept and what might be true of property in movable goods has been
applied without distinction to property in land, a very different thing.
This is certainly a great mistake.
To justify private property as the natural right of the individual to
the fruit of his own exertions sufficiently explains property in movable
goods, including the product of the land which a man’s own labor has
tilled, but does not explain property in land or in the fruit of another’s
labor; while to trace its origin to the actual possession of weapons, or-
naments, etc., an attempt which Dargun has recently renewed, leaves a
gap between movable goods and immovable which no analogy can bridge
over, for they are totally different. No doubt individual property in mov-
able goods has always existed, for the conditions of human life acquire
it. But the conditions of property in land are quite different. Land is not
the product of human labor, and its use is temporary; it can be occupied,
detained or possessed only in a limited and figurative sense; it might tee
possible to defend a small portion of land against trespassers; but it
would be impossible to defend the larger tracts which alone are under
consideration here. Property in land is not a physical fact and cannot be
explained by physical facts: occupation labor, etc. To say that land is
occupied or possessed, as is currently done, is to use a metaphor or a
legal fiction. Land, by its nature, admits of only one relation to man, the
employment of its use, the common enjoyment of many.
Hence the first form of property in land must have been its common
use, and further, it must have been used by such a group or horde as we
meet with everywhere in the beginning of social evolution. The evidence
supporting this conclusion is abundant. Even the primitive hordes of
modern times use land in common.138
Thus, in the nature of the cases, common property in movable goods
is impossible, but so-called common property in land is real and origi-The Outlines of Sociology/111
nal. What is commonly called private property in land is never real,
much less original; it is purely a legal relation; presupposing a compli-
cated social organization. It presupposes, first of all, an organized con-
trol, with power to compel obedience. This is necessary that the indi-
viduals of the ruling class may procure from the subject class the labor
power to till their lands and make them useful; thus they prove their
property. Without power to dispose of the labor force of others it would
be merely a name, with that power it becomes valuable.
A second presupposition is the possibility of excluding some from
the enjoyment of the product in favor of others. The organized whole
must protect the movable goods thus acquired; for if they were left ex-
posed to every aggressor it would not be worth while to raise them. In a
word, property in land is a legal relation which necessarily presupposes
governmental organization and the guarantee of legal protection.
Thus the “common property” which the primitive horde is said to
enjoy in the land on which it has settled is simply common use and not
real ownership, for the word “own” contains originally the idea of sepa-
rateness. Laying aside our complex, advanced legal relations, and speak-
ing of primitive conditions, we must take “ownership” to be separate
ownership and its antithesis is unseparated, not-own, i.e., common. It
was a much later and over-refined jurisprudence which transferred the
idea of separate ownership to a juristic person composed of a number of
natural persons, and it would be an unseemly transfer of modern legal
conceptions to speak of the common property of the primitive horde.
Passing on from the use of the land in common, we first recognize
the beginnings of separate immovable property when one horde has over-
powered another and uses its labor force. As soon as there are subjects
who are excluded from the enjoyment of certain goods which their own
labor contributed to produce, in favor of the ruling class, and when the
members of the ruling class are protected in their enjoyment of them by
the well-organized whole, then there arises separate or private property
in immovable goods. Not only did this form of property arise with the
organization of control and by means of it, it was at first the sole object
of the organization, which, moreover, contains the germ of the state. So
long as the organization continues in a nomadic condition, and lords and
slaves alike have no abiding place, we do not call it a state. We apply
that term only when a permanent dwelling place has been adopted and
the organization asserts its sovereign right of property over the land it
occupies against all other social communities.112/Ludwig Gumplowicz
The State
The state is a social phenomenon consisting of social elements behaving
according to social laws. The first step is the subjection of one social
group by another and the establishment of sovereignty; and the sover-
eign body is always the less numerous. But numerical inferiority is supple-
mented by mental superiority and greater military discipline. There is a
double life in the state; we can clearly distinguish the activities of the
state as a whole, as a single social structure, from those emanating from
the social elements.
The activities of the state as a whole originate in the sovereign class
which acts with the assistance or with the compulsory acquiescence of
the subject class. The movement is from within out; it is directed against
other states and social groups. Its object is always defence against at-
tacks, increase of power and territory, that is, conquest in one form or
another; and its motive, in the ultimate analysis, lies in human provi-
dence, in the impulse to secure conditions favorable for existence [in
Lebensfuersorge] to use Lippert’s apt expression.
The activities within the state are seen in the several social elements
and arise naturally from the positions which they occupy in the state
and to each other.
The motive of each is essentially the same as that which animates
the state as a whole. They seek conditions favorable to existence and
therefore endeavor to increase their power. In particular, the superior
class seeks to make the most productive use of the subject classes; as a
rule this leads to oppression and can always be considered as exploita-
tion. The subject classes strive for greater powers of resistance in order
to lessen their dependence.
These are the simplest and most fundamental efforts and they ac-
count for the internal and external development of the state; while dif-
ferences in the history of different states are due to different local and
ethnical conditions. As the commonest things of life are often the most
difficult to understand, so it is that political scientists to this day have no
clear conception of the state; each has his own definition and scarcely
one is correct.
Modern scholasticism has made the theory of the state endless and
fruitless. “Volume I” of a work on the definition of the state has ap-
peared in Berlin139 already and there is a “history” and a methodology
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use general terms, calling the state a “politically organized national per-
son”140 or the “highest form of personality,” or the “organism of free-
dom.” Others solve the problem by using a metaphor, by calling it a
“living being,” an “organism,” etc. But Knies justly remarks that “it is a
sad proof of unclear thinking to discuss scientific conceptions in meta-
phors.”141 Schulzermade great progress in the method of defining the
state by insisting that “it is a question of separating the essential from
the unessential in the plenitude of social phenomena;”142 and after me-
thodically searching for its historical characteristics he concluded that it
is the “association of a settled folk in an organic community under a
sovereign power and a definite constitution for the purpose of securing
all the common ends of a folk’s existence, above all for the establish-
ment of law and order.
But his definition can he improved by eliminating superfluous parts.
The idea by no means clearly expressed in the words “an organic com-
munity” is included in the preceding phrase; for a “folk,” and much
more, a “settled folk,” is “an organic community.” Indeed a “settled
folk” is a state; no further “association” is needed to make it one. It is
superfluous also to mention a “constitution,” for a written constitution
is not essential and an unwritten constitution is a prerequisite of a “settled
folk.”
If nothing but the utliver.ial and essential characteristics of every
state were incorporated into the definition, an agreement could be easily
reached for there are but two. First, there are certain institutions di-
rected to securing the sovereignty of some over the others secondly, the
sovereignty is always exercised by a minority. A state, therefore, Is the
organized control of the minority over the majority. This is the only true
and universal definition; it is apt in every case.143
But many definitions of the state predicate its end, declaring it to be
a union or community for securing the common weal, for realizing jus-
tice, etc. All this is wholly inadmissible. No state was ever founded with
one of these ends in view; and there are many which are states though
they have never exhibited even a trace of such a purpose. The truth is
that in the course of time under favorable conditions every sovereign
organization necessarily acts in harmony with these ends; thus any state
may serve them, indeed after reaching a certain stage of development
every state does endeavor to advance justice, welfare, etc. But the defi-
nition must not be confined to states at one stage of development only; it
must apply regardless of the stage which has been or ever will be at-114/Ludwig Gumplowicz
tained. Moreover, the affirmation of such ends conceals the fact that the
single object in organizing a state was to establish the sovereignty of
some over the others, and that the results which necessarily followed
were not foreseen, much less intended; they cannot be referred to the
intention of the founders who followed their own immediate advantage,
as all men do. High above egoistic human efforts social development is
the product of natural law.
There is still another universal characteristic of the state, although
it has hitherto been wholly overlooked; there are always ethnical differ-
ences between the ruling class and the ruled.
We called attention to it for the first time in our former publications;
“authorities in political science” solemnly ignored it, but they could not
refute it. The world moves, nevertheless.144 States have never arisen
except through the subjection of one stock by another, or by several
others in alliance.
This is not accidental; it is essential, as we have already proven. No
state has arisen without original ethnical heterogeneity [Heterogeneituet];
its unity is the product of social development.
Spencer without specially emphasizing ethnical heterogeneity con-
firms our position when he says that “no tribe becomes a nation by
simple growth.” Instead of the naive conception that a family gradually
grows to be a tribe and the tribe becomes a folk, he holds that there must
be a combination of several tribes, to which we add that, with perhaps a
few unknown exceptions, tribes are united only by the forcible subjec-
tion of one to the other. Spencer also goes on to say that “no great
society (nation) is formed by the direct union of the smallest societ-
ies;”145 by which he evidently means that a great nation necessarily com-
prises several smaller ones and includes a multitude of ethnically com-
pound groups; it is a group of the nth power, so to speak.
Let us observe the necessary result of founding a state, i.e., of sub-
jecting one community to another or to a union of several others. It has
already been pointed out that it is due to the effort to secure conditions
favorable for existence. But the efforts which men naturally make to
better their condition require the services of other men; if this were not
so, states would never have been founded and mankind would have de-
veloped along quite different lines or not at all. It will be readily con-
ceded that civilized men cannot live without the services of others. But
there is no man known to history nor can any be thought of so uncivi-
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The services which are needed are not easy; and the farther back we
go the heavier they necessarily were. Their alleviation is an infallible
characteristic of progressing civilization; we can observe it in the devel-
opment of current industrial relations, and the struggle for it is the real
subject matter of so-called social legislation (Social politik). How men
must have had to labor and indeed must still labor without the knowl-
edge and the means of civilization!146
Many governments still commute death sentences to labor in the
mines expecting to profit by this act of grace, and once the conquered
were similarly condemned to slave-labor in the interest of the victors.
Men never have treated their fellow-men (using that word in its most
primitive sense) so severely; and why should they do violence to their
natural feelings when strangers have never been lacking whom it has
always been meritorious to prey upon. United under the leadership of
the eldest and the mightiest they have imposed the yoke of servitude
upon the stranger in hardfought battle.
Thus nature laid the foundation of ethnically composite states in
human necessities and sentiments. Human labor being necessary, sym-
pathy with kindred and tribe and deadly hatred of strangers led to for-
eign wars. So conquest and the satisfaction of needs through the labor
of the conquered, essentially the same though differing in form, is the
great theme of human history from prehistoric times to the latest plan
for a Congo state.
Notice the condition thus established. The one party commands; the
other labors and accommodates itself to superior force. As every war
must cease raging and the weaker party must give up fruitless opposi-
tion, so nature helps to make the situation peaceful and lasting. But
peace and permanence are the elements of order, out of which come
habit, custom, rights.
The hostile contact of different [heterogen] social elements of un-
like strength is the first condition for the creation of rights; the condi-
tions established by force and accepted in weakness, if peaceably con-
tinued, become rightful. Inequality of power is essential, for contestants
of equal strength would wear themselves out in mutual conflict or,
morenaturally, would unite and subject a weaker. Moreover inequality
is stamped on every right; the husband orders his wife, the parent in the
strength of his years commands his minor children, the owner excludes
all others from enjoying the fruit of his property: all these are rights
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to think that rights have been or can be equally distributed. They arise
only in the relations which exist in the state; they express them and
measure their inequality.
Let us now examine more closely the nature of political relations.
Universally there is a ruling minority and a subject majority, this is the
essence of the state as it is the essence of sovereignty.
But what is the ruling minority disposed to do? There is but one
thing it can wish, viz.: to live in better circumstances with the services
of the subject majority than it could without them. The result is a com-
mon industrial enterprise conducted under compulsion in which the
greater burden, all the unfree service, falls upon the subject class though
the rulers freely contribute their no less valuable share in support of the
political community. Thus compulsory labor is organized through the
organization of sovereignty and the whole body of rights.
The kind of industrial labor depends upon the nature of the soil, the
climate and the material resources of the state. If the subjected popula-
tion was roving over rich agricultural lands it will be compelled to till
the soil and the conquerors will settle among them so as to exploit both
land and people to the best advantage. The agricultural states of Europe
still bear traces of such a compulsory organization of labor wherever an
exclusive nobility has settled among a numerous agricultural popula-
tion, spreading itself like a net over the whole land.
But a huge swarm inhabiting an extended prairie and pasture land
will adopt a different social organization. The captives taken on many a
plundering raid will be distributed among the members to perform the
heavier work of tending cattle, transporting tents and the like. The no-
madic state thus organized will fulfill its political functions as truly as
the settled state of the large property owners. In the latter case the lord
upon his manor or in his castle manages the peasants and vassals settled
about him, satisfying their simple necessities from the produce of the
fields and reserving the surplus for himself. In the nomadic state the
master from his chieftain’s tent rules over his numerous following, who
tend his herds and enjoy a simple subsistence out of the increase; the
rest of which, after the richer subsistence of his family is deducted, is
added to his accumulated wealth and capital
The organization will be different still where a narrow strip of coast
like Phoenicia, or a group of islands like Venice, make agricultural or
pastoral pursuits impossible. The superior speculative talent of the rul-
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subject class; they will be put to ship-building and employed as sailors,
so that the rulers may seek distant coasts and win wealth and power in
navigation and foreign trade.
Labor must always be organized under compulsion, the training
and the discipline of the state are necessary. It demands of the laboring
class, in the beginning at least, untold sacrifice of life and health; but
finally in a rising civilization they become participants in the material
and moral possessions.
The life of the state is summed up in this common though unequal
labor. In it the state performs its task and fulfills its mission, if task and
mission can be spoken of where blind impulse rules on every hand; out
of it comes the highest moral possession of mankind, civilization.147
The State as Industrial Organization
The motive force in the establishment of primitive political relations
was economic es has been seen; higher material welfare was sought.
But this force never fails; the innermost nature of man keeps it in cease-
less operation, promoting the development of the state as it laid its foun-
dation. Investigate the cause of any political revolution and the result
will prove that social progress is always produced by economic causes.
Indeed it cannot be otherwise since man’s material need is the prime
motive of his conduct.148
This necessity incited men to exploit the services of their fellows,
and nature supplied a great many different groups whose natural an-
tagonism is still an important factor in developing political relations;
for human labor’could not be exploited without violence, and ethnical
and social contrasts promote the disregard of all human considerations,
facilitating the satisfaction of human needs and maintaining the ever-
lasting struggle. Thus the two fundamental social processes are satis-
faction of needs and exploitation of the services (Dienstbarmachung)
of foreigners, two apparently unimportant means with which nature
accomplishes so much. Moreover the evolution cannot cease, for nature
has provided that man’s needs shall not stand still; higher and “nobler”
wants are constantly awakened; while at the point where natural ethni-
cal distinctions {Heterogenéitæten] would disappear artificial “social”
distinctions arise to perpetuate the antagonism of human groups. Hu-
man desires never fail and there are groups differing in stature, color
and odor, in diet, morals and religion, or in possessions, conditions,
calling, occupations and interests.118/Ludwig Gumplowicz
Only in the course of social development they rise to higher stages
and meet us in new forms as the need for the bare means of subsistence
with the most primitive is transformed in the higher stages into the ne-
cessity for satisfying ambition, love of glory, the interests of a dynasty
and various other ideals; and the life and death struggle between hordes
anthropologically different [heterogen] becomes a contest between so-
cial groups, classes, estates and political parties. The great sociological
difficulty in describing the course of development arises from the fact
that there can be no leaps. Though social development like every other
case of evolution is gradual, the transitional phases are innumerable and
imperceptible and overtax the resources of science. The only alternative
is to treat a small number of examples chosen more or less arbitrarily,
which is all we can endeavor to do here.
It must not be forgotten that here, as elsewhere, the same phenom-
ena are found sometimes contemporaneously, sometimes in sequence.
There is a social development in time from the simplest satisfaction of
necessities and the rudest struggle for existence up to the highest needs
of a refined civilization and the system of rights developed in political
strife; while its counterpart with all the imperceptible gradations and
vivid contrasts can be seen in the cross-section, so to speak, of a state on
the highest plane of development for if we look at its inner structure we
see the proletarian toiling for his daily bread in the sweat of his brow,
and all the countless stages to the uppermost rung of society, to the
statesman struggling for position or for principle. Moreover, what is
true of the desires is true also of the means of satisfying them.
This in passing. Let us now turn to a closer analysis of the social
evolution founded upon and promoted by organized sovereignty. Equal-
ity prevails only in the most primitive hordes. In them alone are needs
satisfied without the subordination of one man’s labor to another’s ends;
in them alone there is neither command nor obedience, lordship nor
dependence,chieftain nor subject. Equal misery is the lot of all.
“When Rink asked the Nicobarians who among them was the chief
they replied, laughing, how could he believe that one could have power
against so many?” And there are many similar examples. Among the
Haidahs “the people seemed all equal;” Among the California tribes
“each individual does as he likes;” among the Navajos, “each is sover-
eign in his own right.”149
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are without even that primary contrast of parts implied by settled
chieftainship. Their members are subject to no control but such as
is temporarily acquired by the stronger, or more cunning, or more
experienced, not even a permanent nucleus is present.”150
Plainly the subjection of some to the service of others is opposed to
the feeling of equality, of solidarity, of consanguineous relationships.
Even the ruling classes of Europe exhibit the same feeling. “The noble-
man in a peasant’s cottage is the peer of the commander of the Palatine’s
army” (“Szalchcic na zagrodzie ròewny wojewodzie”), say the Poles.
This is the equality of the syngenetic group.151
The primitive horde emerges from this condition of uniform inde-
pendence and uniform misery only when a strange horde comes within
its reach as the result generally of migration or a plundering raid. If it
subjects the strangers its wants are more easily satisfied and its eco-
nomic life is raised above the primitive condition; the “extra” labor of
some for others begins.
If the rulers should remain content with the higher stage of eco-
nomic life; if they could isolate their state from external influences, de-
velopment would cease. But Lycurgian plans can never be realized; states
can never be “isolated” even with Chinese walls about them.
Stagnation in development is prevented by the steady growth of the
wants of both rulers and subjects, for the law that wants increase with
the opportunity to satisfy them is universal, and the isolated state is also
an object of desire to its neighbors near and remote, so that as they grow
powerful it must increase its means of offense and defence. Even the
least aggressive state will be drawn in spite of itself into the stream of
“history” evolution cannot stop. As wants increase, the state, which
was called into being to satisfy them, is driven to further conquests of
territory and power. But the same tendency which animates the state as
a whole animates also each social division within it. The only difference
is that its manifestation is confined by established political relations to a
struggle for control by peaceful means; while outside the state it breaks
out in bloody and destructive wars.
But, however unavoidable war may be, it cannot last always; for it
produces physical and mental exhaustion; and if it becomes chronic the
end for which it is undertaken is thereby defeated.
Peace is as necessary as occasional war, for both are the result of a
natural law of strife; and so it was possible to establish states, since120/Ludwig Gumplowicz
otherwise the more powerful must have had to exterminate the weaker.
But peace is useless without the opportunity to satisfy the wants which
war was undertaken to secure. However, only one party can be victor;
one party secures the better satisfaction of its wants; and the other is
circumscribed and oppressed. Some force is necessary to maintain the
unequal condition in peace; suitable institutions must be set up and sedu-
lously sustained. This tile ruling and possessing class does while the
other class accommodates itself to the law of the victors. But it jeal-
ously guards the established limits, now staking everything on prevent-
ing any further circumscription, now striving to enlarge them.
So apparent peace is only a continuous latent struggle. What is its
object? What are the means employed? What is its essential characteris-
tic? The immediate object of dispute is the body of reciprocal rights.
The less privileged oppose every limitation whatever asserted in the
interest of sovereignty: restricted connubial rights, exclusion from of-
fice and positions of honor, incapacity for holding landed property and
others only relatively less important and less common. Sovereignty can-
not be maintained without them, and the peaceful struggle of the un-
privileged is directed to breaking them down and removing them even-
tually.
In the common interest, the subject class must be assigned some
privileges and functions, for Spartan severity cannot be rigorously en-
forced. Even the superfluous Helot population was not always extermi-
nated, neither do the Australian colonists hunt down the natives every-
where. In Sparta, to be sure, the contest of the Helots could not be
conducted by peaceable means, but the sovereignty over them was not
shortlived on that account; it succumbed to another course of develop-
ment.
But wherever in the interest of the whole the least concession is
made to the subject class it serves as a lever to enlarge their privileges.
Two conditions, however, are necessary to success: well-being and en-
lightenment. When the ruling class is well off the condition of the sub-
ject class will necessarily rise too; otherwise the desires of the sovereign
class cannot be fully satisfied. But appetite comes with eating and the
first progress creates the desire for more.
Thoughts cannot be hermetically sealed, and as social facts even
more than any other facts provoke reflection, the subject class, if re-
lieved from external pressue and direct need, will experience mental
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the social relations their life is easier and they are lulled to sleep men-
tally. But it is otherwise down in the seething mass of the “people.”
Huge numbers of them may succumb to the hard conditions of life and
languish in ignorance and stupidity; but if the pressure ever relaxes, or
if it falls on unusually strong natures, the mental reaction is all the more
violent. On the whole the life of the subject classes is more fruitful in
ideas.
Some degree of well-being and some ideas is the necessary leaven,
as even Aristotle knew. It only needs a favorable opportunity, an exter-
nal danger or defeat, a permitted popular gathering, a tumult of unusual
dimensions, to make the first breach, further development in the market-
place and on the forum is unavoidable. The same factors are active; the
method is the same; the result is the same. Woe to the conquered, was
the cry in the beginning and woe to the conquered is often the cry to the
last.
Development of Rank and Political Organization
But the social struggle is not so simple as it is here represented. Eco-
nomic development and historical facts create a multitude of classes
equally endowed with political tendencies and the result is a complexity
of political rights. Intermediate classes intervene between the master
and the slave which may hold the lower classes in dependence end bein
subjection to the upper, or be superior to all in certain spheres of activ-
ity and dependent in others. They may be both rulers and ruled.
The simplest political organization consisting of lords and vassals,
the simple civitas of the Romans, receives the first fatal shock from the
foreign merchants. The effect of their visits upon the primitive political
constitution is vividly portrayed by Caesar in his “Commentaries.” The
Belgians were the bravest of all the Gallic tribes, he says, “because they
are farthest removed from the civilization and culture of the Province
and the merchants visit them least often bringing things which tend to
effeminate.” The merchants seeking gain penetrate the primitive politi-
cal organization and disturb its monotonous course, for their “fine ar-
ticles” charm the uncultivated man.
But these “missionaries of commerce” are the pioneers of culture.
They visit the most inhospitable shores and impenetrable regions of
unknown lands, staking both property and life; and the thousands who
fall are followed by other thousands fearless of death—all for the sake
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by the history of European colonization in all quarters of the globe, and,
above all, by the living present. The clever Hansa-man, the trader with
his wares seeking gain, is the first to enter the Congo and the Niger
valleys, braving the difficulties of the dark continent and visiting tribes
who receive the stranger as they would a wild beast; then, if his venture
succeeds, come the “chivalrous lords” and “patriotic statesmen.”
The merchant, coming as guest and offering his wares for sale, is
personally free and knows how to maintain his freedom. Identified nei-
ther with the lords nor with their vassals, he soon becomes necessary to
both, for the “articles” which he brings from a distance delight them and
awaken new desires which must be satisfied. The one class labors more,
the other saves more in order to get the new means of satisfying the new
wants. They begin to grow “effeminate;” but it must be added that they
also grow in “civilization” and “culture.”152
They learn to value and to tolerate the stranger, and he in turn dis-
covers the virgin treasures of the land. Things are gladly given to him
which before his time had no worth and without him would still have
none. Occasional visits are followed by permanent settlements and the
first settlers are followed by more numerous followers. A middle class
forces itself in between lords and vassals; personally free and having no
direct share in the government; instituting its own corporation in its own
quarter—the later city; by compromise with the lords creating for itself
rights within an assured sphere limited and defined both from above and
below.153 Thus a new factor arises in political evolution and social strife.
Changes proceed more rapidly than before; foreign commerce makes
domestic labor more productive and awakens handicraft and industry,
while those who follow the new branches of economic labor are
cousoliclated by their common interests into compact groups demand-
ing their rights.
But such rights are only the realization, the unhindered exercise of
acquired power, i.e., supremacy within politically recognized limits,
which, however various the means of acquiring it, consists essentially in
the free and disposable possession of whatever will satisfy human wants.
Prominent in the list is the possession, or better, the disposal of
human energy and labor. Without human services every other posses-
sion is valueless unless incleecl by means of it human labor can be
instantly secured, which reduces to the same thing. The power varies in
greatness with the coefficient of disposable human energies and not with
the amount of other possessions, though generally the former is propor-The Outlines of Sociology/123
tional to the latter.
There is one method of utilizing human services directly that is with-
out the intervention of other possessions; it is the one by which the
founders of political order assure themselves of the services of their
vassals and slaves. They rely upon physical and mental superiority, strict
military organization and discipline and innate tact in governing. Power
thus acquired may be strengthened by various material and moral means;
or it may fall into decay through weakness, lack of discipline and ener-
getic opposition.
Other means of facilitating and assuring the uninterrupted applica-
tion of human services is the possession of supplies and of institutions
for promoting production. But the most powerful moral means is a purely
natural factor, habit. Having elsewhere154 emphasized its overwhelming
power in political and legal relations, it is a great satisfaction to us to
find our views confirmed in a recent work.155
“The power of habit is mysterious as witchery,” it is said. “It sways
the insignificant life of the individual and the great history of
mankind. The dark impulse of all material things is in the midst
of change to pause; in the midst of ceaseless motion to become
stable for a moments by the pendulum’s uniform swing to give to
constant vibration the appearance of regular motion; and essen-
tially the same impulse gives equipoise to all the mental activities
of our race. First the natural inclination to repeat the same act,
then the incorporation of the repetitions in regular habit: how much
conscious thinking and willing thus gradually becomes the un-
conscious function of an unthinking machine!... Rule and order
and custom and law transmitting civilization from generation to
generation would be unintelligible without the incessant action of
this mysterious force.”
Thus nature itself is the strongest ally of the rulers. Habit becomes
an element of their power and its incessant action produces the other
moral factors, order, custom, rights, and also the moral bonds that unite
men of the same language and religion. For however unlike the rulers
and ruled in these respects the former have understood how to adapt
themselves to thelatter, at least outwardly, in both respects—an end to
which, moreover, the force of circurnstances directly tends.156
Thus do the founders of sovereignty sustain their power, but the
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possession of material goods and the more necessary they are the greater
is the equivalent offered for the surrender of them whether in labor,
services and goods or in the right to demand services. In any case the
equivaleut can be reduced to terms of human labor; and so the middle
class also acquires political power. By labor, industry, inventiveness,
speculation and thrift it can even attain to the balance of power in the
state.
That the possession of material goods can be a source of power
only in the state is so self-evident as scarcely to need mentioning; for
where club-law and anarchy prevailed they would fall to the physically
superior; no power-producing energy is inherent in them. Within the
state however the purely economic power, as we may briefly call it, has
secured recognition and has its part in sovereignty.
Let us consider how the middle class exercises its authority; who
perform the services to which their authority, like every other, may even-
tually be reduced. The rulers as a class do not perform them; they must
be performed either by the subjects as a class or by wage-laborers drawn
from other sources. The rulers therefore cannot recompense the middle
class directly by them. They offer treasures of the land over which they
exercise “eminent domain,” products of the fauna which are also the
“lord’s property,” agricultural products produced by the labor of the
subject people, and finally the concession of rights to have the exclusive
sale of articles of universal necessity, to hold markets, to claim certain
services from the unfree, etc. In so far as the lords must acquiesce as a
class and each can be compelled by law and right, it is proper to speak
of the power of the middle class over the rulers, although up to a certain
point in political evolution the balance of privileges, prerogatives and
power is decidedly with the latter. The power of both can be expressed
in services of the ruled class which, being superior in numbers, repre-
sents the greatest amount of human energy in the state and is the great
reservoir from which the whole political apparatus is fed. In a word the
whole state is supported by its lowest and most numerous stratum.
Later we shall inquire whether the burden becomes greater as the
classes increase in number and variety; at present we must consider the
course of political evolution Though material wants created the middle
class, even in the very beginning of social life wants of quite another
character laid the foundation for another class which should some time
mightily affect the evolution of the state.
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the riddle of its own existence, peremptorily demands pacification; how
this is found in religious ideas and how these lead to religious ceremo-
nies.157 We will not here enlarge upon the psycho-social process in-
volved;158 but it is a fact that universally these religious needs sooner or
later produce a priestly caste inspired with the desire to sustain and
increase its power.
Now its power also must consist in the ability to command men’s
services. The only difference is in the form of the power and the manner
of securing it corresponding to its peculiar means of satisfying human
wants.
While the nobility commands human services immediately by its
superiority; while by establishing an organization it confers an undeni-
able benefit upon the whole; while further the merchant brings material
goods to both the lords and the subject receiving an equivalent from
both: the priestly caste conducts the religious ceremonies, thereby satis-
fying a peremptory need of human nature, and fortifies its position by
acquiring material goods and human services.
The classes differ only in their functions; the equivalents received
by all can be reduced to the same terms: a greater or less sum of human
services rendered in kind or in goods or in the grant of privileges, rights
and “royalties.” The rationalist might object that the services of the
priest are imaginary and no real equivalent for what the recipient of
them gives in the sweat of his brow. The same might also be said of the
services of the ruling class. But what are these objections against the
fact that men’s religious wants are as peremptory as their material, and
that the ruling class also fulfills its function in social economy and has
no substitute!
Besides sociology must avoid criticising nature. It is interested only
in facts and the laws of their behavior and it cannot raise the question
whether the thing could not be accomplished differently or better. Social
phenomena follow necessarily from and must be the requirements of the
nature of men and their relations.
Sociology is coming to recognize that there would be no rulers if
there were no servants; no priests if there were no believers; no traders
if they could find no buyers. The phenomenon of class-building can be
referred to a universal law: each want produces its own means of satis-
faction. In so far as a class is able to satisfy a social want it first is
indispensable, and, secondly, receives an equivalent which can be ex-
pressed in terms of human services, the instrument of power. But in126/Ludwig Gumplowicz
exercising its acquired power it participates in government.
As new wants produce new professional classes and castes, the more
progressive a state is and the higher its civilization the more numerous
they are and the more complex must be the mutual dependence of the
several social circles which jointly possess the elements of power.
Material and intellectual (moral) wants, it has been seen, are rooted
and grounded in human nature; they might be called primary. But civi-
lization keeps on developing others which may be called secondary, such
as the uncivilized and those on lower stages of culture do not feel; such
as men become sensible of only as a result of their higher culture.
On a low stage of culture, for instance, the priest is at the same time
medicine-man, and no need of a lay (weltlich) physician is felt. By a
process which might be called a differentiation of wants, there arises
out of the religious needs a demand for medical care and treatment which,
on the higher stages of culture, is supplied by the medical profession
which is organized, has social standing and enjoys legal protection.
The necessity of legal assistance has grown out of the intercourse
and the legal relations of men in the civilized state. It is well known
what great influence the legal professionwields in the modern state. But
its power is no greater than the great and universal need it satisfies.
The necessity for an administrative department as the state becomes
large, for distributing governmental duties among a number of function-
aries and maintaining facility of commmlication between them and the
people has produced the official class, which has its own interests, pos-
sesses power and exerts a controlling influence in its own sphere.
The trading and industrial class has been subdivided into very many
different classes and callings, because a division of labor became neces-
sary as the demand increased for many products which commerce brought
to hand or trade and industry supplied.
In the modern civilized state large industries are opposed to the
small, the laboring class to the capitalist and the undertaking classes,
agriculture to manufactures, and so forth Each has its own interest which
it represents, its own power which it strives to increase, and each bears
down upon the others according to its strength and their resistance. In
other words each participates in sovereignty solely and exactly in pro-
portion to its power. Wherein this power consists we have already seen.
Just as the middle class was subdivided to correspond with the divi-
sion of labor and the development of specialties so also a military class
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changed. It assimilated portions of other classes and developed into the
modern military profession, and though in deference to passing doc-
trines, some efforts have been made to sink this independent profession
in the universal obligation of all citizens to bear arms it is a question
whether they can succeed, whether nature will not prove stronger than
doctrine, finally producing in spite of them a separate military class.
The Twofold Origin of Classes
We have seen that some classes, the ruling, the peasant and the mer-
chant classes for instance, arose from the union [Zusammentreffen] of
different [heterogen] ethnological elements; that their characteristic dif-
ferences are original. Such classes antedate the state and are the more
easily maintained in it because their differences are both anthropologi-
cal and moral.
But there are others, as we have seen, the priesthood, large industry
as contrasted with small, scholars, jurists, officials and so forth, which
arise front the others by a process of differentiation. When they have
become fully separated they in turn devote their whole conduct both
active and passive to guarding their peculiar interests and take on the
nature of the original classes.
These phenomena depend upon a universal law which we must ex-
plain before we can show its application in the social domain. Corollary
to the distinction between original and derived classes is that between
heredity and adaptation. Organic types seem to arise in two distinct
ways and the solution of the whole anthropological problem depends
upon setting aside the one or harmonizing the two. Is the principle of
perpetual growth in organic bodies heredity, or adaptation, or what?
The wisdom of the ages which must not be despised answers hered-
ity, radical modern materialism answers adaptation: “The man is what
he eats;” Darwinism to reconcile the difference says: Both. Let us see
which answer is nearest the truth. A superficial glance at organic struc-
tures is enough to show that heredity is the mightiest principle of their
growth. It is clearly the rule that such structures are as their progenitors
were. However there are some exceptions, for which the cleverest and at
present the most widely accepted explanation is Darwin’s theory of ad-
aptation; what cannot be explained by heredity must be referred to the
property of adaptation to external conditions, which organisms possess
and to which the struggle for existence forces them to resort.
This theory would scarcely have found acceptance if Darwin’s ge-128/Ludwig Gumplowicz
nius had not pointed out many cases which show that organisms do
adapt themselves to external conditions in their growth and so change
the hereditary type, though he was less successful in showing that changes
produced by adaptation would become hereditary.
So the law of adaptation is still an hypothesis in spite of the particu-
lar instances cited in support of it, though the law of heredity is estab-
lished beyond a doubt, we believe. It is a fact however that natural
structures arise in two ways; they are either primary or secondary. There
are two universal and so to speak opposing tendencies in nature: one we
might call originality, the other imitation. That is to say, what nature
made originally in some unknown, “creative” way, is also frequently
produced under tile influence of external circumstances which may be
easily comprehended. The latter origin is called by Darwin’s school evo-
lutionary.159
Autogenesis and evolution always co-operate; and we are often in
doubt whether a particular organism is genetic or evolutionary; while in
many cases in fact it may be either. Nature’s processes are after all one
and the same, like those by which an artist produces an original and a
replica. As it is not impossible for a painter to produce an original be-
cause he has made copies so it is a fallacy to conclude with the Darwin-
ians that the many instances of evolution prove all organisms to have
originated in that way. Some human types originated in adaptation and
evolution; but not necessarily all. If the geographical character of the
habitat is sufficient still to modify a type of organism how much greater
must its influence have been upon the origin of varieties, for once it
produced, so to speak, genetic differences, but though still active the
original genetic effect proves to be more permanent. This might seem to
justify one argument used in support of evolution, viz., that if the period
be indefinitely extended the supposition of an original method becomes
superfluous. But this is only arithmetically correct, it is insufficient to
refute the supposition of an original genetic origin when so many other
considerations support it.
Both forms of origin, the primary and the secondary, the genetic
and the evolutionary, are common in social as well as in organic phe-
nomena. Social inequality arises originally from the union
[zusammentreffen] of distinct [heterogen] ethnical elements of unlike
power; and it also arises by evolution, by the slow development of some
elements at the cost of others which sink in power owing to unfavorable
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Though the original method of forming states is by subjugation, it
might happen (?) as an exception that a period of peaceful development
should result in the differentiation of the population into classes, the
stronger gradually separating themselves from those who were weaker
and needed protection. As a rule classes rise originally, i.e., out of dif-
ferent [heterogen] ethnical elements, or by the permanent organization
of such as are at different stages of development at the time of their
union. But there are instances of secondary origin also; since as we have
seen some turn to this calling, some to that, according to conditions and
inclinations: and those of each calling congregate in a class, But whether
a social group arise in one way or the other, its character as a group, as
a factor in social development, is not affected. It tends in the direction of
its own interests, it tries to protect and further them, to increase its
power and to acquire a corresponding influence in thc state.
These efforts are always the same and all groups necessarily had to
adopt the same policy respecting them. The natural differences between
the original classes and the syngenetic coherence within them helped in
maintaining and extending their power; and the secondary groups in
turn must needs acquire like differences and coherences. Hence comes
the strong tendency to divide into classes and to maintain the power of
each by endogamy; or by celibacy to sunder all connection with other
social groups and prevent the weakening of power by division.
Society
The great number and variety of mutually related groups within the
state considered as a whole is called society in contrast with the state. In
this wider sense society is not different from the state; it is the same
thing viewed from another point. But in the narrower and more accurate
sense of the word each group centering about some one or more com-
mon interests is a society. This double meaning often leads to confusion
which is made worse because social groups are not always separated by
a hard and fast line. They overlap and intertwine so that the same men
are bound to one group by one set of interests and to another by another
set. Thus a government official may own a large estate, be a zealous
adherent of a religious sect, and be a sugar manufacturer also. In the
social struggles over material and moral questions his position will be
finally determined by his relative interests.
On the other hand with the development of civilization, certain in-
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societies embrace the subjects of several states. Religious beliefs, the
ties of kindred, socialism, e.g., have produced international groups.
Until these relations are thoroughly and scientifically analyzed the
notion of a society will remain confused. Such unclear Hegelian defini-
tions as von Ihering offers explain nothing.
“Society,” he says, “may be defined as the actual organization of
life on the plan of mutual assistance, and since the individual is at
his best only through the others it is at once indispensable per se
and in reality the universal form of human life.”160
For society substitute state, political economy or anything else and
the definition is equally good and equally bad; in fact the state has actu-
ally been called “the form” or “the organization of human life:” general
phrases fitting anything and explaining nothing. Ihering’s use of them is
not surprising perhaps for instead of seriously studying the phenomena
themselves he inquires, as Romanist, what the Roman jurists say about
them and frames his definition to correspond. His meaningless defini-
tion of society is derived from soaelas. But others have failed without
this excuse.
How helpful in contrast is Spencer’s clear explanation of society
considered as a unit.
“It is the permanence of the relations among component parts,”
he says, “which constitutes the individuality of a whole as distin-
guished from the individualities of its parts.”161
The “permanent relations” between men unite them into a society,
and since there are different kinds of relations there are different kinds
of societies and a man may be bound to several at once, as we have seen.
Much would be gained it we could use “society” simply to desig-
nate a concrete number of men united by “permanent relations,” for it is
perfectly clear. The broader use suggests nothing real; it is only another
way of looking at folk-life. Schaeffle, who calls these narrower social
circles “cohesive masses or tissue” (Massenzusammenhaenge oder
Bindegewebe), remarks that it is
“singular that social philosophy has as yet been unable to assign
even the most insignificant place in its system to these elementary
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tremely sensitive. They are thrown with much other rubbish into a
heap called ‘society,’ which is alleged to lie midway between the
state and the individual. In reality no such miscellaneous society
exists.”162
He fails to note that a “society,” something less than the state and
more than the individual, had necessarily to be assumed as the starting
point of a social philosophy which began with Schloezer’s and Hegel’s
“society of burghers,” and later was powerfully influenced by the broader
conceptions advanced by Mohl, Stein and Gneist.163 But nowadays when
people ought to know that there is no concrete reality behind the idea the
use of the word in its broader signification has no further justification.
If it should be objected that all the social groups in the state are united
by “permanent relations,” such as those of common territory, govern-
ment, etc., and hence in turn form one “society,” we reply that the word
“folk” is a sufficient designation. There is no further use for this expres-
sion in its wider signification. It should only be applied to the simple
social groups in the state or to those united by interests which transcend
state limits.
Societies
We cannot be expected to enumerate all the societies which occur in the
state and still less to discuss the historical development of each. Lippert
in his “History of the Priesthood” has described one successfully; to do
as much for every other would take us far outside the limits of this
sketch. We can only explain the social “relations” which bind the mem-
bers of the several groups together and the general principles underlying
their power in the state, for here also the description of what is indi-
vidual must be reserved for history; sociology can only state the general
modes of behavior, the laws of the phenomena. It is clear that the soci-
eties both in their origin and in their development are controlled by “laws”
since human nature is the same everywhere and social differentiation
corresponds to the growth and development of human wants as we have
seen.
Social structures thus arising from a common basis must be the
same in essence; must have the same life-principle, make the same ef-
forts and have the same aspirations. Whether they shall develop power
and sovereignty depends simply on the greater or less resources they
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alike in plan and tendency.
To discover what ties bind a number of men into a society we must
start, as elsewhere in sociology, with an original or primary condition,
one which we cannot analyze further, the origin of which we cannot
observe. Such a bond is association in the horde.164 It seems to be natu-
ral and, in contrast, all others are evolutionary arising with social devel-
opment. Of course they are natural too in a sense the difference is that
we know their origin and do not know that of the former.”165 To those
who feel this bond it suggests a contrast with the “stranger;” later re-
flection based on experience adds the aetiological explanation of com-
mon descent from some god or hero.
Analysis shows that the positive binding force is association and
simple consanguinity with the resultant community of language, reli-
gious ideas, customs and mode of life, while the contrast with the stranger
lies in his lack of participation in them.
In reality all the social binding forces are represented in the primi-
tive horde: association and consanguinity, similar material and intellec-
tual needs and similar interests in satisfying them, and there are no so-
cial contrasts which cannot be referred to dissimilarity in one or more of
these respects.
Social development presupposes the junction of heterogeneous or
the differentiation of homogeneous elements. In the former case the com-
bining elements are united by common interests and fall into social op-
position for lack of them. In the latter the differentiating group develops
certain common interests which hold it together and separate it from the
rest. The first is the case when political relations are established be-
tween foreign elements or a middle class is gradually developed; the
latter, when the various priestly, military and professional classes slowly
appear.
The establishment of the first political relations calls two social
classes into existence at once: the lords and the slaves or serfs. The
social bonds which unified each group and created feelings of tribal
loyalty will be strengthened by the common interest of rulers and the
common lot of subjects respectively. Class feeling will be added to tribal;
but it does not follow that mutual opposition will be intensified. The
centrifugal factors will be offset by local association and all the ties
which habit and adaptation develop under such circumstances. The
psycho-social functions: language, customs, religious ideas and ceremo-
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The subject class may even acquire a feeling of respect for the other;
and all the factors together may be strong enough to make the two classes
at times appear as one in contrast with outsiders. But the difference in
rank, the separate consanguineous circles (while intermarriage is pro-
hibited), and the difference in political interests will keep them perma-
nently apart.
So when a foreign merchant class takes its place beside the others
all are strangers at first in every respect. Language, customs, religion,
descent, everything which binds the members of one group together sepa-
rates it from the others. Some of the dissociating factors may disappear
in time; local association may develop love of home and folk; and as-
similation of language, customs and ideas may follow. But in spite of all
and in addition to differences in descent, rank, customs, and class eth-
ics, the interest of the traders will be permanently opposed to the inter-
ests of the other classes.
When classes are differentiated from a homogeneous element the
course of events is different.. There is simply some one interest which
distinguishes the dissociating class from all the others and brings its
members together. Besides, such classes are not composed of the mem-
bers of one class exclusively but generally attract members from differ-
ent sources. The sacerdotal, military, official and learned classes are
recruited fronn the older classes indiscriminately for the inclination, fit-
ness and capacity for such callings is not distributed with regularity.
Though the peculiar interest of one calling distinguishes all who
follow it from all others, still the individuals stand in the greatest variety
of relations to the classes whence they sprang. Hence new complica-
tions arise and social classes become curiously involved, crossing or
coinciding in part, or becoming wholly exclusive. These conditions of-
ten exert a decisive influence upon their position and power in the state;
upon the results of the social struggle.
The Group-Making Factors
Let us now attempt a scheme of the forces or “relations” which classify
and unite men in societies. On a former occasion166 I distinguished “three
natural” bonds: consanguinity, local association and common interests.
They are very comprehensive, especially the last, but I now think a
double classification according to fundamental principles and perma-
nency is plainer and more to the point.
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terial, economic and moral. The material factors are common place of
residence, sociableness or common social life, consanguinity and rela-
tionship. The economic factors are similar and equal possessions and
like callings: agriculture on large or on small estates, tenancy, manufac-
turing, skilled trades, commerce and so forth. The grouping into nobil-
ity, burghers, priests, artists, scholars, writers, etc., is partly economic
and partly moral; that according to language, religion, political alle-
giance, nativity, citizenship and nationality wholly moral. Accidentally
sharing the same fate, as in a common migration, is a moral factor also.
But most of these factors are of varying duration and their perma-
nency must be considered. The influence of a common place of resi-
dence may continue from generation to generation or no longer than a
visit at a watering-place and its effects vary accordingly. The effect of
common religious views is different according as they have been inher-
ited generation after generation or are the result of recent proselyting.
The following table illustrates the double classification showing that
each relation enumerated may endure for a longer or shorter period:
r e t f a n o i t a r e n e G
n o i t a r e n e G
e f i L r o Fy t i r a r o p m e T
l a i r e t a M
e t a i d e m m i n i ( e c n e d i s e r f o e c a l p n o m m o C
) . d o o h r u o b h g i e n e t o m e r r o
. e f i L l a i c o S n o m m o C
. y t i n i u g n a s n o C
. p i h s n o i t a l e R
c i m o n o c E
; y r t n a s a e P ; s r e h g r u B ; y t i l i b o N — k n a R
. c t e , d o o h t s e i r P
. y t i C e h t n I ; y r t n u o c e h t n I — s n o i s s e s s o P
; s t n a n e T , s r e n w o d n a L — n o i t a p u c c O
. c t e ; s n a s i t r A ; s t n a h c r e M ; s r e r u t c a f u n a M
l a r o M
. e g a u g n a L
. n o i g i l e R
. e c n e i c S
. t r A
. ) . c t e , s t n a r g i m e ( e t a f l a t n e d i c c AThe Outlines of Sociology/135
The greater the number of group-making factors binding men to-
gether the more intimate is the social bond and the greater its cohesive
force and power of resistance. Strongest of all is a community united by
permanent material, economic and moral forces. It is a unitary race,
and in the struggle for existence is superior to all lesser social
combmations in endurance if not in power.
In the primitive horde, in the “small simple aggregates” with which,
according to Spencer, social evolution begins, we find all three classes
of factors permanently acting: common place of residence, common
blood, common means of subsistence, common language, religion, and
customs generation after generation. When such social groups are po-
litically organized they retain their compactness and cohesion. But the
union grows weaker as language, religion and other factors became
common to several social groups. Membership in the same political
system is sure to produce this result in the course of time.
Without doubt consanguinity is the strongest group making factor.
The consanguineous social group always retains something of the el-
emental power of primitive hordes, treating all strangers as hostile be-
ings. The division of European nations into lords, middle class and peas-
ants would not have produced such rigid social distinctions if the three
classes had not, generally speaking, represented distinct consanguine-
ous groups, for economic differences would have been counteracted by
the assimilation of language and religion. However it is also the ten-
dency of each economic group to become a consanguineous unit.
The Social Circles in the Social Struggle
It has already been pointed out that it is not the size of the social group
which determines its power. The lords were always in a minority, and m
modern states with millions of inhabitants the power rests with the “up-
per ten thousand.” The intimacy of the union and the resultant organi-
zation and discipline together with mental superiority complement nu-
merical inferiority giving the minority the preponderancy. The minority
applies the strategical maxim: march as individuals, strike as one. The
masses always lack unity and organization as the result partly of their
great bulk, partly of indolence. Since the result of the social struggle
depends on discipline the minority has the advantage because it is small.
Besides there will be greater intimacy and more common interests; the
group-making factors will be more numerous, more intense and more
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The more indolent a man is the less appreciation he has for the ideal
goods of life. As he has fewer wants he has fewer interests in common
with other men and is less energetic in defending them.
The power of a social group increases with the number of common
interests among its members irrespective of its size. When success de-
pends on numbers it relies on uniting with other social groups. This is
very important; it is the key to social politics. The number of common
interests necessarily varies inversely with the number of individuals in
the social group. For though the number of interests increases as condi-
tions improve, it is the condition of the minority especially that im-
proves since the majority must labor and serve to produce it.
Prosperity is the natural lot of the minority; with improved condi-
tions the number of interests increases: with these the intensity of social
cohesion; and this gives more social power.
In the final analysis the intensity of the union depends upon the
personal character of the individuals. But as their mutual intercourse is
made easier by custom, and as good customs grow with common wel-
fare and culture the union is strengthened too.
The highest and smallest aristocratic circles are mightier than all
the other social groups in the state though a thousand times larger. The
masters united in a guild are stronger than the journeymen and laborers.
In times of revolution everything may depend on nurnerical strength
and then the small groups are at a disadvantage. Their power can be
realized only under normal conditions of political organization. But this
must be considered the normal condition of civilized man.
Each group exerts whatever power it normally possesses and tries
to have its relative position recognized in the state in the form of rights.
But every right is made the basis of renewed efforts. Human desires are
constantly growing and no social group ever rested content with what it
had obtained; on the contrary present attainments are used to increase
power and satisfy new desires.
From this fundamental law the conduct of each social group can be
definitely predicted in every case. It will strive, like the state, to increase
its power. But the result of the struggle does not depend on the indi-
vidual. Though there are always individuals who deviate first one way
and then the other, they, like meteoric stones which are loosened from
their planet and fly off in all directions, are abnormal, and do not influ-
ence the behavior of the group as a whole.
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other social groups in behalf of its own interest solely and knows no
standard of conduct but success.
The struggle between social groups, the component parts of the state,
is as inexorable as that between hordes or states. The only motive is
self-interest. In “Der Rassenkampf” we described the conflict as a “race-
war” for such is its inexorable animosity that each group that is able
tends to become exclusive like a caste, to form a consanguineous circle,
in short to become a race.
What is the character of the struggle between the social groups?
What are the methods and the means? No general answer can be given;
for they differ with the position which the groups occupy in the state,
with the amount of power and the instruments which they possess.
The refusal to perform religious rites is an instrument in the hands
of the priesthood. The higher nobility can make certain lucrative and
influential offices exclusive. The guild-masters require “proof of com-
petency.” Attorneys restrict the privileges of practicing law. Manufac-
turers insist on free trade in grain. Laborers strike, etc., etc. The social
struggle consists in establishing appropriate institutions for increasing
the power of one social group at the expense of the others. However it
may be with the individual the society never errs in seizing and applying
the right means; its instincts are always right.
If this seems to be a contradiction consider the actual experience of
history. At every step it shows the mistakes of even the cleverest indi-
viduals and the demoniacal cleverness of society infallible as natural
law.167 Theories and passions often confuse the individual; but society
never fails for it never reflects and never chooses but naturally follows
the powerful attraction of its own interests.
The Field of Combat
It is a peculiarity of the social struggle that it must be conducted by a
collective whole. Previous organization into assemblages is necessary,
and every society must secure some suitable organ for conducting the
social struggle. Thus the ruling classes through their parliaments exer-
cise the legislative power and are able by legal institutions to further
their own interests at the cost of others.
In the cities the middle class very early resorted to the use of guilds
and representatives. The priesthood also organized into hierarchies and
created synods and councils, consultative and representative bodies. The
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not thus organize made the conduct of the struggle in their interest more
difficult. It is in consequence of having entered upon this struggle that
laborers now organize and wily agitators even found peasant unions;
the procedure is logical.
Yet the difference must not be overlooked. The prosperous and prop-
erty-holding classes perfect their organization more easily because the
greater number and intensity of their common interests make it easier to
unite and act as a body or by representatives. The weaker social connec-
tion of the masses prevents a sound and strong organization. Such as
occurs is generally the ephemeral artificial work of selfish leaders seek-
ing selfish ends. But this much is certain: without organization, without
united collective action the social struggle is impossible.
The proximate end of organization is to establish a legal norm for
the mutual relations of the groups, to confirm by right the commanding
position which has been acquired or is striven for. Hence it is clear that
the society which has already acquired the right of legislation in the
state occupies the most powerful position, and that it is the aim of every
other society to participate in the same right.
It is well known that the history of European politics generally turns
upon the struggle of the lower classes for participation in legislation,
that it has been partly successful, and that it is still in progress. Indeed,
it can never end, for after the third estate comes the fourth. The real
object is to be able to conduct the social struggle with equal weapons.
The Moral Character of the Struggle
Nothing impresses thinking men so seriously as the contemplation of
the social struggle, for its immorality offends their moral feelings deeply.
Individuals can consider ethical requirements, they have consciences,
but societies have none. They overfall their victims like avalanches with
irresistible destroying power. All societies, large and small, retain the
character of wild hordes in considering every means good which suc-
ceeds. Who would look for fidelity, veracity and conscience in the inter-
course of the “most civilized” states of the world? Lying and deceit,
breach of confidence and betrayal is on every page of their history; and
saddest of all, no one can foresee whether it will ever be different, though
the noblest men may stand at the head of affairs, with the highest inten-
tions. What self-deception it is to believe that monarchs rule the social
world! They are not responsible for all the moral lapses that occur daily
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How trivial are royal assurances that the friendliest relations exist
with all the neighboring states! Often they have scarcely been uttered
before bloody war breaks out. They were not really perfidious. The
current of history, the rivalry of states, is not under the arbitrary control
of rulers.
However cordial the personal relations of the monarchs not one will
cease arming. It is felt instinctively that with the first favorable oppor-
tunity any state will pounce like a wild beast upon a defenseless victim.
Indeed, it is generally recognized that states oppose each other like sav-
age hordes; that they follow the blind laws of nature; that no ethical law
or moral obligation, only the fear of the stronger holds them in check;
and that neither right nor law, treaty nor league, can restrain the stron-
ger from seeking its own nterests when the opportunity is offered.
The same is true of the struggle of the social groups in general. It is
conducted not by individuals but by societtes and communities.
The lack of moral principle is nowhere more conspicuous than in
the leagues into which societies unite for the sake of assuring success.
The overmatched horde makes terms with its recent enemy in order to
fall with superior force upon the present foe; civilized states consider
only their own advantage in making alliances. No consideration of prin-
ciples, intimacy of relations or community of ideas avails; republican
France and America ally themselves with Russia without scruple; con-
stitutional and liberty-loving England upholds Turkish rule and aids
American slaveholders, and social units behave in the same way. The
extreme conservatives fight side by side with the social democrats to-
day for the sake of defeating the middle classes, and to-morrow perhaps
will join their defeated foe to overcome their quondam ally.
But these “perfidious” struggles do not show the individuals to be
utterly base. They only prove that in the struggle of the wholes indi-
vidual opinions play no part, that here social groups struggle inexorably
to satisfy their own interests, to demonstrate their own power. Blind
natural law controls the actions of savage hordes, of states and of soci-
eties.
The Struggle Emancipation
Though the exercise of legislative power, as we have said, is indispens-
able in conducting the social struggle those who do not possess it are not
condemned to perpetual passivity. The unique method which they em-
ploy against the ruling classes is aptly celled the struggle for emancipa-140/Ludwig Gumplowicz
tion. The might of ideas is on their side, a significant statement which
needs careful explanation.
The superior classes, as we have seen, cannot rest content with the
fact of superiority; political relations need to be confirmed; might must
be turned into right. It seemed simple enough for them to say: Let this be
right. But every right has its obverse obligation; however comprehen-
sive, it has its limits at which obligations begin, the rights of those who
hitherto have had none. So the rights of the rulers produced the rights of
the ruled. The germ was there and it must develop.
But more than this; the human mind probes to the foundation of
things seeking the principle of causation and analyzing the changing
phenomena to find their eternal unchanging essence. Now in the chang-
ing phases of right the enduring principle is the idea. Thus rights not
only led to obligations but also to the idea of right.
If the obligation could be called the consequence of right in space,
the idea was its consequence in time. Whoever asserts his rights can not
escape their consequences. Thus the rulers themselves forge weapons
with which the ruled and powerless classes successfully attack them
and complete the natural process. The egoism of the powerful prepares
the way for the uprising of the weak.
The idea of right is not a purely fanciful conception. It has power to
influence men and can be practically applied. Men grow accustomed
year by year to submit to rights; they use legal forms constantly and
learn to respect rightful limitations, until finally the conception, the very
idea, of rights pervades and controls them. In this way the idea of right
becomes the fit weapon for those who have no other.
But its application is not simple. The legal bulwarks of the power-
ful will not yield to a simple appeal to ideas as Jericho’s walls fell at the
blast of trumpets; and, besides, the propertyless and powerless are un-
able to use such mental weapons immediately. Again we see the egoism
of one class promoting the social evolution of the whole. The bourgeoi-
sie in the struggle with the other property classes is the first to appeal to
universal human rights, to freedom and equality. It claims to be con-
tending not for itself alone but for the good of the whole folk. And it
succeeds not without the support of the masses whom it flatters and to
whom it discloses the resplendent goal of freedom and equality. Its might
like that of the higher class is now based on right, and though for the
moment what it has won seems to be clear gain, it has found the yoke of
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For the lowest classes participation in the struggle was a profitable
experience. Even the slight amelioration of their condition was an ad-
vantage. It taught them many a lesson. But it is hard for them relying
simply on ideas to undertake the social struggle, for political regula-
tions are firmly based on the possession of material goods and are de-
fended by the middle class also, and moreover as time goes on some of
their ideas prove false and indefensible. But in spite of exaggerations
they are logical consequences of principles which the ruling class as-
serted in its own interest and from which the middle class profited de-
claring them at the time to be universal. They cannot be wholly eradi-
cated; they aid the struggle for the emancipation of the fourth class
powerfully.. They inspire the masses with fanaticism and the struggle
for emancipation succeeds.
Meanwhile, however, an unsocial compound of societies has taken
the place of the primitive horde. The principles suited to one condition
are unsuited to another and cannot be permanent. The false consequences
must be corrected step by step back to the point where might of its “own
right” as spontaneous factor of public life undertakes the control of a
society tired of revolution. This completes the period of evolution in the
social struggle: from the freedom and equality of the anarchic horde
through might and inequality, right and law to the freedom and equality
of revolution and state-destroying anarchy; and from this unbearable
condition to the despotic might of reaction and the beginning of a new
period of evolution.
The Growth of States
Semper Augustus, always augmenting the empire, the characteristic title
of honor borne by the Roman and German emperors, is a naive recogni-
tion of the nature of the state; for its most natural tendency (here predi-
cated of the ruler) is incessant increase of power and territory.
It is inherited from the horde and characterizes every social com-
munity. A roving horde subjects strangers and uses as many of them as
possible for servants and slaves. After permanent settlements have been
made and states founded the object of the raids must be either to levy
contributions and exact tribute or to annex territory. As the latter is the
most successful way of augmenting the state it is the most frequent and
desirable; it is the general rule of history, and all great states have at-
tained most of their greatness in this way. So long as inherent strength
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must be some natural’ limit to the tendency, otherwise the whore inhab-
ited world would long since have become one state.
The first condition precedent to external growth is relative stability
of political authority within. If the political authority is not firmly estab-
lished, if there are no firm bonds of reciprocal interest between rulers
and ruled, or of common interest in the state the rulers cannot undertake
foreign conquest without risking their position, as many historical ex-
amples show.
A state can undertake foreign conquest with prospect of success
only when by shrewd and strong political organization or through com-
munity of interests it has succeeded outwardly at least in giving its con-
stituent parts the nature of a social element. It must come into action as
a unit. Hence follows the social law that a state’s ability to undertake
foreign activity grows as the process of unification proceeds within it.
Since every new conquest adds a new element no conquest can be un-
dertaken successfully until the spoils of the former have to some degree
been assimilated and social unity is re-established.
It is a simple consequence of this social law that statesmen have
always looked upon internal divisions in neighboring states as security
against attack upon their own. For as soon as the state is strong inter-
nally it must utilize its power externally, though in some cases an enter-
prise which promises advantage to all will even relieve considerable
internal friction. So necessary and so strong is the tendency to foreign
conquest that no state can escape it what ever may be the feeling of the
ruler at the time. The method will vary with the circumstances; and
unfavorable circumstances will be circumvented or overcome.
So long as a compact and powerful body politic finds itself in the
midst of weaker states it will continue its policy of conquest and annex-
ation to the last possible limit, as Rome did in Italy and as Russia is
doing in the East where its neighbors are weak and loosely organized.
If all are equally powerful so that no one can hope to overthrow any
other one then two or more will form alliances in order to conquer the
selected object of attack. If a weaker state happens to be neighbor to
several more powerful it must supplement its strength by alliances or
they will not fail to partition it among themselves. No code of private
morals can successfully oppose; even the men who are individually the
most exemplary are forced to act in harmony with their surroundings.
The scruples of individual feeling and sentiment are unknown in poli-
tics, as Emperor Francis said: “The state has no daughter.”The Outlines of Sociology/143
Political conditions are peremptory. Natural law prevails though
the will of the individual seems to be “free.” Those who suffer speak of
“crimes.” As well call an earthquake by which thousands have perished
a crime, for the only difference is that in the one case we think we see the
responsible agents while in the other we can find none.
But the conditions of the party attacked may present serious ob-
stacles to the policy of conquest. For a folk, which is the product of a
long period of development, is such an exclusive unit that the attempt to
incorporate it must tax the strength of the conquering state and leave it
for a long time incapable of future external activity. That is to say, it is
not easy neither does it promote humanity nor good morals to subject a
foreign folk by violence. Though simple conquest and annexation can-
not be treated as “crimes” without characterizing the whole history of
mankind as one long crime, yet every violent attempt to destroy a folk,
which is a product of history, is after all immoral and inhuman.
To profit by the conquest of a neighboring folk a state must some-
times resort to war indemnities. Plundering expeditions, conquest, an-
nexation, incorporation and war indemnities: these are the various forms
in which the natural tendency of the state to augment its power and
extend its authority is manifested.168
It would not be hard to set a limit to the increasing size of a state.
But in fact the tendency is ceaseless and may lead on to destruction as
history proves. Every great state has striven to increase its authority
and the greatest have striven to rule the world; the end has come only in
their sudden downfall, in an historical catastrophe.
The social law thus illustrated is not peculiar to the growth of states
but is manifested in all other social domains. The periodical crises of
economic production, for instance, are due to it. Each lucrative process
of production is repeated until the limits of present need have been far
exceeded and business breaks down for lack of demand. The experi-
ment though often tried is constantly repeated. Admonitions avail noth-
ing and “wise moderation” will at most influence a few individuals; the
tendency of social communities knows no limit but the “crash.” In trade
and commerce, everywhere, social strife for power or for wealth and
property lasts until all energy is exhausted. Disruption, crisis, panic are
then unavoidable.
So long as the state has aggressive power it strives to augment, to
increase its territory, to conquer, to colonize, etc. This continues until
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other states and crippled. Only when strength fails does strife cease.
State and Folk
Since each political organization creates a civilization and each local-
ized civilization is with the aid of such spontaneous moral agencies as
language, religion, custom and rights169 transformed into a folk, it fol-
lows that with the development of a number of states side by side a
number of folk must arise also. If the mere fact of common allegiance is
sufficient to bind the subjects into a social unit it is clear that as the
number of mutual relations between the subjects increases the unity will
be more pronounced. In this way the folk-state acquires greater offen-
sive and defensive power. But in the course of time the folk-states will
fall into opposition; the original contest will be repeated in higher form;
and as the perpetual strife for power animates them also it cannot fail to
happen that some are disrupted and others grow.
As the impulse to increase power is not checked by the establish-
ment of any political or national relations whatever, a great variety of
social and political combinations are bound to arise in the course of
history and it cannot fail to happen that there will be political organiza-
tions consisting of different folk and parts of folk.
The greater difficulties which the conquering state must encounter
and the scruples it may entertain at annexing foreign folk in whole or in
part we have already discussed. But if the margin of superiority is not
too narrow the foreign folk-elements will eventually be assimilated by
the conquering race and blended into a social unit, a new folk. There
have always been composite folk-states, they are the necessary result of
the historical process which is constantly breaking down the old and
establishing the new. To deny their right to exist or to justify them less
fully than folkstates would display crass ignorance of history. Social
relations tend to develop; and as surely as history produces only what is
reasonable this higher order of political organization will overcome the
internal struggle of the composite folk and justify itself.
The struggles are severe; they are, so to speak,.higher powers of the
simple social struggles. To the social contrasts of the unitary folk-state
the contrasts between the different folk are added. As the most con-
spicuous difference is in language the contest centres about the right of
one or the equal right of several in official business. But the essential
point is the struggle for authority; the contest over the language is only
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The question at issue is whether the authority shall be monopolized
by a privileged folk speaking a privileged mothertongue. The struggle
becomes justified when the unprivileged folk-elements possess suffi-
cient social and political power and have acquired sufficient mastery of
the official language to oppose the ruling folk successfully. Other things
being equal the folk which can use more than one of the competing
languages will win, the polyglots will overcome the ruling class which
remains monoglot.
But when the victory has once been secured the unpractical idea of
the equality of tongues must yield to the real needs of the state. Either
there must be one official language or the whole people, or at least the
ruling classes, must speak several. In a composite folk-state there can
be no serious question which should be the official language. As it is
simply the means for promoting general intercourse throughout the state
plainly the most available one must be chosen, and this must be the one
most generally used or rather the one most widely diffused among the
educated classes of all the different folk-elements. Generally this will be
the language of the older civilization. Only living tongues of course can
be considered. But its rank will be questioned so long as its natural
representatives enjoy any political advantage or other folk-elements suffer
political prejudice. In a word the struggle which begins with the battle-
cry “no discrimination on account of language” will continue until the
actual relations are so altered that the complete equality before the law
of all the elements is no longer imperiled by the official preference ac-
corded to the language of the oldest civilization; or a general polyglottous
condition of all the folk-elements may end the struggle.IV. The Psycho-Social Phenomena and The
Individual
Individualism and Collectivism
The point of view from which social phenomena are considered has
oscillated between two opposite principles—individualism and collec-
tivism. Not only the attempts at explaining “the social world,” but also
all propositions that aimed at shaping it in virtue of its accepted nature,
and all the differences and disputes in the domain of social science turn
upon the antithesis between “mankind” and the individual. There was
no third standpoint, no middle way known to the theorists.
While Smithianism and materialistic philosophy considered egoism
and self-interest the source of social development and the sole motive of
human behavior; others pointed to the self-sacrifice of the individual
and contrasted egoism and self-interest with “charity” and “altruism.”
While some sought to explain social phenomena by the egoistical nature
of the individual, the statisticians pointed to the “community,” “soci-
ety,” “mankind” and its nature and “development according to law for
explanation. The real truth was overlooked. Neither one alone and nei-
ther to the degree supposed is the cause and motive of social develop-
ment. If we prefix to each the adjective “social,” giving it the meaning
not of the abstract whole but of the limited social circle, like the syugenetic
group, we shall have found the middle way which social philosophy has
hitherto missed.
Not personal but social egoism is the motive of social development;
not devotion to the world at large, nor “charity” in the broad universal
sense of Christian theory, not fellow feeling with mankind; but social
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nity. Man is not so bad as crass materialism pictures him; neither is he
so large hearted as Christian philosophy in vain requires him to be. He
is neither devil nor angel, simply human. Fettered to the community by
natural ties of blood, habit and mode of thought, his egoism is social, his
sympathies are social; to demand more then social sympathy is to de-
mand something unnatural and superhuman and to credit him with less
than social egoism is to do him wrong. But social egoism includes social
sympathy, social sympathy is social egoism. Let us call their union
syngenism and we have identified the motive of all social development
and the key to its solution.
Those who conceive the whole social world from the individualistic
standpoint, who explain all development by reference to the individual
and look upon his development as the highest goal and simple object of
all that transpires in society, want to heal all the hurts and ills of the
social world by freeing the individual and proclaiming his rights.170
Doctrinaire liberalism and abstract constitutionalism both occupy
this position. Every individual as such must have every possible right
and enjoy every privilege of the “most favored” individual—that it may
be well upon the earth. The plan has been tried in Europe repeatedly and
has failed for the individual profited nothing from all these rights, rely-
ing upon them alone he hurled himself against the unyielding barriers of
social institutions which no proclamation of individual liberty can force.
At the opposite pole is socialism, communism and every other form
of collectivism. The collective whole, preferably the largest at hand,
must labor for and protect the individual; the worry and the care fall
upon it; the labor must be performed in common; the individual must be
directed and utilized: but also supported.
Unfortunately the legislative conditions have never been adequate
for an experiment or it would appear that a collective whole for the
individual so providently is as Utopistic as a self-determining individual.
In truth, everywhere and from the very beginning the social world
has moved, acted, fought and striven only by groups. Legislation to be
wise and true must take account of the actual conditions, neither being
blind to them like the “constitutionalist” nor imagining with the collec-
tivist that it can change them. The only possible solution of the social
question lies in the harmonious co-operation of the social groups so far
as that is possible.148/Ludwig Gumplowicz
The Individual and His Social Group
The great error of individualistic psychology is the supposition that man
thinks. It leads to the continual search for the source of thought in the
individual and for the reason why the individual thinks so and not other-
wise; and prompts naive theologians and philosophers to consider and
even to advise how man ought to think. A chain of errors; for it is not
man himself who thinks but his social community; the source of his
thoughts is in the social medium in which he lives, the social atmosphere
which he breathes,171 and he cannot think ought else than what the influ-
ences of his social environment concentrating upon his brain necessi-
tate. There is a law of mechanics and optics by which we compute the
angle of refraction from the angle of incidence and in the realm of mind
there is a similar law though we cannot observe it so exactly. Every ray
of thought falling in on the mind is reflected in our views. What we
think is the necessary result of the mental influences to which we have
been subjected since childhood.
The individual simply plays the part of the prism which receives the
rays, dissolves them according to fixed laws and lets them pass out
again in a predetermined direction and with a predetermined color.
The influence of environment upon the human mind has always
been recognized by psychologists and philosophers; but it has been con-
sidered a secondary factor. On the contrary the social medium which the
child enters at birth, in which he lives, moves and has his being, is
fundamental. Toward this environment the individual from childhood to
ripest old age is more or less receptive; rarely can the maturest minds so
far succeed in emancipating themselves from this medium as to under-
take independent reflection while complete emancipation is impossible,
for all the organs and modes of thought, all the organs for constructing
thoughts, have been moulded or at least thoroughly imbued by it. Granted
that very mature and independent thinkers have passed the age of recep-
tivity, still it is questionable whether the most eminent and original phi-
losopher in the world can so far dissociate himself from the acquired
modes and organs as to substitute independent creations in their place.
Consider the mental make-up of the ordinary or “average” man.
The child gets his first impressions from his earliest surroundings. His
earliest ethical ideas come from the conduct of his nurses and early
tutors! Praise and blame, reward and punishment, the hopes and fears
that are raised, the frights which he is given, all go to make up his first
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citizen has become the exact mental image of his “family,” giving the
word its broadest Roman meaning.
His childish mind corresponds exactly to the many-sided mould in
which it was cast; it bears the impress on every hand stamped upon it.
Thus prepared the youngster comes in contact with the “world” in
the shape of a troop of playmates and companions for the most part cast
in the same mould. Their impressions are much the same; all have been
inspired with the same admiration for certain things and persons, and
filled involuntarily with the same hate and abhorrence for others which
prevailed about them. Even for food and drink they have received the
same tastes and distastes. They are mere clockwork, which runs as it is
regulated. Who is it who feels, thinks, tastes; not the individual but the
social group. Its thoughts, feelings, tastes, impressions, hence also its
plans and purposes, its objects and its conduct re-live again; as the el-
ders sung so chirrup the young.
Who can comprehend all that has been accumulated in the mind of
this new individual? The mental precipitate of generations long gone is
condensed in the mind of one person. There are experiences thousands
of years old which have been inherited for generations as completed
intuitions; destinies historic, and prehistoric, with their effects upon
mental character and inclination, with their forms of thought and mode
of reasoning; sympathies, prejudices and prepossessions deeply seated
and concentrated in the mind of the “free” individual like countless ravs
in a focus. They live in him as thought, though the crowd imagines that
he thinks freely; and as feeling, though the crowd imagines that whether
right or wrong, praiseworthy or blameworthy, it is he that cherishes
them.
For the great majority of men intellectual development, strictly so-
called, ends with this; the educative impressions of childhood and youth
suffice for the whole life. Only an insignificant minority continue their
education by receiving mental impressions and influences from without
their social group as they have opportunity. How much we overrate the
efficacy of classical antiquity and the accumulated culture of other na-
tions in this particular! How insignificant it is in comparison with the
inherited and inculcated culture in which the spirit of the social group is
manifest!
Unprejudiced consideration will convince us that all the “educa-
tion,” especially that of our schools, is scarcely sufficient to varnish
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etrates into the depths of the soul unless the pre-existing conditions are
favorable.
What do the so-called educated men, doctors, teachers, officials,
etc., generally get from their education, whether acquired in school or
not, save a little knowledge? But knowledge is not thought, neither is it
feeling. What does knowledge profit if it cannot alter thought or influ-
ence temperament? and it can do neither. Hence the sad sight of people
who with a little knowledge so much the more easily conceal from the
world the vulgarity of their ideas and their inborn baseness, who var-
nish over rudeness by pretending special knowledge and vainly cloak a
coarse nature in “education.”
Even if it were as Buckle contends in his great work that mankind is
improved by knowledge and by that alone; it must first improve the
mass or at least the group which in turn would ennoble the individual.
Though paradoxical it is true that the knowledge of the mass, of the
social environment, benefits the individual, while the knowledge which
he acquires comes too late to affect him. Like a piece of coin he is
complete when he steps out into the world.
A mature young man is bound to his family, class, or social group
by ties of common interest. He is treated by the world, that is by the
other social groups, simply as a member of his syngenetic circle and so
feels that his identity with it is involuntary and often a misfortune. How-
ever much he may know he is only what his social medium makes out of
him, subject however to modification by the heterogeneous social ele-
ments that confront him. Though there are rare and exceptional cases
where individuals, whether living in isolation or separated from their
own circle by force, have been thoroughly absorbed by a strange group
or have of purpose submerged their identity in it, a complete transfor-
mation of character taking place, they simply confirm the rule.
The fate of the youth determines the destiny of the man in his broader
sphere. Hard conflicts of interests arise and struggles with powerful
currents which the individual can neither cause nor control, but by which
he is tossed to and fro, with which he must swim lest he sink. Does he
choose?
The current beets him back; of what avail is his knowledge? He
must struggle, but if he would not sink he must swim with the favoring
tide; and his freedom consists only in holding himself as much above it
as possible and warding off the opposing flood as best he may. To get
into an entirely different current, or to change his course is a matter ofThe Outlines of Sociology/151
accident, not of choice.
The struggle of life brings the individual to self-consciousness in-
deed and he obtains an unobstructed view of the field of conflict; he has
acquired personal knowledge, not simply adapted another’s. But it can-
not transform him for he is at the end of his career and cannot begin life
anew. Like the youth of Sais he has drawn the veil, and knows the se-
cret; he knows what he was and must make his exit. His own knowledge
is his only comfort—or disappointment.
Between the cradle and the grave one thread is spun which breaks
not and cannot be reunited; a chain is extended whose every link is
wrought into the preceding. Man may choose to break it by violence,
but not to re-weld it. He may die by his own hand, but can never be born
again, though even the self-determination to die must be conditioned in
the whole preceding life.
The whole belief in the freedom of human action is rooted in the
idea that man’s conduct is the fruit of his thoughts and that his thoughts
are exclusively his own. This is an error. He is not self-made mentally
any more than he is physically. His mind and thoughts are the product of
his social medium, of the social element whence he arose, in which he
lives.
Those who doubt whether the influence of the social medium can be
so powerful must consider what is more remarkable, that the social ele-
ment in which a man moves exercises an undeniable influence upon his
physical features. The fact is well known to physiognomists and is too
apparent to be seriously contradicted. Who does not recognize an En-
glishman, a Frenchman, an Italian, a north or a south German among a
hundred different nationalities? It is difficult to say exactly how we rec-
ognize them; only the artist’s crayon can express it; but we recognize
John Bull, the “honest Swabian,” the Frenchman polite and tractable
and even the Parisian, the Italian somewhat uncanny and
Mephistophelian, and so on.
Who has not observed how living for years among a people of a
pronounced type of culture conforms a foreigner’s whole external ap-
pearance and bearing to theirs?
Does not the German become a perfect John Bull after living a de-
cade or two in England? Who has not observed the remarkable
orientalizing effect of life in the East upon the European? We have known
Poles, offspring of old Polish families, who after a long residence in
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cite further instances. Those who have no experience can neither com-
prehend nor believe it; but those who have will certainly corroborate us.
To these alone we turn with a logical demonstration. That which
works the greater may also work the less; if the social element changes
a man’s physical features surely it has already changed his mind, has
more easily transformed his thoughts and opinions and exerted upon his
feelings and disposition an influence which betrays itself in his whole
outward bearing; for this is nothing but the expression of the mental
man, the mirror in which his soul is reflected. Human speech may never
be sufficiently discriminating nor our thoughts clear enough to express
what we recognize as characteristic in the different types, though the
artist’s crayon already does it in the illustrated comic papers. Still we
must confirm the fact that there is something by which we recognize the
members of various nations, peoples and social groups, etc., that it is
transferable to the individual by means of the social influence regard-
less of descent or relationship; that this influence seizes upon and trans-
forms the human mind quicker and easier than the body, but that after a
while it seizes this also and transforms it by its power.
While we are considering the action of the social factor on the indi-
vidual whom it surrounds, we must not fail to notice that the character
of a social group is developed by the continuous assimilating action of
the whole on its parts. We distinguish different nationalities not so much
by physiognomy, figure, complexion or proportions, for our eye is not
sensitive enough to perceive all this without practice and without the aid
of scientific apparatus. But what strikes us is the type—something in-
expressible and indefinable which is the effect of social influence, i.e.,
of the influence of the social factor.
It is of the utmost importance that this should be fairly appreciated
for it shows us that the character of the social group depends more on its
mental than on its physical constitution. In a word the type or physiog-
nomical character of a folk or social group is not anthropological but
social. On the one hand this explains how it is possible for a foreigner to
assume the type of the group into which he has fallen; while on the other
the transformation of the individual by the group proves that we are
dealing with purely social and sociological facts; for if the type were
anthropological the transformation and assimilation of the individual
through the group would be inconceivable.
After the influence of the social medium upon the individual has
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which exercises it. If it is not anthropological what is its character?
After what has been already said no one will expect a precise an-
swer. The that can be said is this: Between each thought or desire and
the accompanying act intervenes man’s fÚsiz, We know that violent
thoughts and efforts are expressed externally in the fÚsiz because we
see it daily and hourly in cases of sudden anger, joy, pain or despair, the
effect follows the cause immediately. But a natural result which is real
and true where we can observe it is no less so where our eye is too weak
to notice it. If an internal emotion, thought or effort exercises an influ-
ence upon our body, upon our deportment and bearing, it may exercise
it in such infinitesimal degrees that our sense is too weak to perceive the
separate and distinct effects. Our perception does not begin until, after a
long series of effects, the completed type confronts us.
But can we designate the effective agents more exactly? Thoughts
and desires produce the type, we said. Life in turn, social life, produces
them. As it differs from zone to zone and land to land among men of
different races and different ethnical composition so their thoughts, their
entire conceptions and their efforts, are different and difference of type
follows necessarily. As a people’s conceptions and thoughts stand also
in the perpetual stream of evolution and alter from time to time, there
arises the well-known variety of type among members of the same folk
in successive generations.
Influence of Economic Status on The Individual
Our assertion that thoughts and opinions are created by the social life
can be made still more specific. A man’s behavior is determined imme-
diately by his economic status, which constrains him to follow a certain
mode of life and awakens the corresponding mental conditions within
him. In all freely organized states amid the multitude of divisions and
subdivisions there are, as we have seen, three grand social circles distin-
guished by economic status: the ruling class, the middle class including
merchants and tradesmen, and the peasantry. They bring up their mem-
bers differently by accustoming them to their respective opinions, cus-
toms, legal usages and principles and, by offering them arid even im-
posing upon them a particular calling, compel them through self-inter-
est to continue in the path traversed by the whole circle.
Thus the nobleman is accustomed to rule and command and to have
his life made comfortable for him by others in the hereditary way. Higher
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ciation of others and the thousand and one traits which, independent of
land, folk, nation, religion, race or individual peculiarity, characterize
aristocracy universally.
The peasants and slaves of every land and people cherish deep,
suppressed ill-will towards the lords. It is inherited from generation to
generation, and is held in check by the consciousness of mental inferior-
ity and economic weakness; but when opportunity offers it bursts into
flame with the wildness of a barbaric horde.
Neither persuasion, kindness nor advances can uproot it. In stolid
resignation the peasant closes his social circle to the higher classes—
which however do not open theirs to him,—hears the consolations of
religion as a matter of habit without the least reflection, and throws the
blame for all the misery of his life upon the lords. Yet habit and inherited
notions have taught him to bear his hard lot calmly, and acquired feel-
ings of respect make it easier for him to do so; though all together they
would be insufficient to maintain the political organization were it not
protected by the strong arm of the state’s power.
The member of the middle class is educated in “business” tradi-
tions. Trade, commerce and business profits are his ideals from child-
hood on and he sees many examples of accumulated riches. Fortune-
hunting, an idea that the peasant never knows and which seldom incites
the nobleman, is the great object which attracts the middle class. They
soon learn that skillful labor and inventiveness lead to success and ev-
ery thought turns in that direction.
Seldom can the peasant, bound to the soil by law or by the force of
circumstances, think of leaving his hereditary pursuit. As a rule he is
unable to conceive of such a thing. So overwhelming are the legal and
political regulations that it does not even occur to him to oppose them.
As a result of his inertia his horizon grows narrower and narrower, not
extending beyond the neighboring village; he must either give up and
labor and adapt himself to the circumstances or pine away and die in
misery—or in prison; there is no alternative.
It is otherwise with the townsman. Trade extends his horizon; the
world lies open before him; his plans are ambitious; but the narrow
limits of political regulation hold him in check. What is more natural in
such circumstances than the attempt to break through or circumvent
them! This it is which causes the social fermentation and starts the so-
cial struggle. In such an atmosphere as this the quickwitted townsman’s
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opposes the contented conservatism of the ruling classes. He it is also
who first stirs up the resigned conservatism of the “masses.”
Lord, townsman, peasant: these would be the three types of indi-
viduals if the state had not progressed beyond the primitive stratifica-
tion of society. But we know how complex the social structure has be-
come and how the different types have multiplied.
It is impossible for the scientist to distinguish them all; art alone can
present the typical and the sociologist must yield to the delineator. We
will only add that as civilization advances and the sphere of the state
enlarges the ruling class subdivides into the civil class, the military class
and the large landholders and transfers its various functions to particu-
lar organs.
Each of these smaller circles has its particular interests, its peculiar
calling and its corresponding views and manner of life. The subdivision
into classes determines also the method of participating in the govern-
ment of the state. Compare the general who remains a soldier and stakes
his professional honor on fulfilling the royal orders even against his
own convictions, the minister who feels in honor bound to hand in his
resignation on account of some difference of opinion with his monarch,
or incident which does not please him, and the “great lord” who will
accept a royal invitation to hunt but will politely decline a minister’s
portfolio in order not to sacrifice his freedom. How different the views
of life’s duties and principles! What different ideas in one and the same
ruling class through the social differentiation of pursuits!
With the middle class it is the same. How different is the artisan’s
line of thought from that of the merchant or shipowner! How different
the type of mind among merchants themselves according as one stays in
a shop, another is engaged in foreign trade, and a third trades on the
exchange! Yet these are not individual fortunes, but social destinies,
social fates.
What must be the mental character of the workman’s child, accus-
tomed to uninterrupted labor in the family, meagre earnings and the
monotony of the small tradesman’s life; and how different in the circle
of the traders on exchange with the abrupt alternations of wealth and
misery and the continual excitement of speculation where success de-
pends on the turn of events the world over.
How many educated professions are differentiated in the middle
class: doctors, attorneys, judges, teachers, officials, master mechanics,
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atmosphere of principles, ideas, views and conceptions, in which its
members live and in which their posterity is born and educated.
The number of types is endless. But it must be pointed out that in
every case the individual’s thought and conduct, feeling and effort is not
created in him but in his social circle. Least of all is it created by him
freely and independently. it is laid upon him without his knowing it; and
sociology must emphasize some of the fundamental factors in the pro-
cess.
It follows from what has been already said that it is the moral force
alone which transforms the individual. The group affects him through
his moral nature, his thoughts and views; he is only a part of it, growing
up in its moral atmosphere, drawing his intellectual life from it. In this
process bodily descent and long lineage is not the decisive factor. What-
ever the anthropological material, if it comes early enough into a group
however strange, if it is uninfluenced by any other and is treated like the
other members it will be as completely assimilated as though it had been
born there. Hence it is that while anthropologists assure us that no race
in the world is pure; and while experience daily shows us the greatest
variety of anthropological types in one and the same society, the mem-
bers of each group show a unitary moral type. Anthropological variety
and moral unity is characteristic of every social community, not simply
in Europe, but of the whole world. Yet so predominant is the impression
made upon us by the latter that the impression of the former disappears
in comparison. As we are in general more impressed by what is human
in man, i.e., by his intellectual and moral faculties, than by what is
animal, so we are most impressed with a man’s social type and the
anthropological escapes our observation. Thus when an individual has
certain outward marks denoting membership in a group, such as cos-
tume, head-dress and the like, the moral type of the group is still more
striking in him and we do not notice his anthropological type or deceive
ourselves about it unless it is very conspicuously unusual.
The notorious fact that all Chinese seem alike to us is due to the fact
that, being struck with the well-known outward characteristics, queue,
clean-shaven crown and the like, vie observe nothing else except the
moral type, although there are as different anthropological types among
them as in any other folk. Similarly, to a negro all the soldiers in a
regiment of European grenadiers will look exactly alike because in ad-
dition to the similarity of costume, head-dress, etc., he notices only the
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pologist or craniologist would certainly find in such a regiment suffi-
cient data for a classification into many races and anthropological types.
But some social circles, as we have seen, are very firmly bound
together, compact and cohesive, while others are loosely connected and
less cohesive. The degree of cohesion depends, as eve have further seen,
on the number of group-making factors, on the interests holding the
group together and on their permanency; for some are inherited and will
endure while others are temporary, ephemeral and momentary.
The difference in the degree of social cohesion has great influence
upon the creation and the endurance of moral types, and we do not
hesitate to formulate a sociological law that the tenacity and endurance
of a moral type is directly related to the degree of cohesion and firmness
of social structure, and so to the number of group-maliing factors. It is
as if their greater number put the individual under better control; for
highly cohesive social circles are well adapted to create firm characters.
The individual members seetn to be cast from one mould, to be flesh of
its flesh and blood of its blood; nothing more nor less than pieces of it.
Hence the elemental moral power of men contending for their class,
their rank their folk, to which every groupmaking factor and every
heartstring binds them.
Contrast with this the vacillation and unsteadfastness when one of
the forces binding a man to his own is dissolved; and the unnaturalness
and artificiality of the individual who presumes to represent a group
with which he has only a loose, ephemeral connection, the most of the
group-making factors being absent. Therein lies the perpetual ridicu-
lousness of the parvenu, which meets us not only where the “upstart
without family connections” puts on airs on account of his intimate
relations with counts and princes (who is not familiar with this type) but
also where the townsman among peasants would demean himself like a
peasant or the aristocratic candidate explains his political and industrial
program to his agricultural constituents. The ridiculous effect in every
case lies in the absence of every natural bond of union between the
individual and the group which he would have it appear he belongs to or
represents, for unnaturalness is always ridiculous. With such comical
figures compare the man who represents his own social group. His ap-
pearance commands respect everywhere; its very naturalness is impos-
ing. Even an individual of little importance must be taken seriously for
his coming is natural and in good character
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the very nature of political and social development there is an incessant
movement of individuals back and forth, up and down, so that the social
circles lap and overlap in the greatest confusion and individuals stand in
the greatest variety of relations to their own and to foreign groups.
Thus life is richly provided with every degree of variation from
cheerful pleasantry to bitter earnest, from delightful comedy to shock-
ing tragedy. But it is a barren task for science to distinguish the count-
less shades of individual form and situation, though not for history and
art.
Morals
We have tried to explain how the moral type of the individual is pro-
duced by the group and have already pointed out that the social group
not only creates the individual’s thoughts and opinions, sentiments and
feelings but builds up what we call morals also. For morals is nothing
but the conviction implanted by the social group in the minds of its
members of the propriety (Statthaftigkeit) of the manner of life imposed
by it on them. This conviction, the individual’s innermost thought con-
cerning his whole conduct and that of others, is the second factor in the
development of morals. The first is the acquired and customary habits,
the manner of life and conduct. There are certain rules and principles
which the individual receives from his group applicable to all spheres of
life and to all possible situations.
Consider a man who is firmly rooted in his group. In no situation
which is accessible to it considering its nature and position is he in
doubt how he should proceed. He has acquired a standard of conduct
and possesses a moral code which guides him everywhere.
While the simple unitary group (Spencer’s “small and simple ag-
gregate”) constitutes the individual’s whole world, in the primitive horde
and wild natural stock,he knows what is right, proper and permissible
toward his fellows and toward strangers.
But as soon as two or more groups have been united and sover-
eignty has been organized the different moral views begin to contend in
the larger social circle. The primitive moral codes are useless and a new
one-must be formed if the union is to continue. Not only do the relations
of sovereign and subject peremptorily demand this, but they pronde it
for themselves. The members of the new union become habituated to the
new institutions which become necessary to sustain sovereignty; and
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and as the new political organization grows and is perfected the new
moral code gives forth rights, i.e., statutes promulgated by the state the
transgression of which is punishable by the state.
Hence there is a fundamental difference between rights and morals.
The former is a product of the union [Zasammentreffen] of different
social elements, the latter is the product of the relations between the
simple social group and the individual. Rights never arise except in a
union of societies however simple it may be; organized sovereignty is
always presupposed. Morals arise in the most primitive social element,
in the simple aggregate or horde.
Every complex community, consisting of parts which are united by
certain group-making bonds, constitutes in so far a social unit aside
from the social circles comprised within it. Necessarily the very fact of
the existence of this social community will create a common moral code
binding on all its members. But on account of the weaker cohesion of
the whole it will of course not have the effective power and intensity of
the moral codes of the several social elements and will frequently come
in conflict with them and sometimes be broken down by them. It may be
confidently asserted that probably the greater part of the crimes and
offenses occurring in the state arise from the conflict between the gen-
eral and the particular moral codes. Thus the poacher does not offend
against the morals of his group when he hunts game in the mountains
although in so doing he violates not only the rights but also the moral
code of the political whole.
Many infractions of right in the mercantile world, such as usury
and the like, result from the antagonism between its moral code and that
of the political whole and prove that the higher unity, the state, has not
succeeded in reducing the social elements to a homogeneous community
and imbuing every individual with that higher morality which is as needful
for the welfare of the whole as the primitive morality of the horde is for
its welfare.
It is the state’s supreme object to do this. Consciously or uncon-
sciously it strives toward it and though it should never be quite accom-
plished, no higher sanction or more complete justification of the state
can be given than the determination to educate mankind to a higher
moral plane. But the ideal moral code must never be limited to national
sentiment which is nothing more than a potentialized love of the horde.
It should at least embrace mankind so far as it is civilized or capable of
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construction of political systems like the European, which will in time
reduce Europe to a social unit, however loose; the process may then be
extended to other portions of the world. A1though its realization may lie
in the unseen future, civilization must hold fast to it if it would be any-
thing more than a blind natural process; and it is certainly the noblest
function of social science to point out the wearisome way along which
mankind, dripping with blood yet pants for the distant goal.
Morals and Truth Perception
It has undoubtedly already become clear that morals are not the result of
human reflection, the conscious product of the human will and under-
standing; but are, like all social institutions, the result of natural devel-
opment, a product of the natural and necessary feelings and thoughts of
man in connection with the active impelling forces of life, the resultant
as it were of the mutual action and reaction of nature and human life.
Hence we can distinguish two elements in the result, the natural and
the human. The former is everlasting and unchangeable and is constantly
and universally repeated. The latter is perpetually changing because it
represents the ways in which individuals react upon natural realities and
forces.
Hence it is that in the morals of all ages and peoples we find some-
thing similar and typical and also something changing and individual,
for while the social process that produces morals is always the same, its
various contingencies make the psycho-social result different.
Placed by nature in a sequence of necessities which he cannot alter,
man strives naturally to adapt himself to them as best he can and to
make life as pleasant as possible, habit helps him over the worst diffi-
culties by deadening his sensibilities. He gets accustomed to the rack on
which he is stretched and ceases to feel it. He attributes his sufferings to
a higher necessity and, knowing the uselessness of protest, gives up the
futile fight and looks instinctively for means to alleviate his hard lot.
In following this natural tendency, or rather in being driven to do
whatever his nature and conditions compel, he reflects (which again is a
part of his nature) and believes that he acts freely, finding a proof of his
freedom in the individual shading of his acts, though this happens sim-
ply because reflection, in essence the same, is individualistic in form.
If, acting as he must though reflecting as he acts, he hits upon a
mode of behavior which long experience proves to be the most suitable
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good and the moral way; the contrary is to him immoral.
Thus the man acquires moral ideas which correspond to the larger
or smaller extent of his needs and experiences, the higher or lower stage
of his civilization, the more or less complex relations of his life, grow-
ing, broadening and developing with them.
But, as we have seen, an individual’s moral feelings all develop
within the sphere of his social group through its influence upon him.
Take a primitive savage, a gregarious human being; what are his
moral ideas? He is bound to his fellows by the natural feeling of connec-
tion. They help him in his need; to hold to them, help them and stand by
them loyally is one of his moral ideas. But strangers from another horde
waylay them, try to get their property, invade their hunting ground, slay
them occasionally and steal them; therefore to kill these strangers and
rob them is another of his moral ideas.
Now the element in these ideas which is natural and eternal inheres
in the mind of man, surviving savagery and appearing in changing garb
and more refined form throughout the whole period of human existence.
To-day as thousands of years ago there is the struggle with the foreigner
for lordship. Between strange social groups to-day as always there are
only two possible relations: conflict or alliance against a third. After
century upon century of development, in the midst of high civilization,
the primitive moral idea of the savage meets us in the form of patrio-
tism, heroism and bravery.
The savage feels more keenly than the civilized man that he is only
a part of the community, for without his own horde his life is every
moment exposed to the superior force of hostile beasts and alien hordes.
It cannot appear to the savage immoral to satisfy hunger and thirst;
and to feed the helpless children of his own horde must seem to him
good, profitable and a moral duty.
Between young and old, helpless and strong, arises a mutual rela-
tion of protection and gratitude which with the changes of years be-
comes reversed, protection of children and the infirm creates a moral
idea. But if times and circumstances and also individual dispositions
cause a horde to put an end to the misery of old age by violent death, this
practice also becomes, locally and temporarily, a moral act and the same
is true, locally and temporarily, of fostering or exposing children. The
essence of the moral idea is the same: practices springing from natural
tendencies take on one form or another; whichever one lasts and proves
to be suitable comes to be considered moral162/Ludwig Gumplowicz
The relation of the sexes and the division of industrial labor be-
tween them is regulated by time and circumstances, the temperament of
the particular horde, and its physical and mental constitution. Whether
the result is promiscuity polygamy or polyandry, whatever practice per-
sists and is recognized as suitable becomes a moral duty and command,
a part of morals.
When one horde establishes lordship over another, when two make
offensive or defensive alliance against a third, or finally when captured
aliens are reduced to servitude and slavery, the circle of life’s relations
broadens, a new series of practices begins and a new sphere of moral
ideas arises. The best method of handling captives, slaves and servants,
and the best conduct toward allies offer new grounds for moral opin-
ions; and the most reasonable and appropriate government of subjects
becomes the only moral one. Fidelity towards allies produces a new
moral idea. The different treatment of members of different social circles
makes in time moral principles, conforming to the usage, which eventu-
ally settle into rights.
As a different treatment seems wise and appropriate for each condi-
tion of life, so different moral standards grow up according to the differ-
ent social position of the younger or older generation, of able-bodied or
infirm men, of women in different periods of life, of masters and depen-
dents, of the rich and the propertyless. Unconditional obedience is rec-
ognized as moral in servants and slaves; inflexible energy and strict
discipline in masters. The killing of a master is recognized as immoral
conduct in a slave, the killing of a slave is by no means immoral in a
master.
Now men are never satisfied with actual occurrences simply; it is a
peculiarity of the reflecting human mind to ascribe them to causes which
have no relation whatever to the natural causes and to give the most far-
fetched explanation possible. A myth-maker and poet by nature, man
ascribes poetical and generally anthropomorphic significations and deri-
vations to natural phenomena and he treats social occurrences in the
same way.
As man at first ascribes his own existence to the creation of a
supersensual being so he traces all social differences to different cre-
ative acts of the same being. Social organizations which the force of
circumstances has produced he prefers to ascribe to an original arrange-
ment of the creator of the world, being led by an unconscious desire to
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relations have been so far developed that murder is interdicted and to
spare a fellow-being’s life is a moral commandment, the myth-making
mind has a god appear in flames and deliver to the law-giver in the midst
of thunderings anal lightnings a table on which stand the words: Thou
shalt not kill.
Every code of human morals from the earliest times to the present
day has this thoroughly characteristic peculiarity; the product of actual
occurrences and real relations is everywhere explained by and derived
from imaginary circumstances, and men cannot comprehend a moral
idea otherwise.
Whether theologians base morals upon divine commandments, or
philosophers derive them from ideas inherent in man, fact and fancy are
blended together until one seems incapable of existing without the other.
As moral ideas take root in men’s hearts, get control of their disposi-
tions and become a part of their mental ego, the myths which support
them take root there also; until it appears as if morals could not be
maintained without myths and every attack on the latter must cause the
former to fall.
Socrates was accused of undermining virtue and morality, the real
forces of life, because he questioned the existence of those creatures of
the imagination, the Olympian gods And so to-day, whoever ventures to
criticise and doubt one of the myths which have been put forward as the
explanation and foundation of our morals, whoever denies the “univer-
sal and eternal truth of inherent, moral ideas,” and seeks to represent
them as the product of actual social relations changing with them and
taking manifold forms and shapes, is considered a dangerous enemy to
them.
This fight of naïve ignorance against truth in the name of morality
is observable in very many spheres still. Advanced moral sentiment seek-
ing to explain and support the idea and the feeling of brotherly love
produced the monogenetic myth of the descent of all men from one pair
of parents; and so polygenism, which is thought to menace the myth, is
immoral, though brotherly love might just as plausibly be founded upon
the unity of species in a polygenetic mankind. Its real explanation, how-
ever, is quite different: the development of human society.
The history of sectarianism presents the same spectacle under count-
less different forms. The simplest religious ceremonies are connected
directly with certain moral ideas and an attack on the former is de-
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stand in any connection whatever. Every new system of philosophy,
every hard-won scientific acquisition has the same contest against the
alleged “guardians of morals.”
When the intellectual revolution and the materialistic philosophy of
the eighteenth century overthrew some of the prevailing prejudices the
jesuitical alarm cry was everywhere raised that morals were being un-
dermined. Because in a certain age the stock of moral ideas corresponded
to a certain degree of scientific knowledge; because at a given time the
opinion was universal that the soul is a temporary occupant of the hu-
man body and after its decay will rise straight to heaven and begin a
new life there: the whole moral and ethical code was thought to depend
upon the maintenance of this belief. Whoever dared to doubt the immor-
tality of the soul was thought to have sinned against morality and virtue
as though immortality and the dualism of soul and body were the only
conditions on which they could thrive. Many a time indeed have men
sought to uphold the existing moral order by this fable; and when no one
knew better the effort was praiseworthy. But every such prop is ready to
fall the moment advanced knowledge lays bare its untruthfulness; though
it by no means follows that morality is undermined and threatened by
the removal of the alleged prop; for the basis of morals is truth and not
fiction and all these pious fictions have not prevented the grossest im-
moralities, the horrors of the inquisition and trials for witchcraft, the
greatest crimes mankind has ever committed.
The alleged descent of man from lower animals is denounced by the
church as undermining the whole ethical and moral code; as if this had
some connection with the alleged creation of man by a god or was in-
deed the result of it.
Following natural and necessary tendencies the human state has
grown up and has become in civilized regions what it is to-day, the
guardian of right and custom, the promoter of welfare and culture. Cor-
responding to this fact a moral theory of the state has been produced in
the human mind, a pretty myth, according to which the state sprang
from a social contract which the citizens once made for protecting rights
and securing justice; and it gives adequate expression to the ideas which
the actual evolution of the state has produced.
But when it is announced as the result of modern objective investi-
gation that the state arose by violence and owes its existence to the
superiority of some over others, the “moral” heresy-hunters (Angstmeier)
and hypocrites raise the alarm that the moral idea of the state is under-The Outlines of Sociology/165
mined, right is uprooted and public morals corrupted. It is the policy of
stupid parents, who expect to inculcate morals and a sense of obligation
in a child by telling him all sorts of ghost stories. Science should not be
misled by such ungenerous and narrow views. Morals is the ripened
fruit of the actual development of civilization and cannot be harmed by
the scientific investigation of its real foundation; on the contrary the
truth will certainly be much more wholesome for its promotion than the
stupid lie upon which it has been sought hitherto with little success to
base it.
As the origin of moral ideas is a very difficult problem and a dark
region in human knowledge, it has always been easier to explain it in
poems and fairy tales. Nevertheless it is not difficult to see that every
progress in the perception of truth, and especially of nature, must pro-
mote morals.
For as nature’s sway and the acts of man go to make up the events
of life, human acts are reasonable when they correspond to natural ten-
dencies and complement them; and unreasonable if they mistake these
tendencies and oppose them.
There can be but one principle of human rationality and of human
morals and ethics: to be governed by the import and tendency of nature’s
sway. Hence knowledge of nature, natural science in its full scope, em-
bracing every department of human life, is the only and the necessary
basis of the science of morals and ethics.
Without natural science no moral science. Hence the low state of
morals where natural science is neglected, and the higher and purer
morality with greater progress in the knowledge of nature’s sway.
The explanation is simple. Nature has all the characteristics which
oriental monotheism ascribes to its god: omnipresence and omnipotence;
everything everywhere happens as nature wills, according to nature.
Indeed at bottom the idea of god is only a symbol of nature, perhaps
unconscious and poetical at first, later misunderstood and misinterpreted.
As man himself is subject to nature, is constrained by her demands,
must satisfy his natural needs, lives according to the measure of the
strength and capacity she has given him, and following her commands
must close it, so his mind is deeply impressed by her omnipotence and
the resulting course of events. He can scarcely conceive another mode
of existence; and this one seems right and just, reasonable and moral
(sittlich). He has no other standard for the events of life than the as-
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synonymous with unreasonable and immoral. Man’s ethical sense has
been engrafted upon nature’s sway. Her norms even in social life have
been transformed and condensed in his mind into moral ideas. By nature
the parents and elders assume direction of the rising generation—and
the honor and respect which the younger pay the elder accords with our
moral ideas. Whatever is natural is moral. Therein lies the eternal, fixed
and unchangeable basis of all ethics and morals.
Hence there is really but one code of ethics and morals which has
been and always will be as fixed and unchangeable as the forces of
nature. But if nevertheless there have been temporary and local differ-
ences in ethical views it is, first, because knowledge of nature has not
everywhere reached the same stage of advancement and men often yield
to the grossest self-deceptions in respect of it, secondly because there
are whole spheres of human life, like the social sphere, which on ac-
count of meagre knowledge are not considered natural, in which the
sway of nature is not conjectured or presupposed, in which therefore a
correction of inherited moral conceptions in accord with the recognized
“will of nature,” or a concession to natures tendencies is entirely out of
the question.
By searching for truth, therefore, and by investigating nature and
her sway, in the social sphere as well as elsewhere, science labors in the
service of morals and breaks the way for its progress, although inciden-
tally old and cherished idols may be overthrown and the wail of the
“moralists” aroused.
Rights
Heretofore rights have always been treated from the standpoint either of
individualism or of a very indefinite collectivism. As these two extremes
contended against each other progress swayed from one to the other in
literature. But since neither was true, it ought not to be surprising that
neither the philosophy of rights nor the prevailing scientific treatment of
them is satisfactory, and that the schools of the philosophers have pro-
duced nothing but disgust and rancor after centuries of labor.
Let us briefly review the dreary maze. The original rules of human
conduct receive their sanction in part from precedent and custom and in
part by reference to the will of the gods. Belief and custom are the
earliest sources of right of that which is the standard of conduct. As
reflection awakens it distinguishes between these precepts of religion
and morals and the laws which the rulers set up, and hence the earliestThe Outlines of Sociology/167
jurisprudence could consider political law alone to be the source of right.
Upon further scientific investigation this naive conception was found
unsatisfactory; and then began the argumentation in a circle. Some sought
the source of right in man immediately, in his nature, in his social in-
stincts or in similar characteristics which were ascribed to him. Others
believed that they had found the source in the community, the folk, in
society and its “common will.”172
The truth lies between the two, as we have shown.173 Rights are not
the product of the individual and his nature and constitution, nor are
they the creation of the folk or of a common will or national spirit in-
vented ad hoc. Rights are a social creation, a form of communal life
produced by the conflict (Zusammenstoss) of unlike social groups of
unequal powers such unlikeness and inequality is the necessary precon-
dition of all rights. In the primitive horde, a homogeneous, simple, un-
differentiated group, there are no rights, nor are they necessary. Com-
plete equality prevails; it is not the soil in which rights are wont to grow.
There are neither family rights (promiscuity prevails) nor property
rights—hence no rights of inheritance; nor any sort of rights in person-
ally where there is no trade and commerce. Life is not regulated by
published ordinances; whatever is is holy. The forms of life produced in
the course of time to satisfy wants, which we call custom, are fully
sufficient to regulate the life of the primitive horde. No one marks their
gradual rise and they are generally ascribed to the will of the gods.
Custom and a few religious precepts suffice for men in such a state.
But when unlike groups come together and different ethnical ele-
ments have to live side by side the custom of neither is sufficient, for it
is not recognized by the other. One subjects the other, sovereignty is
organized, and the superior power of the stronger makes existence side
by side possible by regulating the manner of life. The regulations thus
built up for the existence of unlike elements side by side are reduced by
practice to rules and principles which create rights.
Thus, as we have seen, by the rape of women from another tribe
arose the first family right, the right of the man over his wife; thus also
by reducing the foreign element to servitude arose the right of the lord
over his slave; and from the resulting distinction between the lord to
whom the fruits of the soil belong and the slave who cultivates the soil
for his master arose the right of property. The soil together with the
acquired sovereignty passed from father to son in the father-family—
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this primitive sovereign organization the exchange of goods produced
other property rights, first of all the rights of debtor and creditor with all
the complications to which the development of trade and commerce give
rise.
Rights are always due to the contact of unlike social elements and
every right bears evidence of such an origin. There is not one which
does not express inequality, for each is the mediation between unlike
social elements, the reconciliation of conflicting interests which was
originally enforced by compulsion but has by usage and familiarity ac-
quired the sanction of a new custom.
Thus family right subjects the wife and children to the control of the
father and compels the reconciliation of opposing interests until in time
usage and familiarity substitute new customs and new morals for the
original constraint. Property rights regulate the inequality between owner
and non-owner in respect of the thing owned; the rights of inheritance
regulate the inequality between the heir and the non-heir in respect of
the inheritance; the rights of debtor and creditor regulate the inequality
between them in respect of the object of the obligation. In short every
right arises from an inequality and aims to maintain and establish it
through the sovereignty of the stronger over the weaker. In this respect
every right is a true reflection of the state to which it owes its existence,
and which also aims only at the maintenance and regulation of the life of
unlike elements side by side through the sovereignty of one over the
other. And since the maintenance of inequality is the soul and real prin-
ciple of every right, corresponding to each there is a duty; correspond-
ing to each one entitled to receive there are one or more obligated to
give; just as in the state by its nature there are rulers and ruled.
Rights and the State
Thus it is plain that rights can arise only in the state and nowhere else
for they are eminently political institutions, flesh of the state’s flesh and
blood of its blood, containing as it were a particle of political sover-
eignty. For whence comes the grain of sovereignty in every right if not
from the great reservoir of sovereignty which we call the state’s power?
From this great reservoir political sovereignty flows like water through
an aqueduct into a network of rights. It is only necessary to turn the
cock of execution, and political sovereignty, the state’s power, is there.
In civilized states a small fee is paid, generally in the form of a stamp
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no more be conceived without the state than an aqueduct without a res-
ervoir and pipes and cocks.
Nevertheless scholasticism succeeded in building up countless sys-
tems of “natural rights” which were alleged to exist without the state,
beyond its borders and superior to its authority. Fortunately they are all
overthrown, dead and buried. But their spirit hovers over the sea of
jurisprudence where “innate” human rights are still spoken of; in addi-
tion to those “proclaimed by the French revolution” such as freedom
and equality, other “inalienable rights” also, such as the right “to live,”
“to work” and so on. They are deduced either from the “conception of
man” as a “free, sentient and reasonable” being or more generally from
the “conception of justice.” We have elsewhere shown the arbitrariness
and insipidity of these deductions.174 They are simply deductions from
natural rights though every premise is false and the whole system is
buried in its grave. That man is a “free” being is pure imagination, still
less is he a “reasonable” being, if by “reason” we mean the peculiarity
that a person is led in his action by reason and not by blind impulse.
The premises of “inalienable human rights” rest upon the most un-
reasonable self-deification of man and overestimation of the value of
human life, and upon complete misconception of the only possible basis
of the existence of the state.
This fancied freedom and equality is incompatible with the state
and is a direct negation of it. But the only choice for men here below is
between the state with its necessary servitude and inequality, and—an-
archy.
There is much unavoidable evil in the former; but on the other hand
it promotes and protects the greatest good that man can experience on
earth. Anarchy raises to infinity the evil which is unavoidable in the
state without affording even the least of its advantages, for the greatest
human evil here below is human stupidity and baseness. Scarcely can
the state hold it in check; in a condition of anarchy it rages without
restraint heaping horror on horror. There is no third choice, for it is
impossible to return to the primitive horde;175 and between these two
modes of social existence: the state and anarchy, it is not hard to choose.
It is no less an error to deduce rights from “justice” or a “feeling of
justice,” to place them above the state and to propose their realization in
the state. This procedure rests on an optical illusion. For what is jus-
tice? Whence do we get our conception of it? It is created only by the
actual rights as they exist in the state. Our conception of justice attaches170/Ludwig Gumplowicz
itself to political rights; our receptivity, our sense and feeling of it have
no other source. It is no contradiction that occasionally we have reason
to acknowledge that a political right is wrong and violates justice; for
the development of our sense of justice, which takes place under the
influence of political rights, may apparently outrun their development
in that all institutional rights exist only in virtue of written law or deep-
rooted usage and tradition while political relations together with our
sense of justice go right on developing. In such a case our yearning for
justice is only the forerunner of a new statutory right which has been
previously grounded in the conditions and in the degree of the state’s
development and which it might be said is already recognized though as
yet unwritten. In a word we must distinguish between justifiable reform
movements based in the nature of the state and mere Utopias. The former
spring of themselves from its whole previous development; the latter are
separated in thought from the state and stand upon ground upon which
no political institution has ever stood such as freedom, equality and
absolute justice, apart from the state and based on “natural rights.”
What “justice” in this sense is and how it is found we do not and
cannot know. To us justice is the simple abstraction of political rights
and it stands and falls with them. If we imagine our past apart from
political development and political rights the conception of justice van-
ishes utterly from our mind. Plato recognized this, and as he was about
to explain in the “Republic” what a “just man” and what “justice” were
he began by describing the founding of the state out of heterogeneous
unequal elements. Presupposing that each part would assume the most
fitting role that befell it in the state he called this organization of the
state and of political sovereignty just; hence this normal condition of the
state in which each accommodates himself to the role that befalls him is
his type of justice. By this shift, starting from the state, which is really
the only possible way, Plato reaches his conception of justice which he
then applies as a standard to the individual.176
The words of Thrasymachus in the same dialogue: “My doctrine is
that justice is the interest of the stronger,” (338) might be applied to
justice in the state, for in fact the weaker must accommodate himself to
the stronger; the state can be regulated by no other rights than such as
are most agreeable to the stronger. Indeed this is relatively best for the
weaker and in this sense political order presents the only conceivable
idea of justice, the only source from which we can draw conceptions of
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and equality and indeed naturally must be. In fact justice has univer-
sally been the real expression of the relative power of the social ele-
ments in the state. With changing conditions and especially with pro-
gressive development of the state in agriculture and industry, in science
and art the relations gradually became more humane and lenient. Rights
and legal regulations are humanized and the idea of justice in the ab-
stract grows more perfect. But to-day no less than in Plato’s time the
state is the only standard of justice. The necessary conditions of its
perpetuation determine the concept. What the state must do is right and
that can never be “justice” which the state cannot do.
Rights and Morals
We have seen that rights arise at the point where the new whole com-
posed of unlike social elements cannot longer be held together merely by
customs and morals since the customs and morals of one party are not
the same as those of the other. Into this discord in moral views, with
which social unity is incompatible, rights first entered in the form of the
commands of the rulers; but in time as we said, they are transformed
into customs and morals so that, being rights, they become the sub-
stance of new moral ideas. The apparent contradiction between morals
that precede rights and morals that in turn are produced by them needs
some elucidation.
The customs and morals of the primitive horde come from the ne-
cessities of life and the common wants of the primitive social unity, but
needs change in the new social whole composed of two or more unlike
elements. At first indeed because there are no common customs and
morals, force, compulsion and political rights must bind the new whole
together; but usage, habit and all the forces which conduced to fixed
customs and morals in the primitive horde will not fail of their effect in
the new social unity also.
The new rights only indicated the line along which the forms of life
necessary in the new social unit must be developed. In time they will
enter into the moral consciousness, for plainly the new social unity will
consolidate. In one way or another certain modes of peaceable commu-
nal existence will be discovered; people will adapt themselves to their
necessities and by recognizing and accepting them create new customs
and morals to which rights gave the first impulse.
The old morals of the respective social elements must necessarily
be subordinated to the new morals of the complex whole, for while the172/Ludwig Gumplowicz
former insures the existence of the simple group only the latter pre-
serves the complex community.
For example, to a primitive horde and an unmixed stock alien and
enemy are synonymous terms; its morals command the sparing of fel-
low members and the ruthless destruction of aliens. But as soon as any
foreigners become a part of the community, whether received as slaves
or allies or to serve some other interest of the new whole (the relation
will be determined by a treaty from which rights will arise) instantly the
interest of the new community which produces the new right begins to
set aside the old morals which made “alien and enemy” equal and pre-
pares the way for new ones which give the slave, the ally and whoever
else has been taken into the social union a claim to protection and re-
spect. However long rudiments of the old morals may persist in opin-
ions and sentiments the new interest of the new whole has framed new
morals which prove victorious over the old.
Wherever there are rights the process is the same. Although in primi-
tive times, or even in the feudal state of Mediaeval Europe, the wealth of
tolerated classes such as the traveling merchants may have been good
booty to the ruling classes and robber knights, the theft of which did not
offend against the old morals or detract from knightly honor, yet the
new rights which protected the property of the burghers in the interest of
all prepared the way gradually for the new morals which to-day forbid
the nobility to seize the property of other classes. With difficulty and
after centuries of trial, but with final success, political rights have pro-
vided new morals concerning property and it is now inconceivable that
in the Middle Ages knights and noblemen, who made so much of honor,
did not scruple to surprise a city and rob its citizens of their hard-earned
goods.
The displacement of the old morals by new rights due to the wants
and interests of the new whole is seen most plainly in the development of
patriotism. The original tribal consciousness of the respective social
elements of the state is changed in time into a folk or national conscious-
ness. While the old morals recognized only the duty of the individual to
sacrifice himself for the narrowest syngenetic group the common inter-
ests of the new whole have created new morals which demand his un-
conditional sacrifice for a whole which is ethnically and socially com-
plex.
If we must cite examples at least we shall not need to go far afield
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was morally bound not many decades ago? If we characterize it in one
word as “particularism” we shall at the same time have indicated the
powerful change through which morals have passed in this respect as
the result of events and new rights. The Rhenish Union was commensu-
rate with the older morals, though the same thing to-day by the same
people in the same land would be called the height of immorality, trea-
son and infamy. These moral changes have taken place since the events
of Jena and the war for freedom, since the rights of the German Union
and the new German Empire. The former morals of the parts must yield
to the new morals of the new whole to the making of which the new
rights gave the impulse. As the new rights paved the way for the new
morals and made them, so now the new morals will continue to be the
strongest prop of the new rights until in the perpetual change of earthly
things new events and circumstances make new rights again to which
existing morals must be sacrificed.
The objections that can be made to our presentation of the relation
between rights and morals are easily foreseen, for frequently the rela-
tion is apparently reversed. Even in the present century how often have
we seen decayed rights swept away by the powerful current of “public
morals;” and yet it was only apparently so, for in fact every such right
was merely a screen behind which other conditions came into existence
peremptorily demanding recognition as rights, and although existing
written rights seemed to prevent the realization of the demand neverthe-
less moral ideas were created which, exerting a powerful influence and
taking possession of the consciousness of the masses, suddenly rose like
a tornado overthrowing the old rights as though they were paper; where-
upon the rights which the conditions had long since demanded and which
had already entered the moral consciousness procured legal expression
and validity.
If I might use a somewhat questionable metaphor to illustrate I should
say that behind the regular rights legitimately wedded to the nation and
known as such there appeared secretly, from the force of circumstances,
illegitimate rights which shunned the light and in illicit intercourse with
the nation begat morals; and as these, still illegitimate, came into the
world and grew up they helped to set the betrayed old rights, which had
lost their force and justification, violently aside; whereupon the legiti-
mation of the new morals followed by subsequent marriage, per
subsequens matrimonium.
“So there was an unwritten natural right based in reason,” cries174/Ludwig Gumplowicz
some supporter of natural rights triumphantly. Not so fast. It is true that
in such moments of development rights rise through hard birth pains
from the dark womb of actual conditions into the light of existence. But
they are not natural rights, based on reason and independent of time and
conditions. On the contrary they are always conditioned in the actual
circumstances. In the sense that they correspond to the conditions from
which they spring they are natural and reasonable, but not in the sense
that their source is in a natural consciousness of right or in reason and
that they always remain the same. The requirements which arise from
actual conditions according to time and place, which correspond to them
and are therefore natural and reasonable, being formulated into laws,
become rights after having struck deep root, as has been said, in moral
consciousness.
Thus the objection that the source of rights is moral is based on a
misconception of the actual forces. Equally unfounded also is the doc-
trine of natural rights. But there is another objection which seems to be
supported by the facts. Political rights do not always enter into the moral
consciousness of the community. However long they may endure they
have public morals against them and eventually must succumb. This
frequently occurs and though it seems to establish the moral source of
rights, in truth it does not.
We often see valid political rights stand like dead machines in spite
of the application of the state’s whole power, never operating without
the display of the political force, disliked and repudiated by public mor-
als, unable to create new morals and finally ending their burdensome
existence somehow unregretted. Upon closely examining what sort of
rights these are which cannot produce a moral ground into which they
may strike firm root, we observe that there was no pressing need for
them, that they arose from the momentary caprice of one party, from
false ideas and theories, from misconceptions of the actual conditions,
etc. Such rights always hang in the air without footing and are power-
less, valid only through external support and protection, without inter-
nal living force, a stranger and an enemy to public morals, unable to
create new morals and hence from the start ordained to perish. Such
rights are not rights at all. They have no vital force, they are still-born.
All that has been said of the mutual relation of rights and morals
applies to private as well as to public rights and morals. The former
generate their own morel atmosphere as well as the latter and are equally
dependent on it for existence.The Outlines of Sociology/175
For example, take the changes in interest (usury laws) during the
last three decades in certain states of Europe, especially Austria. First,
the severe old usury laws according to the intent of the canonical law
(Recht), dating from the period of industrial servitude and guilds. Over-
stepping the minimum rate of five or six per cent was not only made
punishable by the state, but was also contrary to public morals. The
industrial conditions, the restraints upon trade, commerce and agricul-
ture fully justified the laws of usury. The severe right was the outcome
of actual conditions and produced in public opinion a moral conscious-
ness of the objectionable character of usury. Meanwhile industrial de-
velopment went ceaselessly forward, economic barriers fell; trade, com-
merce and land became free; productive industry felt an expansion hith-
erto unknown; productivity far exceeded former limits, and the old in-
terest right was felt to be oppressively narrow. Behind the screen of this
written right the need for a new one more commensurate with the condi-
tions made itself felt and began to undermine the morals based on the
old. The latter lost its footing and was overthrown and a new right—
complete freedom—was proclaimed, which soon made way with the old
morals and created new which saw nothing immoral in the free contract
of the parties about the rate so long as no other immoral factor was
involved such as taking advantage of youth, inexperience, necessitous
predicament and the like. Then the state permitted and even incited the
erection of institutions of credit which, even when lawfully managed,
brought such rates of interest as two decades before had been repudi-
ated and denounced by both rights and morals, while prominent men of
spotless character who esteemed honor and morals highly competed for
their management.
Meanwhile the industrial boom wore itself out for according to eco-
nomic laws a relapse must come. Trade, commerce, industry, agricul-
ture again declined and their productivity fell off. Again safety was
sought in erecting old barriers and returning to the former restraints and
unfreedom. But above all else the new right of unlimited freedom in
interest rates contrasted with the industrial decline and lost footing in
the actual conditions which demanded something else. The need of change
became manifest; the new morals wavered, the new rights had to fall
and the old restrictions on the rate of interest became statutory rights
again. At first the newly resurrected rights struggled with the vanishing
remnants of the morals which were based on the fallen rights. But they
were victorious, “for only the living is right!” and soon morals will be176/Ludwig Gumplowicz
completely transformed, especially as political power and criminal courts
pave the way for the new rights in public morals. In every department of
private rights examples may be multiplied at will of rights arising from
actual conditions and shaping morals. Permit us further to point to the
many changes in the law (Recht) of marriage and the resulting change in
morals. Wherever for centuries the marriage tie has been indissoluble
by statutory right a taint of immorality is attached to divorce; and if the
law is compelled by actual conditions and the freer development of
modern society to sanction the dissolution of marriage, as recently in
France, the new rights have still to struggle a long while with the old
morals. A recent article in the Paris Figaro occasioned by the new law
read somewhat as follows: “Divorce—well, but remarriage? Public
morals will not endure that in France (!)” The Figaro need not worry. In
Europe and even in France public morals have at times endured worse
things than that in marriage rights; for example the jus primae noctis.
They will soon, if they have not already, come to terms with the new
rights, divorce and remarriage, which, supposing them to last, are rea-
sonable because they take account of existing needs and conditions.
One more question in conclusion. If morals are constantly changing
and follow almost slavishly the rights which originate in actual condi-
tions, why do men always conceive of them as changeless in the midst of
change, the unvarying source of rights and the eternal idea throned high
above all transitory things of earth? Why do they thus appeal to them
and regard them as the standard of rights and political institutions?
The explanation is very simple. The changeableness of rights and
political institutions is visible and appreciable; they cannot possibly pass
as changeless. Official announcements annul to-day the rights of yester-
day. A ministerial ordinance suspends an existing political institution
and substitutes another. But the change in morals is slow and unmarked
as the progress of the hour hand of a clock. A generation is often but a
minute on the moral dial—who can detect such a slight progression!
Generations later the historian and the philosopher notice that the pointer
has moved. The average man “hears it told indeed but lacks believing
faith.” Naturally so, for in the flowing stream of events man must lay
hold on something fixed and unchanging or lose his bearings. Until
Copernicus, the earth at least stood fast under his feet; since then it
moves in a circle and not even the sun stands still. What wonder that
men grow dizzy and look hither and thither for some fixed point by
which to direct their unsteady course in the ocean of life! It is an abso-The Outlines of Sociology/177
lute necessity at human temperament to have such fixed points like stars
on the horizon. To it all the “eternal powers” which man worships owe
their existence nor will they pass away while man lives on earth. Among
them are found the moral ideas; for in them man seeks and hopes to find
a firm point of support for all his actions, a guiding star by which to
regulate all his acts and undertakings, a fixed standard by which to
judge between good and bad noble and ignoble; and indeed he finds in
the moral idea what he seeks. It is really a basal point and a guiding star
for the whole life. The error lies in each one believing his moral ideas
are the only ones, changeless and the same for all times and peoples. It
is no more true than that the earth is a fixed point in the universe. But
just as the earth in spite of its ceaseless revolutions affords a firm enough
ground for human efforts, so the individual’s moral ideas afford him a
solid support upon which to base his character, his efforts and his will.
What cares the landlord or the houseowner that the soil he tills or the
ground on which he builds revolves with the whole globe! It is just as
little concern to the individual that his morals will seem immoral to
future generations; to him it is the one possible fixed ground which he
can cultivate and build upon.
For the individual, however transient he himself is, ultimately finds
in himself the firm support to which he can cling in the wild tumult of
life for protection—and woe to him if he does not find it! It is only
shortsightedness and pardonable weakness in man to believe that it is
external to himself, for he seeks it there in vain. “It is not from without
that it comes, shine inner self creates it.” Thus whether it be purely
personal feelings like real love and friendship which accompany man
through life, or true faith to which pious temperaments devote them-
selves, or higher ideas like enthusiasm for folk and fatherland, for truth
and science, to which the individual unselfishly sacrifices himself every
feeling and every idea is a “fixed pole-star in the flood of events” which
shines before him, consoles and comforts him and ennobler him, too,
though after all it is purely subjective and passes away with him. So it is
with morals.
Thus though philosopher and sociologist inquire how morals arose,
what changes they have undergone, whether they are justified or not, the
individual finds it sufficient for his life that he has them. But whether he
has any and what they are depends upon the degree of development of
his social group, upon the family in which he was born and brought up,
upon his environments, upon the impressions received in tender years,178/Ludwig Gumplowicz
upon the experiences he has passed through, perhaps also upon the knowl-
edge he has gathered, but certainly to a high degree upon the rights
which the state has maintained and to which he has had to conform.
Individual Efforts and Social Necessities
Thus by observing the social world and its phenomena we come to per-
ceive that there is a necessity immanent in the condition of things ac-
cording to which they move, by which they act and which sooner or
later reaches fulfillment.
It is not in man’s power to suspend or check it. He is himself a part
of that world and an element in those phenomena and all his actions are
subject to this all-embracing and universally immanent necessity. His
alleged and apparent freedom cannot alter or prevent its fulfillment.
The common understanding recognizes indeed that the so-called
“natural laws” are fulfilled on a grand scale. But in the fine, micro-
scopical details of individual action it is not so easily apparent.
Concede for a moment the beautiful illusion that the individual acts
“freely,” and consider whet significance it has in view of the fulfillment
of natural necessity in individual life and human society. All of man’s
“free acts” may be reduced to a universal concept and a common de-
nominator: preservation. Likewise all the processes in nature and hu-
man life which take place of immanent necessity may be reduced to a
universal concept and common denominator: change and decay. In the
realm of nature all is perishable. Man would preserve everything.
This fundamental antithesis lies like a curse on all of man’s “free
acts” which are condemned to be exhausted in fruitless struggle against
nature’s necessities. Human “freedom” is but the freedom of the captive
lion, to run to and fro in his cage and to follow the menagerie, cage and
all, hither and thither through city and country.
But the general perception that human freedom accomplishes noth-
ing against natural necessity, that it dashes like waves against a rock-
bound coast only to be broken and scattered in spray, is of little worth.
It is more important from the universal relation between human freedom
and natural necessity to gain some insight into the essence and character
of human actions. This we will now attempt.
We said that the whole tendency of man’s so-called free activity
was to preserve what is by nature perishable and must pass away to
make room for the new. We try to preserve our health while nature works
quietly and incessantly for its decline. We try to prolong our life as longThe Outlines of Sociology/179
as possible even when nature has made its destruction necessary; and as
it is with these “personal” goods so it is with all the rest of life’s goods.
Men try to preserve economic goods beyond the end of their lives for
their descendants, and under favorable circumstances their efforts are
successful for generations. Nevertheless the wealth of the Croesuses of
antiquity has fallen a victim to the allpowerful law of natural decay and
perpetual change and the Rothschilds of our century will leave as little
trace in the future.
Man tries also with his whole thought to preserve “forever” all the
social institutions which he, the blind instrument and means of natural
impulses and inclinations, creates and all the mental products for mak-
ing life tolerable, beautiful and noble, while natural and necessary de-
cay labors to overthrow them, undermines them, gnaws at and devours
them. We would preserve the social community in which we are well
off; but it must end as surely as the life of the individual. We would
preserve our language, religion, customs, nationality and do not notice
how they daily waste away like rocks under dripping water.
Self-sacrifice to preserve what is inevitably destined to fall is con-
sidered noble and heroic, but it is cowardly and ignoble to submit to
natural necessity. To oppose natural impulses is asceticism, which men
do not refuse to admire. To follow natural impulses and necessities is
generally considered low “materialism.” Fanatics who have neither eye
nor mind for the omnipotence of natural conditions are our heroes in art
in whom we delight. The more fanatical the “greater” they are. The
founders of univeral empires, the Cyruses, Alexanders, Caesars and
Napoleons won our admiration because they perished trying to accom-
plish the impossible and unnatural. The simple man who adapts himself
to the natural and necessary conditions of his environment is not worth
consideration.
Our freedom of action and heroism may make the inevitable fulfill-
ment more painful for us, but it cannot prevent it or delay it a single
moment. The necessity immanent in things and natural conditions is
fulfilled however much we oppose it; and it is quite proper to picture
human life as a perpetual struggle against nature though it is false to
believe that man could ever at any point be victorious. What is fulfilled
is always and exclusively natural necessity, never man’s “free will.”
Man’s efforts vacillate from side to side until finally they fall into the
line of necessity—that is decisive for fulfillment. If we may be allowed
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pers of different sizes we have to select one for an open bottle. The
relation between the open bottle and the pile of stoppers is controlled by
an immanent natural necessity in consequence of which only one stop-
per, of suitable size, will fit it. This necessity will be fulfilled if we cork
the bottle from the supply of stoppers at hand, and it will be fulfilled in
spite of our “free acts,” which consist in applying a number of stoppers,
some too small, some too large, to the mouth of the bottle and convinc-
ing ourselves that they do not fit. Eventually one will fit, the one of
proper size, and when we find it we cork the bottle with satisfaction,
proud of our “free action.” A trivial illustration to be sure, in which
other openings might be found besides the one in the bottle. But let us
pass to a more serious example, better fitted for scientific investigation.
Probably human freedom seems under less restraint in the sphere of
scientific and philosophical thought than anywhere else. “Thoughts are
free” and the field not subject to censorship nor made unsafe by the
state’s attorney is large enough. Free man may gambol there at will and
enjoy his freedom, and he has always done so to the fullest extent. But
the object of intellectual labor is the discovery of truth or knowledge;
and what has been the result of these “free” efforts for thousands of
years? It is the old story of the bottle and the stoppers. After thousands
of failures somebody makes a lucky grab and seizes the right stopper
for the philosophical hole. But is that the work of a free mind or of
meritorious intellectual labor? The necessity immanent in things and
conditions was simply fulfilled. Groping in the dark we hit upon a truth.
Scientific and philosophical investigation, that noblest occupation
of “free minds,” is a pure game of chance. Philosophical and scientific
truths stand like rare prizes among thousands of blanks in a wheel of
fortune revolving about us. We “free thinkers,” so proud of our “intel-
lectual labors,” grab awkwardly like innocent children and lo! among a
million blanks somebody gets a prize. This makes him a thinker of great
renown whose “merits” are praised. Yet he is not at all accountable for
the result of his intellectual labor. He is no more and no less meritorious
than the “dunces,” scorned and ridiculed, who had the misfortune to
draw nothing but scientific and philosophical errors. No more meritori-
ous, we say! Indeed “the great philosopher” who appears once in “thou-
sands of years” is less meritorious than the crowd of little philosophers
who by drawing countless blanks made it possible for him to win the
great prize.
Let us go to another field of “free” human actions, legislation, andThe Outlines of Sociology/181
see what relation human freedom there bears to the necessity immanent
in things and conditions. How proud and self-conscious the gentlemen
of the majority are, whether of the parliamentary right or left. They
make the laws for the state to-day. They stake their best knowledge,
they would apply all their wisdom, they appoint their best minds on the
committees and entrust their shrewdest jurists with the drafting of the
bills, and then the amendments by sections! Every one bestirs himself to
furnish the greatest acuteness his cranium can supply—and what is the
result of all this application of “mind” and “free” thought?
For the most part a miserable botch which the real conditions of life
and the necessity immanent in them must correct in order to meet the
wants of the case and be endurable. Savigny denominated it inaptitude
(Mangelan Beruf) for legislation and ascribed it to “our times.” As to
the inaptitude he was right; but no period has been or ever will be better
than our own in this respect. Only by adapting themselves to immediate
wants and taking account of real interests, in short by bending to social
necessities, can lawgivers make useful laws—and it has always been
so, But as soon as they mount the high horse of theory, set up ideal
principles and deduce laws to bring about ideal right and justice; when
instead of submitting to social necessity they enter the sphere of free
intellectual activity in order to make laws in accordance with ideas and
not in accordance with real needs and interests, the inaptitude is clearly
demonstrated.
This inaptitude for “free” origination is manifested in a still higher
degree in politics. Every institution “freely” made is a wretched experi-
ment which must be thoroughly transformed by the powerful currents of
real interests and needs in order to answer to social necessities and gain
any permanence at all. Human freedom (diplomatic) is the worst sort of
bungler and must be forced into the right course by social necessity.
What makes the institutions of human freedom especially frail in
the sphere of politics is the fact that the fundamental tendency of all free
human action, preservation and acquisition, is most pronounced right
here where the natural necessity of eternal change and decay holds most
inexorable sway.
The aspirations of statesmen are directed toward political and na-
tional preservation and expansion. The natural necessity to perish and
decay can go on only by violently overthrowing every free human insti-
tution. Hence no new political institution can come to light without force
and destruction, struggle end bloodshed. Here human freedom, bent on182/Ludwig Gumplowicz
preservation and acquisition, plays a most lamentable part; and social
necessity, tending to change and decay, is revealed in its most awful
sublimity.
There is still another important question to be decided. What is the
relation of this pernicious human freedom to man’s happiness in life?
and can a better insight into its nothingness and vanity help him in avoid-
ing evil and being happier? Let us see.
Certainly if men always recognized inevitable necessity in advance
they might escape much evil fortune by quietly resigning to it. But this
is impossible, first because such knowledge is never vouchsafed to man-
kind as a whole, at most to exceptional individuals, and again because
human freedom, that oscillation back and forth on both sides of the line
of necessity, is based in human nature and is therefore a necessity.
Although it is thus impossible for mankind as a whole to avoid the
disappointments and escape the evil results of the opposition of indi-
vidual freedom and social necessity still it is worth while to inquire
whether a more correct knowledge of necessity does not in many rela-
tions of life and spheres of human activity lessen the sum of evil allotted
to man here below, or better expressed, whether through such knowl-
edge much superfluous evil due to human freedom might not be avoided.
Let us see how far this is possible.
It has already been pointed out that we can never conceive of man
as an isolated being for he never has existed and never can exist in
isolation. If then we conceive of him as having always been a member of
a swarm or horde—and we cannot reasonably do otherwise—his life
and well-being depend upon his environment and is conditioned by it.
Now the impulse of self-preservation, the source of the most powerful
motive of human efforts and “free” activities, is by origin not simply
individual but social. It finds expression in attachment for one’s own
and desire to subdue others.
This social impulse of self-preservation, the reverse side of which is
the necessary desire to subdue and exploit the alien, opens new fields for
human desires and activities, for example the economic and the politi-
cal, the technical, the scientific and even the artistic. In most of them
individual desires come in conflict with social necessities and since, as
is self-evident, the latter assert themselves over the former there is a
preponderance of “misfortune” and “evil” in human life. If now man
could know the necessities immanent in things and conditions and had
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much happier. Generally this is impossible for reasons both subjective
and objective. However let us consider in what spheres it is possible to
subordinate individual desires to social necessities, to adapt and accom-
modate one’s self to the circumstances.
Now the sphere of human efforts best adapted for this will be the
one in which knowledge of natural necessity is farthest advanced, the
sphere of personal life. Here men are least deceived and have long since
learned to subordinate their efforts. Every half-way reasonable man
suppresses the desire to preserve his life beyond the limits set by nature
and submits to the natural necessity of death.
One thing, however, many people have not yet learned, or perhaps
an artificially cultivated trend of thought has made them forget: the low
value of life. Its overvaluation is the source of great personal ill, espe-
cially is it an unfortunate conceit of the “civilized” nations to place too
high value upon the “good” of life.
Yet if man would measure the “natural” worth of human life by
nature’s forbearance and by the productiveness which she allows play
to in this realm, how low the value would be set. A subterranean quake
and thousands of human lives are sent to destruction. Thousands perish
in every storm at sea. A plague here to-day and there to-morrow and
hundreds of thousands fall victims. A bad summer, the failure of har-
vest and hunger frequently snatch off millions in overpopulated regions.
But on the other hand nature can indulge in lighter play with human
life—millions of children see the light daily and nature has shrewdly
provided that this productivity should not cease.
Considering these natural conditions is there any sense or justifica-
tion in overestimating the worth of an individual life as civilized nations
do? How much misfortune and evil men might be spared if all the social,
political and juridical institutions which follow from such an exagger-
ated estimation of human life should fall away.
Next to the preservation of life the satisfaction of natural wants is
the most important content of human endeavors. Here too the wants
produced by man’s freedom are directly opposed to natural necessities
and fill the life of civilized man especially with useless torment and
strife. Nature directs man to an unhampered satisfaction of these mate-
rial wants according to his physical powers. An unnatural trend of thought
produced forms of life which increase the sum of evils incident to life
and run counter to natural necessity without being able to check it.
The impulse to satisfy wants forces man into the economic field.184/Ludwig Gumplowicz
How hard his struggle with nature is needs no lengthy explanation. Natu-
ral necessities press him hard and close. He endeavors to make head
against the embarrassments. Apparently he succeeds frequently, but at
last succumbs. His efforts are expended in two chief directions. He strives
greedily for possessions which he must ultimately leave behind, and he
endeavors to get still more in order to be equal with the more opulent,
whereas economic inequality is a natural necessity.
The economic wants lead men into the political sphere for the state
is expected to furnish to some the means of satisfying their higher eco-
nomic and cultural wants at the expense, though not to the harm, of
others. But the state, like all human institutions, is perishable, and the
older already in decline, must give place to the new, developing in power;
and yet how much energy will be devoted to checking the uncheckable,
to preserving alive what is doomed to perish. In the internal organiza-
tion of states also human freedom overshoots the limit of natural neces-
sity either to force the natural development of social relations prema-
turely or to suppress it unduly and cause stagnation. Hence comes that
perpetual oscillation in the inner life of a state which Comte supposed to
be the result of two opposing principles, the theological and the meta-
physical, and which he expected would disappear with the dawn of posi-
tive political science but we consider it simply the natural process of
“human freedom.”
But human freedom celebrates its greatest triumphs in the sphere of
technics, science and art. For the simple reason that it is only a question
of discovering what are the natural necessities, the actual facts and the
laws of nature or (in art) of reproducing her productions. Men need only
to sniff about in technics or science until they discover how, or to ex-
periment in art until they strike it right; and this they do with great
patience and with assurance of ultimate success. Technics and science
have no higher task than to discover nature and learn her laws. Since
she is always the same and the stream of mankind flows ceaselessly and
man’s thirst for knowledge is always the same, he must eventually suc-
ceed in learning her secrets from her. But the whole of man’s freedom
here consists in submitting to nature’s necessity—his great success is in
recognizing what it is; in adapting himself to it in technics and learning
it in science. Thus human endeavors are in no wise opposed to natural
necessities here; hence their greatest success and man’s greatest good lie
in this sphere. Likewise in art. Free reproduction is the highest aim. The
impulse thereto lies in human nature and hence its satisfaction, like thatThe Outlines of Sociology/185
of every other impulse, yields human pleasure. But the better he suc-
ceeds in reproducing, the more faithfully he clings to nature and her
necessities, the truer the expression, so much the greater his triumph
and his good fortune. He meets with success all the oftener because he
does not act contrary to nature but rather takes her for his chief example
and teacher.
The result of our investigations is indeed not very commendatory of
mankind in general. For since the sum of human ill increases in the
degree that “free” human endeavors are shattered fruitlessly on natural
necessities it follows from what precedes that real success and good
fortune can be found only in the domains of technics, science and art,
which is accessible to only a small minority of mankind; whereas in the
sphere of economic and political life, where these endeavors run power-
lessly to waste against natural necessities, very little real happiness is to
be obtained, and in the sphere of personal life only discreet resignation
can ameliorate the necessary evil at all.V. The History of Mankind as Life of the Species
Sociology and the Philosophy of History
The relation between sociology and the philosophy of history is similar
to that between statistics and history. The former has been called a cross-
section of the latter. That is to say, statistics is occupied with a given
condition, while history would embrace the entire course of human des-
tiny (die Geschicke) as a whole. But it is very plain that this is an im-
possible task; so far as its accomplishment is concerned, statistics has a
great advantage in the temporal and local limitations which it assumes.
So with sociology and the philosophy of history. The latter would
give us the idea of human history in its entirety, would set forth the
theory of the whole course; and hence it must fail through inability to
survey it all, for the idea of a part conceived to be the whole always
falsifies the idea of the whole. On the other hand, the task of sociology
is more capable of solution because of the limitations which it assumes.
It disclaims embracing the history of mankind as a whole. It is content
with investigating the process of human groupmaking, the constant rep-
etition of which makes up the content of all history. Without inquiring
the import of the whole course of history, which it does not know, it is
content to show its conformity to law, to investigate the manner of so-
cial evolution, in a word to describe the processes which regularly arise
from a certain contact of human societies and the mutual effects dis-
played. We would treat the principal questions of sociology: conformity
to law in the course of political history, the way societies develop, and
the problem whether in historical periods of considerable length we meet
with certain ideas, general tendencies (like progress, improvement, and
so on), or even general forms of social process.The Outlines of Sociology/187
Conformity to Law in Development
Conformity to law in the events and developments of political history
has been often suspected and much discussed, and even positively as-
serted. But, as we have pointed out elsewhere,177 no one has succeeded,
so far as we know, in demonstrating it concretely and clearly, while, on
the contrary, the shallow objections of antagonists who denied its exist-
ence and spoke of free will and the guidance of Providence seemed to be
growing more formidable.
But it is a very interesting fact that in spheres which are very near to
political and social life and which, though not identical, are connected
with it by an intimate bond of causal relation, such conformity is so
plain and apparent that it cannot be questioned by even the most zealous
adherents of free will and of the guidance of Divine Providence; and yet
they have never realized that by conceding development according to
law, independent of the will of the individual, in art and science for
example, they concede it eo ipso in these deeper, fundamental domains.
Let us therefore consider those spheres in which conformity to law
is doubted by no one, in order next to show the intimate connection
between this conformity to law and that in the social and political sphere
upon which this depends.
Is it not a scientific commonplace to speak of the evolution of a
people’s art, science and philosophy? What do the modern historians do
but demonstrate their development in conformity to law in each several
nation, an evolution in which plainly the individual must, and uncon-
sciously and involuntarily does, accommodate himself to the law of the
whole and the movements of the community? What does it signify that
for example the connoisseur can tell almost exactly when a work of art
was created, the school to which it belonged and almost the place whence
it must have come, without knowing the artist? What but that it is not
the individual fashioning according to his own arbitrary will but the
community and its evolution, whose slave he is born to be, as whose
slave he works and creates? The individual does not compose; it is the
poetic mood of his age and social group. The individual does not think,
it is the spirit of his age and social group. Otherwise the connoisseur
could not tell whether the picture exhibited belonged to the school of
Tintoretto or Rubens; whether a rediscovered Latin poem is classic or
post-classic, whether a philosophical fragment belongs to the Aristote-
lian or Alexandrian age. That the connoisseur can tell is the best proof
that the individual’s thoughts, feelings and actions are influenced and188/Ludwig Gumplowicz
determined by his age and social environment.
Thus we recognize these facts generally and without contradiction,
while refusing to draw the necessary conclusions from them elsewhere.
But we have seen that the mode of a man’s feeling, thought and action
simply result from the stage of social and political development upon
which he happens at the time to be.178 Can it still be doubted that the
social and political situation exercises a determining, constructive influ-
ence on the mental constitution and endowments of men which are on
the whole always equal?
The peasant boy with artistic talents will draw rude figures in the
sand or carve in wood with a pocket knife all his life long. Raised upon
a higher social plane, educated in an art school in a cultivated commu-
nity, he will become a representative of his time and people, that is, of
the educated classes that stand at the top of the historical development
of the nation. What he has become is due not only to his natural endow-
ments but especially to the social environment in which he was educated
and its degree of development. But he cannot arbitrarily be anything, he
can be only one stone more in the mental structure which the community
and its grade of development necessarily determine, a stone whose place
is assigned to it by the development of the whole.
There is therefore no doubt and it will be generally conceded that
the joint mental development, or, as it is also called, the development of
the human mind, or of the mind of mankind, follows fixed laws and that
the individual so far as he participates in it, actively or passively, must
patiently endure, doing nothing, thinking nothing which does not of ne-
cessity follow from the given historical premises of the evolution. There
is therefore no individual freedom of will here; only all-controlling law.
But how is this mental evolution related to evolution in the social
sphere? That the former is not possible or even conceivable without the
latter conclusively follows from the close causal connection between
mental development and social, political and economic conditions which
we have elsewhere demonstrated.179
Man’s mental character, his mental evolution and so also his mental
activity is conditioned upon the stage of his political and social evolu-
tion. The nomad wandering about with his horde has one set of thoughts;
the hunter pursuing game in the forests has another; the subjected slave
has another; the townsman living by trade and commerce another; the
member of the ruling caste another; and the priest whose power is in the
mysterious charm of religion another. Their thinking is determined byThe Outlines of Sociology/189
the place which they occupy in society and by the degree of its evolu-
tion.
But though we can comprehend how collective mental life and ac-
tivity is connected in a general way with the stage of social evolution,
we lack the microscopical insight to see how each individual is con-
nected with it and how his thought, feelings and behavior are influenced
by it.
Similarly the physicist is able to explain the appearing of the rain-
bow from the position of the sun and the stratification of the clouds; but
he has not the means to show how each atom of steam and water acts in
relation to each ray of sunlight, nor how the refraction of the prismatic
colors arises from the action of each ray of sunlight on each atom and
drop. Nevertheless after the general demonstration of the necessity of
the phenomenon who would doubt that the same necessity which sways
the collective whole constrains each little part to take its appropriate
place!
We see and know the whole mental evolution to be, like the rainbow
in the heavens, a matter of necessity; we know that a condition of soci-
ety, like a particular position of the sun, must deflect culture and civili-
zation just so and not otherwise, and that with a given degree of social
evolution we must meet with one set of mental colors in art and science
and not another, although we lack the means to show microscopically,
so to speak, the necessary influence and effect of the passing social
conditions upon each individual’s acts, thoughts and feelings. Who can
consider the necessary total effect and doubt that it is the sum of neces-
sary individual influences and effects which no man can escape?
Intermediate between the individuals and the general mental effect
are social structures whose necessary evolution in conformity to law
must be concluded from the necessity and the conformity to law of the
total effects though there were no more direct or immediate indications
of it.
Thus whoever concedes conformity to law in the evolution of art
and literature, science and philosophy (and who will deny it?) must grant
the same conformity to law in the evolution of social structures and the
consequent restraints upon the individual.190/Ludwig Gumplowicz
The Evolution of Mankind
We have learned that social evolution is always partial, local and lim-
ited in time; and it has been especially emphasized that we can form no
conception of the evolution of mankind as a unitary whole because we
have no comprehensive conception of mankind as a whole. But, let us
ask, can we not form a conception, broader than the evolution of indi-
vidual groups and social communities, of mankind so far as known to
us; and if so how should we have to conceive this relative whole (rela-
tive, i.e., to our knowledge)?
For we know that Biblical naïvete, corresponding to a “theological
way of looking at things,” to quote Comte, likened the evolution of man
to a genealogical tree springing from Adam and Eve; and it has been
repeatedly pointed out that the same view still prevails in the domain of
social science, in which Cornte rightly recognizes the persistence of the
theological phase down to the present.
The polygenetic view which prevails quite generally at present nec-
essarily does away with the concteption of a unitary genealogical evolu-
tion. But the change only involves assuming several or innumerable
starting points; precisely speaking it is a change of form only, or rather
of number, that is, there is the evolution of several genealogical trees
instead of one. There is assumed to be a steady progress, as before,
along a line of evolution from simple to complex, from rudimentary leaf
to full grown tree, from primitive to refined and, what is decisive in
evolution, from some given original point of incipiency to our time “of
great progress, the summit and climax” of all.
It is plain that such a conception is irreconcilable with a duration of
life upon the earth that surpasses comprehension. Starting from the idea
which the results of the modern investigation of nature make clearer and
clearer we dare not liken the social evolution described above to any
such single or even multiple genealogical scheme. For such a scheme
proceeds only from our inclination to investigate beginnings above all
else, while in the nature of the case we are only capable of knowing the
becoming.
True science, or, again to quote Comte,”positivism” begins only
when we overcome the desire to know the beginning of things and are
content with a knowledge of their becoming. If we keep in mind the two
ideas of the eternality of life upon the earth and our inability to know the
origin of things, we shall obtain an entirely different scheme of social
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of facts; if now we banish all thought of the unity and the commence-
ment of evolution, we have left, as concrete remnant, a process of evo-
lution going on at different times and in different places but always
according to the same laws. Thus those transitions which we described
above, from what is to us the primitive horde with promiscuity and the
mother-family to woman-stealing and marriage by capture, and then to
a simple organization of sovereignty to property, state and “society,”
must not be conceived to be processes which befall mankind develop-
ing, as it were from a certain point of beginning onward whether along
single or multiple lines, but processes which are always being com-
pleted and renewed wherever the requisite antecedents occur. With such
a conception only, and in no wise with the contrary one named, can we
reconcile the fact that the primitive stages of this process are still ob-
servable in distant parts of the world as fresh and original as they must
once have been in our own past.
Evolution as we have presented it is no chronological or local verity
and applies to no particular subject; it is a typical truth—in so far as it
presents a process which is always true of human species wherever groups
of men are found in the proper social condition.
It is erroneous and entirely false to speak of the “evolution of man-
kind” (“le développement de l’humanité”) as Comte does. For we can
speak only of social evolution within the compass of the human species.
It always begins wherever and so soon as suitable social conditions are
at hand and it runs in conformity to law to a conclusion, dying out and
disappearing because there is no further manifestation of necessary so-
cial energy. It is impossible to doubt that evolution really dies out and
becomes extinct in view of the countless sites of whilom culture and
mighty social evolution which now lie waste and barren. There are many
examples in Asia, America and Africa of extensive regions from which
all life has now disappeared, yet upon which social development once
brought forth the most magnificent results of civilization.
These facts are calculated to support the idea of a cyclical course of
social development in general, an idea which gains a foothold just from
the cyclical development of states. I have discussed this point often and
must here return to it again.192/Ludwig Gumplowicz
The Cycle of Development
It sounds like Hegel or Schaeffle to assert that the life of every people
runs in a cycle, that once it has arrived at its highest stage of develop-
ment it hastens to its decay; and that the first best barbarians will make
ready its extinction. Sober minds are not inclined to take it seriously.
Nevertheless it is not difficult to show the causes of this cyclical
motion in the natural, economic and social conditions of folk-life. The
causes are so plain, their operation so very powerful and general and at
the same time so obvious and indisputable that the knowledge of them
ought to convince that their effects will fitly and necessarily follow; for
they are economic and demographic and thus lie in the region where
man’s unfreedom and his dependence on physical wants are wholly un-
deniable; where irrefutably men must be reckoned with as blind natural
forces pursuing their courses in conformity to law.
Men’s wants and desires, as we have seen, cause them to raise them-
selves by groups and societies from a primitive condition to a condition
of culture and civilization; and, having once attained it, so to conduct
themselves that their fall necessarily follows through other groups and
societies in a progressive state.
In a primitive political body, which is economically poor, men have
only one want beyond the desire of self-preservation, the reproduction
of the species. On this stage many children are begotten and population
grows with great rapidity. The wish, which emerges on a higher plain of
culture, so far as possible to insure a better material existence for the
descendants is not effective to check the increase of births for the reason
that future members will be no worse off than the present so far as
property goes while every living human being represents one more unit
of labor, which of itself may conduce to betterment of condition.
For this reason political bodies in the lower stages of culture and
welfare increase rapidly and so make a great relative gain in numerical
strength which can be sustained by increasing productivity and eco-
nomic prosperity at home. A population in such a state of progressive
development is very likely to lay the foundation for a body politic over
which a highly civilized and cultivated minority will rule.
But if, with the development of the body politic, the lowest classes
also rise to a higher degree of civilization and become prosperous, and it
cannot be otherwise, anxiety for the future welfare of posterity begins to
exert a restraint upon the natural increase of the people. The former
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population begins to stagnate and finally to decline. Thus the collective
body becomes numerically weaker than those which have not yet reached
this degree of “refinement,” and this further conduces to economic weak-
ness and political decline; while the community that still stands lower in
development, that still has a poor proletariat in process of sound devel-
opment, carries off the victory through its numerical strength.
These are the real, ever active causes which bring about the cyclic
movement in the life of folk and state and which explain why it is al-
ways the highly cultivated state that is destroyed “barbarian hordes.”
But such hordes are not necessarily external, and if they were they
alone would not be able utterly to destroy powerful civilized states. But
unfortunately every state conceals in its own bosom, and the higher it
rises in the scale of civilization so much the more, barbarian hordes
enough who only await the given signal, the critical moment of civil or
foreign war, to begin the work of destruction. The fall of many a power-
ful civilized state under the assault of rather small barbarian hordes
could not be comprehended if it were not known that domestic social
enemies of the existing order let the secretly glimmering hatred of the
property and ruling classes burst into bright flame in the moment of
danger; and this alone is often sufficient to turn the toilsome labor of
centuries into dust and ashes. This inner enemy necessarily increases
with the development of civilization so that every centre of civilization,
apart from the danger threatening it from without, fosters the seeds of
destruction within itself.
Progress and Innovation
But the fact of cyclical development in state and folk is also decisive of
the question of “progress” in the sphere of human activity. Two asser-
tions which I made in “Rassenkampf” have given considerable offense
and provoked lively contradiction, viz., that there is no progress and
that there can be nothing essentially new in the realm of mental knowl-
edge. That I of course recognize progress in the development of an iso-
lated centre of civilization, each time beginning and running to its end,
has been brought out conspicuously by the briefest of my reviewers in
the English periodical “Mind.” “The general conclusion to which he
finally comes,” it reads, “is that there is no such thing as either progress
or regress in the course of history taken as a whole, but only in the
particular periods of a process that is going on forever in a circle—in
particular countries where the social process is forever recommencing.194/Ludwig Gumplowicz
“It is indeed remarkable that the English critic who reviewed my book in
fourteen lines caught my thought correctly while so many German crit-
ics who made extended reviews of it are of the opinion that I deny all
progress whatsoever.180 However I see from this circumstance that I
could not have expressed myself clearly enough on this point and there-
fore feel bound to carry out my views further or rather to express myself
more clearly.
As I consider man to be a permanent type not only physically, with
Kollman,181 but mentally, I am of the opinion that there is a fixed upper
limit to his mental activity also, to which individual natures fortunately
endowed have always been able to attain, but which no man can ever
pass.
Man’s physical strength in the nature of the case can never exceed a
certain maximum, which of course certain individuals have at all times
attained to. In morals there have always been good and noble natures
everywhere; and low and bestial ones too in the greatest variety of gra-
dations; and it is recognized that a real improvement in men is scarcely
to be noticed here and that an apparent improvement is brought about
locally and temporarily only by conditions, institutions and measures
introduced from the outside. It is quite the same in intellectual matters.
Man’s intellect is ever the same—it moves in a sphere having a
fixed and inexpansible upper limit which has been reached from time to
time by individual geniuses. But there is an apparent progress arising
from the fact that from place to place and time to time an intellect of
equal power finds footing upon the total accomplishments of his prede-
cessors and uses them as the starting point for further successes; not
that later generations work with higher or more complete intellects but
with larger means accumulated by earlier generations, with better in-
struments, so to speak, and so obtain greater results.182 So it is of course
impossible to deny progress in the field of invention and discovery—but
it would be a mistake to explain it from the greater perfection, or the
progress of the human intellect. An inventive Greek of ancient times, if
he had followed Watt, would have invented the locomotive—and if he
could have known the arrangement of the electrical telegraph, it cer-
tainly might have occurred to him to construct a telephone.
Between human intellect four thousand years ago and to-day there
is no qualitative difference nor any greater development or perfection—
only the completed labor of all intervening generations inures to the
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to-day accomplishes apparently greater “miracles” than the like intel-
lect four thousand years ago did without it. But in fact, laying aside the
advantages of the former, the latter accomplished no less wonderful
things.
Fortified with this, one could object to my assertion that progress is
relative and appears only in separate periods of development by saying
that it only needs such a continuity of mental labor to lead mankind into
unsuspected and indefinitely prolonged progress.
The conclusion would be impregnable if the premise, the uninter-
rupted development of human civilization in general were equally cer-
tain; but it is to be doubted, for, first, we find proof in well-known
history of the continual recurrence of catastrophes which send centres
of civilization precipitately to destruction. What happened in India,
Babylon, Egypt, Greece and Rome may sometime happen in modern
Europe. European civilization may perish, overflooded by barbaric tubes.
But if any one believes that we are safe from such catastrophes he is
perhaps yielding to an all too optimistic delusion. There are no barbaric
tribes in our neighborhood to tee sure but let no one be deceived, their
instincts lie latent in the populace of European states. The deeds of
anarchists are only scattered flashes of lightning who will guarantee
that the stone will not some time break? The barbarians do not live so
far from Europe as appears to be generally assumed and the insurance
of Europe against these infernal powers would not be entirely free from
risk.
Thus the proposition that the development of civilization is per-
petual and uninterrupted, as premise to the conclusion that progress
may be indefinitely prolonged, could have only a potential value.
But it must also be considered a proof of the stability of the human
intellect that in spheres which have no connection with invention and the
discovery of natural forces, in moral and social philosophy, not only is
there no indication of progress but nothing new whatever has been said
for thousands of years. “There is nothing new under the sun” and noth-
ing new can be “invented.” Our cognitions respecting virtue and cus-
tom, human happiness and social relations are no more mature than
those of the oldest peoples of antiquity; on the contrary we often become
aware that we are behind them in many things. Though brotherly love
has been taught at different times to very different peoples by individual
law-givers and founders of religions our attitude toward relatives and
kinsfolk is just as different from our attitude toward strangers as ever.196/Ludwig Gumplowicz
To make war Upon strangers and overpower them is a virtue; to betray
one’s fellow citizens is a crime. Respecting the value of life the mutual
relation of the sexes, the institution of marriage and the like the indi-
vidual centres of civilization continue to revolve in the same vicious
circle, from every particular point of which the point opposite seems the
lower. Whatever strikes us as new and original is only a new combina-
tion of very old thoughts and opinions—a combination springing of
course from a new individual conception, for in nature only individual-
ity is endlessly varied.
Individuality is always producing new combinations from the an-
cient store of human thought, and if it were possible for a man to know
all the thoughts of past ages, if he could even know all the philosophers
and thinkers of olden times and peoples, he could easily reproduce his
own most original systems and his most characteristic conceptions of
the world merely by citing from his predecessors. In fact Bastian does
something similar; we often . find his phenomenal mind working out
entirely original ideas with simple citations from other authors. The
whole is the most original product of his individuality; but his remark-
ably comprehensive memory enabled him to gather up the ready cut
stones for his system from the works of thinkers of all ages and peoples.
The individual conception is newt but the material is exclusively old.
Consciously or unconsciously it is constantly repeated, never newly cre-
ated. For here where no invention or discovery in the field of natural
forces is involved the human intellect has from the first traversed the
whole sphere of perception possible in the nature of its organization and
can never rise beyond.
The conceptions of the human mind in this sphere are just like kalei-
doscopic views. Philosophers and thinkers have been turning the kalei-
doscope for ages and it is impossible but that particular portions have
often been exactly repeated though probably the whole picture never
will be, since the combinations are infinite. The difference in the picture
we ascribe to the difference in individuals, and perhaps correctly.
Justice in History
Nothing so shakes the conception of a “just providence” in simple de-
vout souls as the perception of the “world’s” “injustice” obtruding itself
at every step in human life. In spite of toilsome theological explanations
and justifications simple faith in God is disturbed and pious hearts are
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flows can be the work of a good and just God? It is the necessary and
inevitable consequence of an anthropomorphism which conceives of God
in the likeness of man and hence ascribes to him human “justice.” But
that which comes to pass in the world and in life, or properly, in life and
history is in no sense human justice, rather it is historical justice which
to man’s mind must seem to be harsh injustice; though here again the
fault is due to that false individual standard which man applies to the
events of life—whereas they come to pass according to an entirely dif-
ferent, so to say, a great social standard by which they must be judged.
If we measure them with individual human measure we suffer.
What is commonly meant by justice? A certain standard in the dis-
tribution of material and moral goods—in fact there are two concep-
tions of justice. One starts from the complete equality of all men and
hence requires an equal measure of rights and possessions for each indi-
vidual. The other takes into consideration the unequal value of individu-
als and their powers and doings and is content with a proportional dis-
tribution. Both take the individual as the object and standard in exercis-
ing justice and in every transaction having man for its object ask whether
it is commensurate with the value of the object. If so it is pronounced
just; if not, unjust. There is no opportunity for variety of judgment save
as differences of opinion prevails concerning the value of the object or
the proper conception of justice.
These conceptions of justice start from the consideration of man’s
conduct toward man to construct their criteria of judgment, which have
a certain justification in themselves. But men are not content to apply
them to human conduct alone, but transfer them to historical events also
and even to natural events in general.
In the case of historical events the transference is due to the false
hypothesis that they are brought about by men through their free will;
and in the case of natural events it is due to an anthropomorphism which
represents God as acting after the manner of men and bringing them
about.
No elaborate proof is necessary to show how incongruous such an
idea is. Historical events are not brought about by men any more than
natural events by God; and if they have no author whose conduct can be
regulated according to the value of the objects affected nothing can be
said about justice or injustice in connection with them.
In a somewhat different sense, however, without regard to the sub-
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and of natural events strikes individuals according to their merits, i.e.,
whether the good are spared or rewarded, the bad fallen upon and pun-
ished; hence whether there be justice or not in history and nature. But
even in this form such a question its inadmissible because the individual
is never the object of history or nature, with them nothing depends upon
him, and we have no criteria of his worth even if we should conceive
him to be the subject of the historical and the natural process.
History and nature are visible and recognizable only through their
effects on masses—indeed they may be said to occupy themselves only
with certain natural groups and quantities consisting of a number of
individuals that is with folk, stems or families existing either together or
in the relation of successive generations. But the only possible relation
which is perceivable between the effects and the existence of the objects
is that of causality, the connection between their natural constitution
and the fate that falls to their lot. In other words, these natural human
groups under the action of history and nature play precisely the part of
any other natural objects exposed to the workings of natural forces.
Natural forces will produce effects upon them according to their char-
acter—rotten limestone will yield to the process of weathering quicker
than hard granite; rain will change a treeless declivity into a bare rock,
while a wooded slope will gain fresh strength and luxuriance from it. In
this interplay of cause and effect, of occasion in the objects and action
by the natural forces can we speak of justice and injustice? No more can
we in the destinies of a folk or an individual. They are the results of
causes lying partly in the object, partly in the natural forces of history
and nature. Hence there is no Justice in history unless we wish to apply
this category to the conformity of results to causes. Such justice as this
we always find everywhere realized with inexorable rigor.
In life and in history every man suffers whatever fate is conditioned
by his natural constitution. Yet his natural constitution depends not on
him, but, as we have seen, upon the social medium from which he
emerges. This is to blame if individual fates are so seldom proportional
to individual merits. For fate strikes the individual in proportion to the
merits of the species, so to speak. His own merits may be different.
Historical development cares nothing for that.
Hence the individual often suffers wrongs which he does not de-
serve, but which are the natural results of causes lying in the past of his
social medium, as when the children atone for the “sins” of their ances-
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ral, for the development of the natural forces of history depends upon
the character and the conditions of its subjects. But the subjects are, as
we have seen, not the individuals, but the social media in which the
individuals are included as results. The course and the events of history
are commensurate with the character and conditions of the social me-
dia; and this we must recognize as historical justice. There is none other
in history or even in nature. Hence the alpha and omega of sociology, its
highest perception and final word, is: human history a natural process;
and even though, shortsighted and captivated by traditional views of
human freedom and self-determination, one should believe that this
knowledge derogates from morals and undermines them yet it is on the
contrary the crown of all human morals because it preaches most im-
pressively man’s renunciatory subordination to the laws of nature which
alone rule history. By contributing to the knowledge of these laws soci-
ology lays the foundation for the morals of reasonable resignation, higher
than those resting on imaginary freedom and self-determination and re-
sulting in the inordinate overestimation of the individual and those un-
reasonable aspirations which find expression in horrible crimes against
the natural law of order.Supplement
Addendum Part I: History of Sociology
Gustave Le Bon
The rise of sociology in our day from anthropology, ethnography, the
study of prehistoric times, and the history of civilization, is easily ex-
plainable. First anthropology treated physical man simply, and the chief
races of mankind. Ethnography constantly added new material from the
living human world and raised the number of varieties almost to infin-
ity. Then prehistoric man was studied in order, from his condition, to
explain the phenomena of historic man. Making the phenomena of pre-
historic civilization the subject of their investigation, scholars passed
unexpectedly from this introduction into the history of civilization as a
whole, treating also the later period of the same subject. But at last it
appeared that all four disciplines were merely descriptive, furnishing
material for a science of man which, if it would be a science, must for
the reasons above laid down be occupied not with the individual, but
with social groups end societies. In this way it becomes sociology. But
the principal difference between these four disciplines and sociology is
that the latter is in no sense descriptive; but, supported upon materiel
from the former, undertakes scientific investigation in order to establish
scientific laws.
While various authors have severally set forth the disciplines named
with more or less significant digressions into neighboring spheres,
Gustave Le Bon, in a noteworthy book, “L’Homme et les Societés,
leurs Origines et leur Histoire,”183 gives the chief features of them all,
together with a thoughtful presentation of sociology (in Part II) based
upon them, so that his work presents to view the entire course of scien-
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ogy.
In the first part Le Bon simply gives short sketches of the sciences
preliminary to sociology. After an “Introduction” upon the changes in
our knowledge and opinions, in which the author shows that he is at
once agonist and positivist in the best sense of the word, he subjects the
“Universe,” in Book I, to a rigid realistic examination. In Book II “The
Origin and Evolution of Living Creatures” is portrayed according to the
theory of Darwin and Haeckel. Book III, entitled “The Physical Evolu-
tion of Man,” gives a description of anthropology and prehistory. It
treats of primitive man, the formation of races and the several prehis-
toric ages according to the usual divisions. Book IV, “The Mental Evo-
lution of Man,” gives a sketch of psychology on a physiological basis.
Upon the broad foundation of such disquisitions upon these broad sci-
ences which have to do with the universal and the individual, Le Bon
constructs his sociology which occupies the second part of his work.
Aside from Book I of Part II, which simply contains a special intro-
duction to sociology (“Sociology and its Limits, Uses and Methods”),
the substance of what he has to say falls into two books: “Factors of
Social Evolution,” Book III, and “The Development of Societies,” Book
IV. However excellent all that Le Bon offers us in these two books,
however willing we are to subscribe to the most of the sociological views
and considerations which he advances, still we must say that in spite of
the broad foundation which he has given to his sociology, there is a very
serious mistake in the superstructure. He has missed the real subjectmatter
of sociology and has not really found a single sociological law although
he set out with that purpose. A detailed examination will confirm our
judgment.
Le Bon first treats “The Factors of Evolution.” What he under-
stands them to be appears from the titles to the several chapters on the
influence of milieu, of intelligence and feelings, of the acquisition of
language, of commercial relations, of the progress of industry, of litera-
ture and art, of the struggle for existence, of the development of military
institutions, of the knowledge of agriculture and the growth of popula-
tion, of stability and variation, of race, of the past and heredity, of illu-
sions and religious ideas, of politics and administration, of education
and instruction. Without doubt these are very important questions touch-
ing the sphere of sociology. But these “influences” are in no sense “fac-
tors of social evolution.” They are all simply “influences” acting on
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social groups themselves, and they are influenced by the physical and
moral agencies surrounding them, which Le Bon, as shown, enumerates
correctly. But it is a mistake to confuse these conditions, these influ-
ences and agencies, with the real factors or subjects. So Le Bon in the
chapter on “Factors of Evolution” really says nothing that he had not
already said in Part I where, speaking of the development of the indi-
vidual, he showed the influence of all these same agents and circum-
stances upon it. Hence the repetitions which the author cannot escape in
spite of his great literary skill and his evident pains to present the same
thing in different lights and to illustrate it by a great variety of examples,
because they follow necessarily from the false plan of his sociology,
false because too limited and scanty. Thus for example, he treats, in
Part I, page 190, of “The Physical Condition of the First Human Be-
ings.” In Part II, Book II, on “The Factors of Social Evolution,” he is
forced to return to the same theme and treats of the “Existence of the
First Human Beings” again in connection with the “Influence of Milieu
upon Social Evolution.” To be sure he strives here in Part II to relate
other details about primitive man; but the subject is the same and what
is said in Part II could have been said pertinently at the appropriate
place in Part I.
Again another illustration: In Part II Le Bon treats the “Past and
Heredity” as a factor of social evolution. But he treated the same thing
in Part I in connection with the “development of instinct” in the indi-
vidual, where he speaks of “habits gradually modified and preserved by
heredity.” In short Le Bon knows no “factors of social evolution” to
present other than the same agents and forces which influence the indi-
vidual.
In the second half he does not fare much better. Here too the con-
tents do not correspond with what the title promises. The latter reads, as
has been mentioned: “Development of Societies;” and what do the sev-
eral chapters offer us instead? First comes “development of language.”
Is language a society? No doubt language has great influence upon the
development of society. But can the development of language for that
reason be regarded as the development of society?
The same is true of the chapters on the development of religion
(chapter iv), morals (chapter v), rights (chapter vi) industry and agri-
culture (chapter vii). The last is an economic phenomenon; the others
are simply psycho-social Their development is conditioned upon that of
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exerts a certain influence upon it. Yet the development of religion, mor-
als, rights, etc., is not the development of societies. So Le Bon has not
offered us here what he wished to offer and what sociology ought to
offer. He undoubtedly came nearer solving the real problem in the two
chapters on the development of the family and of property (chapters ii
and iii). For as we shall see both these institutions are eminently social
and i nmediately connected with social development, rising directly from
it, forming indeed an essential part of it; only he should have presented
them in this connection as we shall demonstrate and insist below. He has
indeed done so in part but not entirely. For though he does not present
each phase in the development of these institutions as the direct result of
the contact and reciprocal effect of unlike social groups, yet he makes a
beginning of seeking the cause of changes in these institutions in such
transformations as alterations in the relations of the social ingredients to
each other. For example he inquires (pt. ii, p. 294) how maternal kinship
passed into paternal kinship? how the father became the head of the
family? and answers the question correctly on the whole. “It seems to
me,” he says, “that it (this transformation) must have come to pass at
the time where man began the pastoral and agricultural life and had
need of slaves to aid him at his work. Instead of killing his prisoners he
kept them to aid him and became the sole proprietor of those he had
conquered, of the women especially.” Here Le Bon’s acumen led him
aright, even though he did not take for his starting point the reciprocal
action of unlike [heterogen] social groups as the only impelling factor
in all social development as we shall. Indeed had he done so too, he
would not only have struck that transformation in the form of the family
correctly, but he would also have had in hand the right key to solve the
not less difficult problem of the changes in property. But as it is he
stands helpless and at a loss before it, for this time the lucky idea did not
occur to him. He knows that “property has not always existed in the
form in which we know it to-day. The idea that soil, air or light could
belong to any one could not have been comprehended by our first ances-
tors and mankind had to run the greater (?) part of its cycle before this
notion could arise.” But in what way, from what impelling causes the
change in property, or better the establishment of private property, took
place Le Bon cannot explain. He is confronted with a conception that
arose in the human brain one fine day, an idea that sprang up suddenly.
“When agriculture had become known and mankind already had an
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idea of personal property appeared. The ground, like the women, be-
longed at first to all the members of a community. Only very slowly did
it become the property, at first temporarily and then permanently, of a
family and then of an individual.” Thus we see that without any attempt
whatever to explain the causes of these changes in property, he here
simply takes refuge in that phrase with which we have become acquainted
that it “arose gradually.” Doubtless everything arose gradually, but how?
in what way? It is the task of sociology to explain.
The fundamental failure in the construction of his sociology of which
we spoke is to blame for his failure to give us the explanation. If he had
comprehended that the first and most important sociological task was to
investigate the mutual relations and reciprocal effects of unlike social
groups, he would himself necessarily have found out that changes in the
family and in property are nothing but the result of these reciprocal
relations and effects. He would have reached another result also which
in the beginning of his undertaking he confessedly strives for but com-
pletely fails of in consequence of the entirely wrong path into which he
struck. We mean the discovery of those “invariable laws knowing no
exceptions,” those “fixed and inexorable laws” (Part I, chapter viii),
which, as he quite correctly assumes, control historical events as well as
the evaporation of a drop of water or the movement of a grails of sand.
We find indeed the recital of events and developments conforming to
law in the psycho-social sphere (language, religion, rights, morals, po-
litical economy and so forth), but of real social laws, of such laws as
control ti e relations and reciprocal connections of social elements, we
find no trace with him.
In view of this it is certainly characteristic of Le Bon that he treats
all the secondary social phenomena, like language, religion, rights, etc.,
at great length; but has not devoted a single chapter of his “social sci-
ence” to the most important and primary social phenomenon, the state.
This is indeed a gross and obvious omission, but it is also merely a
consequence of the entirely mistaken plan of his sociology.
Nevertheless it must be recognized that Le Bon’s sociology is one
of the most valuable achievements of scientific labor in this field. He is
distinguished for thorough knowledge of all pertinent disciplines, com-
prehensive view and above all for a sober unprejudiced mind. His work
unquestionably forms an important landmark in the development of so-
ciology; and we greatly regret that in the foregoing discussions we have
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have afforded us welcome support on many a hazarded point.
Addendum to Part IV: Might And Right
There are several omissions in the “Outlines” before us. For example I
have not treated the psycho-social phenomena of language and religion
because I discussed them at length in my “Rassenkampf,” to which I
must refer the reader, especially as I should like to have the “sociologi-
cal investigations appearing under that title considered preliminary in
part, and in part also supplementary to these “Outlines.” For a similar
reason I have given no space in the statement before us to the special
question concerning the relation of might and right, because in the first
place I treated it at great length in my “Rechtsstaat and Socialismus”
and so would have to repeat here, and moreover the criticisms made on
many sides failed to make me change my views. Further, my position on
the question is sufficiently characterized in the present “Outlines” in the
thorough treatment of the origin and development of rights as also in the
examination of the essence of the state and the social struggle. Never-
theless I should consider it a serious omission if I failed at this point to
consider the criticism made upon my position in this question by a highly
esteemed scholar and juristic philosopher, Professor Merkel, of
Strassburg, who did me the honor to review my book in Schmoller’s
Jahrbuch.184
This review refers me to an article by my honored critic on “Right
and Might” in the preceding number of the same magazine, and I am
probably not mistaken in believing that that article was written after he
knew the contents of my book, “Rechtstaat and Socialismus” and with
reference to it; and that I am justified in considering it an integral cart of
the review.185 In fact Merkel has so divided his critical material as to
enumerate concisely in the short notice in Heft IV his doubts about my
position, but to put the solid reasons for them in the previous article on
“Right and Might.” This appropriate division of the material greatly
facilitates my reply to the objections made.
First of all I notice with satisfaction that Merkel’s position is in fact
not so far from mine as it might seem from his “notice,” for between my
discussions and his “article” I can discover no essential difference. I
shall therefore confine myself to showing that the objections which are
made in the “notice” are considerably weakened if not entirely removed
by the concessions made in the previous article.
The first objection is that I assert an “essential” difference between206/Ludwig Gumplowicz
political and private rights whereby “the differences really existing be-
tween these subdivisions of rights are in part expressed correctly, though
generally with exaggerations;” but that I do not recognize “what they
have in common.”
The objection is correct in so far as the entire plan and economy of
my work aimed at proving the essential difference, tota genera, between
public and private rights; to which end I was in that place only inter-
ested in emphasizing the prevailing differences. I have not denied “what
they have in common” and it would be hard “not to recognize” it after
the whole juridical literature had based the identity of the two “rights”
on it. But it could not fall into the plan of my work to enumerate it for
the hundredth time, because it would be superfluous. However, that the
really essential differences which I asserted exist, in spite of what there
is in common between these two subdivisions of rights, can be proven
from Merkel’s article on “Right and Might” by showing, in particular,
that the statements and assertions concerning rights therein contained
are inexact and incorrect just because the author does not make the
distinction which I demand; but rather formulates his propositions upon
“rights” in general. In consequence it happens that he asserts something
false about the one subdivision every time that he states something true
about the other. Thus, for example, at the very beginning of the article
cited, Merkel says: “Rights in their origin, their stability and their
changes, as witnessed by history, appear to be dependent upon might in
many respects and questions of right not infrequently find their solution
in the guise of decisions by might which combine the effects of the proof
of the better right with the proof of the greater strength. Events of that
sort are difficult to harmonize with the prevalent ideas of right.” What
Merkel says here is only true of public rights, for whenever anywhere
“private rights” are settled by the “decision of might,” we speak not of
“rights” but of caprice and wrong. Public rights alone may be settled in
this way without sacrificing their character.
In view of such an assertion as this, intended to hold of both “sub-
divisions of rights,” but really true of only one shall I withdraw my
proposition that the difference between private and public rights is fun-
damental? I think not. So much the less as I see my honored reviewer, in
consequence of falsely grouping two fundamentally different things un-
der one concept, ensnared in a net of doubts and contradictions from
which he tries very hard to escape without success though in my humble
opinion they disappear upon holding fast to the essential distinction be-The Outlines of Sociology/207
tween public and private rights as I formulated it in “Rechtsstaat and
Socialismus,” possibly with somewhat too much bias but correctly in
the main. Thus, let us hear Merkel’s lament over the impossibility of
reconciling the concept of “rights” with the solution of questions of
right by appeals to might.
“It is hard to bring such events into consonance with the prevailing
ideas of right. Right is here determined by factors which seem foreign
and even contradictory to our ideas of its nature, since according to
them questions of right are not questions concerning the relative power
of the contending parties but rather concerning the truth and merits of
their assertions and the value of their claims before a higher forum.”
What Merkel here says of “rights” applies only to private rights.
For only questions of private rights concern “the truth and merits of the
assertions of the contending parties and the value of their claims before
a higher forum” and not rather “their relative power.”
But questions of public right are different, even though they are
often put in this form. One example among many: Shall the Duke of
Cumberland succeed his uncle in the government of Brunswick? Is that
a question “of the truth and merits of the assertions of the contending
parties and the value of their claims before a higher forum?”
By no means, because it is not a question of private rights; because
it therefore does not depend upon the “truth and merits of the assertions
;” because there is here in fact no “higher forum,” for the German Em-
pire is at once party and judge. Thus it is in fact a question of public
rights, a question which will undoubtedly be determined by factors which
are foreign to the nature of “rights” (political interests); a question un-
doubtedly “of the relative power of the contending parties,” one of whom,
the German Empire, does not need to recognize a higher forum over it,
because within the sphere of its operations it is itself the highest forum.
Whoever insists upon grouping public and private rights together under
one general concept will never escape from doubts and obscurities and
is necessarily forced into the delicate situation of setting himself, for the
sake of “rights,” in opposition to the most vital interests of his folk and
state in questions of public rights. Now I consider this false
doctrinarianism, and perceive the occasion of the error in the incom-
plete distinction between public rights and private rights. Though they
have much in common it is only in form; in principle they are fundamen-
tally different. But Merkel’s whole argument rests on their identity and
he procures the appearance of confirmation for his view only by allud-208/Ludwig Gumplowicz
ing to private rights, which of course do not stand under the criterion of
might, to prove the inadmissibility of that criterion, and then appealing
from the arbitrary vacillation of the decisions of might to the higher idea
of right—which unfortunately avails nothing in questions of public right.
The consistent disregard of this essential difference runs through
the entire article and even leads to absolutely incorrect statements of
fact. When, for example, it is said that “statesmen have always shown
an inclination, seldom unreservedly confessed however, to treat ques-
tions of right as questions of might...,” the statement is incorrect when
referred to private rights. It is correct only when applied to public and
international rights. They would be strange “statesmen” who threw the
weight of their influence and power on the side of private rights. I should
not be able to name a single one, and they would certainly not deserve
the title. But even Merkel is not thinking of such a meddling with private
rights here for he immediately adds as example that these statesmen
“generally stand in the position of the Athenians of old whom Thucydides
makes to say in a dispute with the Medians: ‘As to the Gods we believe
and as to men we know that of necessity every one lords it over whom-
soever he has power....’”
Thus “rights” in the broader sense, including private rights, are not
brought in question here, only public rights Sovereignty (Herrschen)
alone is spoken of, not doing justice or acting the judge. But if, as Merkel
says later on, “theory in the greater number of its advocates affirms the
independence of rights and the essential difference between right and
might,” in the first place theory has been largely and chiefly occupied
with private rights a field in which the state has left it full authority
(juristic rights responsa prudentum, etc.), and if there are isolated cases
in which it has drawn public rights into the scope of its discussion it was
still only theory—and we know what that signifies in relation to public
rights, for whose advocates, the statesmen, no reproach can be more
bitter than “doctrinarianism.”
Thus after all there has never been any contradiction within the
several subdivisions of right; for the statesmen never troubled them-
selves about private rights, and their assertions, like those of the Athe-
nians of Thucydides, applied only to public rights. But the jurists have
always been up to the ears in the latter and still have the most narrow
views of the state, so that their opinions and assertions are serviceable
only for private rights; for public rights they have never given anything
but “theory,” “precious material for the waste-basket.” In fact there isThe Outlines of Sociology/209
no real contradiction because people did not have the same thing in
mind.
Just so I find that there is no real contradiction after all between
what I said in “Rechtsstaat und Socialismus” upon public rights and
what Merkel says in his article on the same subject. Though, where he
speaks of “rights” in general without distinguishing public and private
rights, our assertions appear indeed to contradict but only in so far as
they do not apply to the same thing.
So if Merkel makes the essential distinction between public and
private rights a reproach against me, it would be easy for me to show
that his discussion would have gained much in clearness and verity had
he maintained the same distinction throughout. He would not have been
forced to limit every proposition upon “rights” in general as soon as it
was expressed and to restrict it in respect first of public and then of
private rights.
For example when he says:
“Where this might [of objective right] is appealed to in the struggle
over subjective right, it is presupposed that its activity will issue
from a position lying outside the conflicting claims and interests
and appearing to hold a neutral relation to them....” (p. 5),
the statement holds good of private, but not at all of public rights. For of
the latter he himself concedes that
“the conditions for establishing and extending the sovereignty of
the neutral factor [that ‘neutral position’] are less favorable.... in
public rights....” (p. 16). “That factor [objective right as neutral
might],” he says further on, “finds itself confronted with more
powerful forces in the struggle for sovereignty in the state and for
limiting or extending it while the sources of its own might flow
more sparingly and far greater hindrances are opposed to the de-
velopment of its organs than in the sphere just considered. The
question here is to surround the supporters of sovereign power,
whom right itself furnishes with superior weapons, with barriers
and hinder the misuse of its weapons. To many this appears a self-
contradictory problem, which must therefore simply be abandoned.
Scholars formerly and in quite recent times have thought they could
show that the supreme power in the state could not be surrounded
with barriers because, as they say, there can be but one supreme
power within one and the same sphere.”210/Ludwig Gumplowicz
The last expression seems to imply that Merkel does not share their
view.
Is it really so? We would not venture to affirm it; if there is any
difference between his view and theirs it is certainly not fundamental.
We will show from his article presently that he is not so very far from
those “scholars” and that there is only a slight shade not so much of
opinion as of scientific tendency separating him from their position and
ours.
Merkel is wrong in charging the opposite view with overlooking the
fact
“that the force of the neutral factor itself, rooted in common and
deep-seated convictions and usages, as for example in the form of
traditional constitutional law supported by a feeling of right and a
lively sense of need in all classes, may conceivably be the highest
force within a community.”
Without overlooking this and other considerations enumerated by
him, it is possible to maintain that all these substitutes for the “neutral
factor” will not suffice in a given case of public rights to take the place
of that higher might which stands neutral above party. For even Merkel
himself who overlooks none of these factors speaks of a “remnant which
no progress [in the development of rights] can overpower”—and more
than that I have not asserted; only I located it unequivocally where it
always has and always must appear, that is, in the highest sphere of
public and national rights. But it is plain from more than one statement
in his article that even he, though reluctantly and with evident regret,
makes the unconditional sovereignty of rights cease in that sphere where
we, without circumlocution and with well-founded resignation, substi-
tuted might for it. He freely concedes that
“in the field of international rights, down to the present, the origi-
nal connection between subjective rights and subjective might”
has been retained “in respect not only of the acquisition but also of
the enforcement of the former in its broadest scope.” “In this field,”
it is said again, “in consequence of the weakness and slight devel-
opment of the neutral factor the competition for more favorable
conditions of life still maintains in part its primitive form. Still
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that will be referred to later, among others, in the mutual recogni-
tion of rights between civilized nations. But this is frequently as-
sociated with plain decisions of might made in the most primitive
way and does not prevent the contest for rights from finding its
solution, in the most important cases even, in the form or upon the
basis of elementary decisions by might.”
“Acquisition through power here takes the form of acquisition by
rights in so far as this is affirmed, without the necessity for a di-
rect genealogical line between him who ‘has taken possession’
[playing on Goethe’s words: “Whence did grandpapa get them?
He took them!”] and him who establishes right to possession....
War here proves to be a continual and abundant source of new
rights, the rule for whose creation is not to be sought in some
higher principle but in the result of the test of strength which war
imposes upon the struggling parties.”
Thus there is no disagreement between our position and Merkel’s in
reference to international rights. With reference to national (state) rights,
likewise, he concedes, as stated above, that “the conditions for founding
and developing the sovereignty of the neutral factor are little favor-
able;” and he does not allow himself to be led astray by the favorite
formula of public rights which speaks of “sovereignty in virtue of one’s
own right.”
He says explicitly:
“Whenever sovereignty over another or any right of decision in
public affairs is exercised ‘in virtue of one’s own right.’ We have
to do in truth with the principle of might.”
But thereby he too strikes “rights” from the supreme position in the
state. We expressed the same thought by saying that between public and
private rights there is an essential difference. He objects to the form of
expression but plainly agrees to the fact. For however much he points to
progress in the idea of rights, with which the neutral factor acquires an
ever higher and more dominating position in the state, which we do not
deny, he has to concede at last that “the problem of saving right from its
dependence on might through progressive development will continually
present itself anew as still unsolved in spite of all progress.”186
Will Merkel in spite of. this concession reproach me further be-
cause I grant the possibility of “limiting the state’s power through judi-
cial decisions” only to a very limited degree and certain extent? Does he212/Ludwig Gumplowicz
mean that what I say “still remains a simple assertion?” But if such a
limitation of the state’s power through “constitutions and judicial deci-
sions” were possible, as Merkel asserts in the review, would not the
problem of “saving right from its dependence on might” be solved which,
he says in the article, “will continually present itself as unsolvable in
spite of all progress?”
Merkel should not have referred me to his article; for in it he takes
away the ground from the objections which he makes against me in the
review. Moreover he concedes, even in the review, that “it is true that
the dependence of right upon might appears more palpable, intensive
and direct in the sphere of public rights than in that of private rights;”
only he considers “that no ground for denying the existence and even the
possibility of the existence of real rights in the former sphere.”
Well, that depends entirely upon the view a man has formed of
“rights.” Whoever looks upon right as objective, throned high above the
strife of parties, proclaiming its will in the form of statutory norms,
must deny its existence and even the possibility of its existence where,
even as Merkel concedes, “the problem of saving right from its depen-
dence on might presents itself as unsolved.”
As I hold the view mentioned I must of necessity draw the conclu-
sion that public rights are entirely different from private rights. Who-
ever on the contrary holds fast to the conception of “rights” even when
“dependent on might” may, of course, discard my distinction.
But I think it has been proven in what precedes that there is at
bottom no difference between the actual conception of the matter itself
in Merkel’s mind and in mine, between his conviction as to the real state
of the case and mine, and that, throughout, the difference between us is
not one of cognition but of tendency, in consequence of which Merkel
lays more stress upon the fact that rights must tend to complete “re-
lease” (Erloesung) from might, while in my book, “Rechtstaat and
Socialismus,” stress was laid on the fact that “release” was impossible
and that we must make terms with the dependence of national right on
might.
But whence, I ask myself, considering the similarity in the knowl-
edge and conception of the matter itself, whence comes the difference of
standpoint and emphasis, right in Merkel’s case, might in mine? I do not
think I am wrong in referring it simply to the difference in the political
situations of Germany and Austria in the seventh decade of the present
century—for finally every political writer unavoidably reflects the po-The Outlines of Sociology/213
litical situation surrounding him however objectively he wishes and pro-
poses to proceed.
No German of the seventh and eighth decades of this century has
had need to be anxious about might under the regime of the Iron Chan-
cellor. On the other hand he has no doubt had some apprehension about
“rights.” What is more natural than that both teachers of public law and
philosophers in Germany have emphasized the preeminence of right over
might and postulated the independence of the former from the latter.
Not so in Austria. We did not need to worry over “rights.” They
throve like an obtrusive weed in every path even where the direction
“reserved for might” was to have been expected. At the helm sat a party
calling itself the constitutionalist and fancying that the entire state could
be subjected to the regime of right. In particular it expected to be able to
attain this object by holding ready the universal remedy, a special tribu-
nal constituted ad hoc for every possible political crime. It was content
with this—for indeed the “eye of the law” in the form of a court of
justice watched over the state. Recently this party has even proposed to
submit certain actions of parliament, e.g., those relating to election cases,
to the jurisdiction of a particular court of justice created ad hoc.
This effort, which is certainly well meant, proceeds from the erro-
neous assumption, is controlled by the delusion we would like to say,
that an ordinary mortal at once becomes an angel or at least an infallible
pope upon sticking a judge’s commission in his pocket. It needs but little
experience, however, to learn that every judge above all else is and re-
mains a man, and in spite of all the conscious objectivity which he in-
dustriously cultivates (and even that not always) is quite as much the
slave of blind impulses, prejudices and efforts which have their source
in his social, political, religious and national position as every other
mortal and certainly not less than every representative of the people.
It must not be ignored that at some point in the state right must
cease and might begin. The creation of a court for constitutional cases
would only transfer the point from the representative body to the court.
Would this be better?
The constitutionalists, so-called, who ought really to be called the
“national rights” party (Rechtsstaatliche), because from the first they
have labored under the delusion that the whole state could be repre-
sented in a juristic formula, have deeply atoned for their error. The power
suddenly fell from their hands for mere right’s sake; and nothing else
could have happened, for the state belongs to might and not to right214/Ludwig Gumplowicz
although it creates and forms the latter, develops and promotes it. This
latter thought I have discussed in “Rechtsstaat und Socialismus.”
It is possible that this witches’ Sabbath of “national rights,” which
raged in Austria in the same decade that Germany got a taste of the
“might before right” theory of the Iron Chancellor, has a share in the
Austrian’s somewhat different standpoint in the question of might and
right. The German reacts perhaps unconsciously against the all too pow-
erful interposition of might. The Austrian, because right has been so
emphasized, may have become a little anxious for national might. I can
see no other difference between Merkel’s standpoint and mine.Notes
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in the Earth’s Surface by Reference to Causes now in Operation.”]
78. “Philosophisches Staatsrecht,” sec. 12; “Rechtsstaat und
Socialismus,” sec. 15–22, 28.
79. “Principles of Social Science,” Philadelphia, 1857–67, 3 vols. Cf.
Stoepel’s introduction to the German translation of Carey’s “Unity
of Law,” Berlin, 1878.
80. Cf. “Rechtsstaat und Socialismus,” bk. ii.
81. “Naturgeschichte des Rechts,” 1867; “Naturwissenschaft des
Rechts,” 1872. Cf. “Philosophisches Staatsrecht,” p 168 et seq.
82. “Geschlechtsgenossenschaft der Urzeit,” 1875. “Ursprung des
Rechts,” 1876; “Anfang des Staats- und Rechtslebens,” 1878;
“Bausteine fuer eine Allgemeine Rechtswissenschaft,” 1880–81; “Die
Grundlage des Rechts und die Grundzuege seiner
Entwickelungsgeschichte,” 1884.
83. “Ursprung des Rechts,” p. 7.
84. [Geschlechtsgenossenschenschaft = kith and kin confederation.]
85. “Unsprung des Rechts,” p. 11.
86. “Grundlagen und Grundzuege,” p. 16.
87. Ibid., p 75.
88. Ibid., p.76.
89. Ibid., p. 83.
90. Ibid., p. 87.
91. This sentence Knight also he cited “Nevertheless, as the tribal state
gradually develops, do differences of rank also appear.” Ibid., p. 102.
If everything developed gradually without our needing to know why
arid how, we should be done with sociology at once.
92. [For a sketch of the sociological writings of Gustave le Bon, see
Appendix A.]
93. To cite one example among thousands, Ruemelin in his essay on
the “Laws of History” (“Reden und Aufsaete,” neue Folge, p.118)
speaks of the “phenomena of inanimate nature, of the organic and of
the psychic world.” We shall recur to this essay later in another con-The Outlines of Sociology/221
nection.
94. “Ueber sociale Gesetze” in the Tuebinger Zeitschrift für die
gesammten Staatswissenschaften, 1868, pp. 134, 118.
95. “Philosophisches Staatsrecht,” Vienna, 1887, sec. 1. “Rechtsstaat
und Socialismus.” Innsbruck, 1881. Part i, sec. 1.
96. Mill, “System of Logic,” Bk. iii, cap, iv.
97. ”Ueber den Begriff eines socialen Gesetses.” Tuebinger Zeitschrift,
1868.
98. Cf. “Der Rassenkampf,” pp. 172 et seq.
99. “According to the psychological axioms of ethnology, when cases
exhibiting similarities occur, the strictly universal and elementary
laws are first applied. When there is no further possibility of finding
the explanation in them resource is had to such historic relationships
as can be established. But the daily swelling mass of ethnological
parallels will soon have converted the most obdurate. For since such
an interpretationof parallels has come to be reckoned a priori reli-
able no one can fail to accept it who is not stone blind.”—Bastian,
“Vorgeschichte den Ethnologie,” p. 91.
100. Cf. “Der Rassenkampf,” p. 56 et seq.
101. [Und ein solcher [zureichender Grund] liegt immer in der
Enwirkung seitens einer anderen Gruppe, i.e., the influence of an-
other group is the only sufficient social cause.]
102. [Nun, Fuerst Bismark hat diesen... Individualisirungstrieb
gruendlich ausgetrieben (sic) und geht ihm noch immer gewaltig an
den Leib.]
103. “The History of Greece.” Translated by Ward. Bk. i, p, 15; Cf.
“Griechische Geschichte.” 6th Edition, Vol. i, p. 123.
104. Curtius-Ward, op. cit., p. 59; Cf. Curtius, op. cit., vol. i, p. 44.
105. Curtius-Ward, op. cit., Bk. i, p. 208; Curtius, op. cit., Vol. i, p, 44.
106. I may certainly be allowed to cite as typical of the opinion of histo-
rians in general the objections made to “history as a natural science”
by the distinguished R. van Krones, in reviewing “Der Rassenkampf.”
The prevalent conception of the task of historical composition could
not be defended more forcibly than it is done in the words quoted.
107. [Individuelle Motive und Beschaffenheiten.]
108. It gives me great satisfaction to observe that the reviewers have
recognized the great importance of my starting point and have de-
clared it at all events worthy of note. Alfred Henigsberg writes in the
Neue Freie Presse, Vienna August 9, 1869: “His hypothesis that222/Ludwig Gumplowicz
mankind is descended from many pairs is the egg of Columbus. It
explains almost every historical event in the simplest and most un-
constrained way, especially that primitive phenomenon, the conquest
of a weaker tribe by a stronger, and the organization of society with
division of labor. It suggests what Stephenson, the father of railroads,
said upon inspecting a good locomotive: ‘how hard it must have been
to hit upon it, it is so simple!’” The reviewer for the Rassegna Critica,
Naples, 1883, No. 9, says: “ There are two points in this book which
especially deserve praise.... to wit the unqualified assertion of natu-
ralism and the fact that, contrary to custom, neither the individual
nor the psychology of the individual, but the social group, is made
the element in the interpretation of history.” Similar notices of ap-
proval appeared in Globus, 1884, No. 4; Ausland, 1884, No 2, Jour-
nal des Economistes, October, 1883; Rihot’s Revue Philosophique
May 1884, and in many other critical periodicals. These critics have
caught the idea of my book and it cannot be no fault that Professor
Alfred Kirchhoff, in Zarucke’s Literarisches Centralblatt. Leipzig,
complains that he does not understand what I mean. However, Pro-
fessor Kirchhoff is a geographer appears never to have meddled with
sociology, arid. is conversant with neither the literature of the subject
nor the questions here under discussion. Judging front the fact that he
notices the book under the rubric “ethnology,” he considers sociol-
ogy a geographical discipline.
109. The concept of force,” says Caspari correctly, “presupposes rela-
tions to another foreign opposing force which is called resistance.
Force apart from resistance of every sort were a forceless force un-
thinkable nothing. Whoever speaks of force must at the same time
conceive of mechanical resistance or he contradicts himself. Hence
every philosophical investigator who had been educated in natural
science and had studied mechanics understood that we must continu-
ally suppose an original plurality of discrete force-media force-cen-
tres, or force-atoms (Democritus), monads (Leibnitz), reals (Herbart),
dynamides (Redterbacher), etc.”—“Kosmos, Vol. i, p. 9.
110. It may be added that among the earlier natural scientists the fol-
lowing accepted polygenism: Cuvier, Buffon, Lacépède and Burdach.
The philosopher Whewell in “Traces of Divinity” holds the Negroes
to be a distinct race of different extraction from the other races of
need. Bory and Vierey also accepted polygenism and Perty says: “The
far greater probability is that men of diverse natural capacities hateThe Outlines of Sociology/223
arisen in different parts of the earth and at various times all fiery
remote from ours.”—“Ethnographie,” p. 386 (1859).
111. “Lectures on Man: His Place in Creation and in the History of the
Earth.” By Dr. Carl Vogt. Edited be James Hunt. London: 1864. Lec-
ture viii p. 222 “Vorlesungen ueber den Menschen, seine Stellung in
der Schoepfung und in der Geschichte der Erde.” By Carl Vogt. 2
vols., Giessen: 1863. Vol. i, p. 284.
112. “Lectures on Man,” Lec. 15, pp. 423–26.
113. Ibid., Lec. 15, pp. 435–36.
114. “Beitraege our physischen Anthropologie der Deutschen.’‘ 1877.
115. Virchow, “Weddes und Alttrojanische Schaedel und Graeber.”
116. To social science it is a matter of indifference that craniologists
like Kollmann compromise with the alleged Darwinian doctrine of
unitary descent by granting that a period of dispersion and of differ-
entiation from a “common stock” may have “occurred in pre-glacial
times.” It is enough for social science to start with the facts of the
post-diluvial period. It gladly leaves the pre-glacial hypothesis to the
defenders of an alleged Darwinian standpoint—to save the “common
stock.”
117. Cf. articles by Kollmann on “American Autochthons,” Zeitschrift
für Anthropologie, 1883, “Statistics on the Color of Eyes and Hair,
taken in the Swiss, Schools,” 1881; “Craniological Material from
Swiss Burial-places.” 1883; “The Value of Pithecoidal Forms and
the Effect of Correlation on the Face of the Human Skull,” 1883.
118. “Craniologische Untersuchungen der Neger und Negervoelker.”
119. “Craniologische Graeberfunde in der Schweiz,” 1883.
120. It has already been stated that Bastian considers such a justifica-
tion superfluous since polygenism is “self-evident.” But the fact that
Alfred Kirchhoff a professor of geography who calls himself a “wicked
Darwinian,” writing in the Literarisches Centralblatt, declares this
theory irreconcilable with Darwinism proves that the correct concep-
tion of Darwin’s theory has not been so widely diffused as could be
wished. Hence the above explanation seems to me still necessary.
121. De Tocqueville was impressed by the thought that peoples, how-
ever distant and unrelated, must develop according to some law. “When
I perceive the resemblance,” he says, “Which exists between the po-
litical institutions of our ancestors, the Teutons, and the wandering
tribes of North America,—between the customs described by Tacitus,
and those of which I have sometimes been the witness,—I cannot224/Ludwig Gumplowicz
help thinking that the same cause has brought abort the same results
in both hemispheres and that, in the midst of the apparent diversity of
human affairs, certain primary facts may be discovered. from which
all the others are derived.”—“Democracy in America,” translated by
Henry Reeve, edited by Francis Bowen, Cambridge. 1862. Cap. xviii,
pp. 441–42.—The ethnographical horizon has been much extended
since, and de Tocqueville’s conjecture is confirmed Sociology may
attempt to distinguish the faits générateurs the “primary facts.” “eth-
nology has irrefutably proven,” say Achelis, “Ethnologie und
Geschichfte’—Ausland, No. 4, 1881, “that certain phenomena of
associative life are perfectly similar among peoples who are entirely
unlike and who have never been related in any demonstrable way
whatever. Hence . . . the nature of the hunted race (species) is mani-
festly one and universal in spite of all differences.”
122. Comte-Martineau, op. cit., Vol. ii, p. 195. Comte, op. cit., Vol. v, p
220, Comte Rig., op. cit., Vol. ii, p. 230.
123. “A Treatise on Man and the Development of His Faculties.”
Edinburgh, 1842, p. 5.
124. Ibid.
125. Spencer, “Study of Sociology.” International Science Series, caps
ii–iii.
126. “First Principles,” secs. 94, 97.
127. “The Principles of Sociology,” Vol. i, sec. II.
128. [Lebanfuersorge.—“Solicitude for the means of subsistence.”]
129. Bastian, “Der Voelkergedanke” passim, especially the conclusion.
130. Ibid. p. 178.
131. Darwin gives the following graphic picture, from personal obser-
vation, of a horde politically unorganized: “The astonishment which
I felt, as I first saw a troop of Terra-del-Fuegians on a wild and
rugged coast. I shall never forget; for the thought flashed through my
mind at once: Thus were our forefathers. These men were absolutely
naked of clothing and covered only with paint. Their long hair was
twisted together their mouths bedriveled from excitement, and their
expression wild, amazed and suspicious. They possessed scarcely
any skill at all, and lived like wild beasts on whatever they could
catch. They had no government and had no mercy toward those not
of their own race.”—“Descent of Man,” Vol. II, p. 356. Cf.
“Rassenkampf,” p. 195 et seq.
132. “Kinship in Old Greece.”The Outlines of Sociology/225
133. For historical cases see Post “Geschlechts-Genossenschaft der
Urzeit,” pp. 16 et seq., where the earlier literature on this subject is
cited.
134. Post op. cit., p. 54 et seq. Dargun, “Mutterrecht and Raubehe” p.
78 et seq.
135. Some idea of the behavior of primitive stocks can be gotten from
the modern Bedouins who, however, have made considerable progress.
A recent French traveler writes: “To fall upon caravans of strangers,
to drive off flocks, capture goods, kill and massacre the defenders,
especially if they are inhabitants of cities. such are the virtues which
he rates highest. All these ignoble heroes of Bedouin legend we would
send to the galleys as highway robbers.” Gabriel Charms, “Voyage
en Syrie,”  Revue des deux Mondes, August 15, 1881.
136. “Der Rassenkampf,” p. 231.
137. “Rechtsstaat und Socialismus,” p. 344.
138. “Man does not have property in immovable things upon this
stage.”—Lippert, “Priesterthum” vol. i, p. 35.
139. Von Rotenburg, “Ueber den Begriff des Staates.”
140. Bluntschli, “The Theory of the State.” (Clarendon Press) bk. i,
cap. i, p. 23.
141. Knies, “Statistik als Wissenschaft,” 1850, p, 90.
142. Schulze, “Einleiung in das Deutsche Staatsrecht,” 1865, p. 116,
sec. 25.
143. Elsewhere in his book Schulze gives almost the same definition. In
section 41 he says that “it is observable that in all actual states men
are subject to a sovereign power and that, as members of the body
politic, they are even held by physical compulsion to certain lines of
activity.” And in section 49: “The presence of a supreme controlling
power is essential to the notion of a state.” Van Ihering, in “Zweck im
Recht,” Vol. I, p. 130, defines the state to be “society as possessor of
an orderly and disciplined power of compulsion.” But he tries to de-
fine the “state” by the less clear term “society” and, besides, adopts
the untenable French view of “popular sovereignty.” Continuing the
argument, he again defines the state as an “organized social compul-
sion.” Properly understood this is nearly correct. But we had already
(“Philosophisches Staatsrecht,” 1976) defined the state to be “the
organized sovereignty of some over the others;” and as “sovereignty”
is more specific than “compulsion,” our definition is the clearer of
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144. [Playing on the words attributed to Galileo while under ecclesias-
tical sentence for his astronomical views.—E pur si muove.]
145. “Principles of Sociology.” Vol. i, secs. 257 260, 456; cf. secs. 448,
451.
146. The naval captain, Pantero Pantera, said of labor in the galleys in
“L’Armata Navale,” 1614 “High wages will supply a galley with
soldiers and sailors, but freemen cannot be persuaded to submit to
service at the oars, to be fastened to the chain and to take without
possibility of resistance the bastinading and other infliction incident
to labor in the galleys.” Yet, if the galley was to move with precision,
the rowing must be controlled by chain, bastinado and all. Therefore
he advised that convicted criminals be sentenced to this slave’s work.
Such was labor in the galleys even so late as the seventeenth century.
“La Fin d’une grande Marine,” by Jensen de la Gravière, “Revue
des Deux Mondes,” November 1, 1884.
147. In addition see “Organized Sovereignty and Civilization.” “Der
Rassenkampf”
148. “The real motive force is the actual need. The only reason for
formulating it in fixed law is to give it recognized legal basis,” says
Bruns on the Development of the Roman Law, in Holtzendorff’s
“Encyclopædia,” p. 91.
149. [Add “as warrior.”] See Spencer, “Principles of sociology,” Vol. ii,
sec. 471 and sec. 466.
150. Spencer, “Principles of Sociology.” Vol. i, sec. 228; Vol. ii, sec.
456.
151. See “Der Rassenkampf,” p. 40.
152. Tacitus also understood that civilization is promoted by trade, and
it is clear that he meant trade with foreigners. Thomas Aquinas speaks
of the merchant, as strangers in the state. He considered it desirable
that the citizens should refrain from mercantile pursuits leaving them
to “foreigners” lest “by the practice of trade“ they “grow covetous.“
Thomas d’Aquin. “Opusculac Venitiis.’‘ 1587, p. 298. (“De Regemine
Principum.”).
153. For historical evidence that the European merchant class began in
this way see “Der Rassenkampf,” p. 332.
154. “Das Philosophische Staatsrecht” sec. 23.
155. “Gegen die Freihertsstraffen,” by Mittelstaedt.
156. For the process of assimilation, see “Der Rassenkampf,” p. 253.
157. “Der Rassenkrampf,” p. 137 et seq.The Outlines of Sociology/227
158. “Cf. Lippert’s “Geschichte des Priesterthums.”
159. We are able to comprehend the secondary or evolutionary origin
while that which is original in the realm of organic nature is incom-
prehensible to our faculties. Accordingly we are always inclined to
prefer the former process; as Darwin and Haeckel do in the domain
of organic and the sociologists in the domain of social phenomena.
But it does not follow that because this is the only we can explain
there is no other.
160. von Ihering, “Zweck in Recht,” Vol. i, p. 95.
161. Spencer, “Principles of Sociology,” Vol. i, sec. 212.
162. Schaeffle, “Bau und Leben,” Vol. i, p. 292, 3ter Hauptabschnitt,
2te Abtheilung, I “Die formlosen Zusammenhaenge odor
Bindegewebe.”
163. Philosophisches Staatsrecht,” sec. 12; “Rechtsstaat und
Socialismus,” pp. 158 et seq.
164. Spencer too has recognized the necessity of this point of departure
in sociological studies, for he says that: “Social evolution begins with
the small simple aggregates.” “Principles of Sociology,” Vol. i, see
257.
165. For the distinction between “natural” and “artificial” social insti-
tutions, see “Rechtsstaat und Socialismus,” p. 329.
166. “Das Philosophische Staatsrecht.”
167. See below. Part i, sec. ix, “Individual Efforts and Social Neces-
sity.”
168. To illustrate the whole range from the most primitive to the most
modern manifestations this tendency I compared (“Der Rassenkampf,”
p. 166) the Apaches and the Kirghese, who are content to capture a
few horses or asses or a herd of cattle, with the modern “European
victor” who knows how straightway to force the payment of several
milliards. This passage offended some of my honored German re-
viewers though it is plain that no exception could be taken save on
the supposition that Bismarck was referred to. But he is neither the
first nor the only “European victor” who has won his milliards. But if
he were the only one still the insinuation is unjustifiable considering
my contention that historical events are subject to natural laws and
independent of individuals. But they should not have applied to the
German war, of which I said nothing, what should be applied to false
idealism which I have always attacked. I confess that in politics I
fully accept the realistic standpoint of Prince Bismarck. He has never228/Ludwig Gumplowicz
spoken of the great indemnity with false pathos, and in his report to
Herr von Manteuffel, from Frankfort in July, 1853, he said: “The
other German states have the same interests that we have, to be left in
peace where there is nothing to be gained,” and weighing the chance
of war he added: “If we can profit by it then the case is different.” If
those who to-day write upon politics would study the works of Prince
Bismarek there would be much less pathos fewer Chauvinistic phrases
and fewer political quarrels.
169. For an explanation of this process, see “Der Rassenkampf,” pp. 23
et seq. and 253 et seq.
170. Marx was quite right when he said “The real insignificance of the
individual is in strong contrast faith the importance conceded to him
in scientific speculations. His insignificance is apparent; not only in
political affairs but in economic.”—“Capital” pp. 235, 236.
171. “To think is to be conscious of the growth of psychological activ-
ity...” Bastian, “Ethnologie,” xii.
172. Cf.  “Philosophisches Staatsrecht,” secs. 4 and 21; “Rechtsstaat
and Socialismus,” I, sec. 4 et seq.
173. See Part IV, sec. I above.
174. “Philosophisches Staatsrecht,” sec. 21–23;” “Rechtsstaat und
Socialismus,” sec. 33 et seq
175. Engels, in his “Unsprung der Families des Privateigenthums and
des Staates.” and Marx too, has in mind such a return to the “gentile
constitution.” It takes a large amount of naivete to conceive of the
return of forms of social existence long since surmounted. It is as
though an old man would become a youth again.
176. “Let us complete the investigation which we undertook in the be-
lief that, if we first endeavored to contemplate justice in some larger
object which contains it, we should find it easier to discern its nature
in the individual man.” Plato, “Republic,” Bk. iv, I. 434, Jowett’s
Translation.
This greater object was wisely chosen. Only by starting from the
state was it possible to arrive at a conception of justice.
177. See “Rassenkampf,” p. 6 et seq.
178. Cf. Part IV, sec. 2
179. “Rassenkampf,” p. 23 et seq.
180. On the other hand Maurice Block, in the “Journal des Economistes”
was inclined to accept the complete negation of progress (though I do
not go so far) if I had made a reservation in respect of science and itsThe Outlines of Sociology/229
technical application. The passage is so remarkable that I quote it.
“One of the author’s views,” says M Block in concluding his discus-
sion of the “Rassenkampf;” “will meet with many objections; is the
negation of progress. Things change apparently but not in reality.
The vesture changes, so to speak, but not the body nor the spirit, and
yet there is some truth in the proposition and if the author had taken
the oratorical precaution to except science and its industrial applica-
tions I should have been persuaded that he was right, for I have asked
myself more than once whether it could be proven that there were in
Memphis, Babylon and Nineveh less good men in proportion to the
whole population than in Paris, London or Berlin.” I readily assent to
the reservation in favor of science and art which M. Block requests,
only however with the counter reservation set forth in the text above
respecting the uninterrupted development of human civilization. Who
will guarantee that its thread, and even the thread of mental develop-
ment will not be completely sundered from time to time so that for
later generations trying to rise again nothing will remain of all the
former achievements? What profit did the entire European Middle
Ages draw from the astronomical knowledge of the Chaldeans and
old Egyptians, thorough as it doubtless was? Was not the thread com-
pletely sundered? and if we compare the grotesque sculpture of Chris-
tian Europe in the Middle Ages with the works of Greek art must we
not confirm the fact that the stream of development of human civili-
zation from time to time disappears in the earth without trace only to
reappear after a long while in some far distant place, working its way
laboriously up through rifts and fissures? Or is the opinion justified
perhaps that such catastrophes, suddenly destroying results of civili-
zation hundreds of years old and causing them to disappear utterly
were only possible in “earlier times” but that we, armed with the
printing press and the steam engine are entirely free from them and
that our mental labor will not perish? We would gladly share this
opinion if only the authorities will set us at rest upon one point, the
cosmic stability of our planet. For to judge from some very recent
indications the forces seething under our feet in the interior of our
planet seem to have very tattle respect for our mental and our artistic
productions and to care as little for laws of the development of hu-
man civilization. Indeed human civilization is threatened by two dis-
tinct anarchistic forces social and cosmic. The former we may indeed
resist—may gracious destiny long preserve us from the latter. Then230/Ludwig Gumplowicz
would we be assured of endless progress in science, art and technics.
181. See above, Part II, sec. 4.
182. Quetelet. vol. ii, p. 393. “Newton deprived of all the resources of
science would still have had the same intellectual strength and would
still have been the type of many eminent qualities, in particular cor-
rectness of judgment and imagination if only a part or science, greater
or less, had been put within his reach he would have been a Pythagoras,
an Archimedes or a Kepler but with all the resources which his cen-
tury presented to him he was, and he had to be, a Newton,”
183. Paris, 1881.
184. 1881, Heft iv, p, 301.
185. “Rechtsstaat und Socialismus” appeared in the summer of 1880
and shortly after a copy was sent to Schmoller’s Jahrbuch for re-
view. A year later, in the summer at 1881, appeared a double number
(2 and 3) of the Jarhbuch with Merkel’s article on “Right and Might”
at the head. At the same time my book was mentioned among the
“books received” with the remark that the “next number would con-
tain a notice of it from the pen of Professor Merkel.” Thus, plainly,
he had knowledge of the contents of my book at that time. Besides I
think that I find in the article unambiguous allusions to it: e.g., p. 16,
where it reads “Scholars of former and of quite recent times have
thought that they could prove that the sovereign power in the state
could not be surrounded with effectual barriers and restraints,” etc.;
and again p 18: “The arguments just recently urged with especial
emphasis against the possibility of such progress (in the sphere of
international law),” and so forth. The attempts and the arguments
mentioned are n fact contained In “Rechtsstaat und Socialismus”
which Professor Merkel should have had in hand some time before
this number appeared.
186. P. 20.